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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Cycling Independent Reform Commission (“Commission” or “CIRC”) was established 
by the Union Cycliste Internationale (“UCI”) “to conduct a wide ranging independent 
investigation into the causes of the pattern of doping that developed within cycling and 
allegations which implicate the UCI and other governing bodies and officials over ineffective 
investigation of such doping practices.” (Terms of Reference, paragraph 3). This Executive 
Summary sets out the CIRC’s key findings on the serious allegations of corruption made 
against UCI and its officials, allegations that it failed to apply and enforce its own anti-
doping rules, and CIRC’s conclusions following an assessment of UCI’s governance 
structures and anti-doping policies. The summary then addresses the state of doping in 
cycling today, and the main factors that led to a doping culture, before listing some of the 
key recommendations.  
 
UNION CYCLISTE INTERNATIONALE (UCI) 
 
ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING IRREGULARITIES BY UCI IN RELATION TO DOPING 
The CIRC has considered a number of allegations made against UCI; these include 
allegations that, if true, could potentially amount to corruption, as well as failures to apply 
or enforce its own anti-doping rules. 
  
Uncorroborated allegations of corruption 
The Commission specifically considered two allegations in respect of payments by Lance 
Armstrong to UCI; however the Commission found no evidence to support the allegations: 
1. Despite allegations that Lance Armstrong tested positive during the June 2001 Tour de 
Suisse and paid UCI to cover up it up, reports from the laboratory show that he did not 
test positive during the Tour de Suisse (although three of his five samples came back as 
suspicious for EPO). A donation of $25,000 was made by Lance Armstrong to UCI for the 
fight against doping, but it was not paid until May 2002 and there is no evidence that the 
two were linked.  
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2. It was also alleged that Lance Armstrong paid money to help finance the Vrijman report, 
which had been commissioned by UCI to investigate accusations by L’Équipe in August 
2005 that Lance Armstrong tested positive for EPO during the 1999 Tour de France.  Six 
months earlier, in January 2005, Lance Armstrong had proposed to contribute USD 
100,000 to UCI’s anti-doping programme and in July, a Sysmex machine was bought by 
UCI, which was finally paid for by Lance Armstrong in January 2007.  There is no evidence 
to link the donation by Lance Armstrong and the Vrijman report, and the timing indicates 
that the two were not related.   
 
Failure to apply or enforce its own rules 
One area where UCI consistently failed in the past to apply its own anti-doping rules 
properly was Therapeutic Use Exemptions.  Two clear examples of this were the cases of 
Laurent Brochard (1997) and Lance Armstrong (1999), when both riders were permitted 
to provide backdated prescriptions to avoid sanction.  
 
Another example of UCI failing to apply its own rules was the decision to allow Lance 
Armstrong to compete in the Tour Down Under in 2009, despite the fact that he had not 
been in the UCI testing pool for the prescribed period of time. Whilst there is no direct 
evidence of an agreement between Pat McQuaid and Lance Armstrong, information in the 
Commission’s possession shows that: (i) Pat McQuaid made a sudden U-turn and allowed 
Lance Armstrong to return 13 days early to participate in the Tour Down Under, despite 
advice from UCI staff not to make an exception, and (ii) there was a temporal link between 
this decision, which was communicated to UCI staff in the morning, and the decision of 
Lance Armstrong, which was notified to Pat McQuaid later that same day, to participate 
in the Tour of Ireland, an event run by people known to Pat McQuaid.   
 
Preferential treatment for Lance Armstrong 
UCI saw Lance Armstrong as the perfect choice to lead the sport’s renaissance after the 
Festina scandal: the fact that he was American opened up a new continent for the sport, 
he had beaten cancer and the media quickly made him a global star. Numerous examples 
have been identified showing that UCI leadership “defended” or “protected” Lance 
Armstrong and took decisions because they were favourable to him. This was in 
circumstances where there was strong reason to suspect him of doping, which should 
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have led UCI to be more circumspect in its dealings with him. UCI exempted Lance 
Armstrong from rules (see above), failed to target test him despite the suspicions, and 
publicly supported him against allegations of doping, even as late as 2012 when UCI 
threatened to challenge USADA’s jurisdiction. In addition, requesting and accepting 
donations from Lance Armstrong, given the suspicions, left UCI open to criticism.  
 
In respect of the Vrijman report (see above), UCI purposely limited the scope of the 
independent investigator’s mandate to procedural issues contrary to what they told 
stakeholders and the public and against Emile Vrijman’s own suggestion. UCI, together 
with the Armstrong team, became directly and heavily involved in the drafting of the 
Vrijman report, the purpose of which was only partly to expedite the publication of the 
report. The main goal was to ensure that the report reflected UCI’s and Lance Armstrong’s 
personal conclusions. The significant participation of UCI and Armstrong’s team was 
never publicly acknowledged. In the CIRC’s view, based on an assessment of documents 
in its possession, UCI had no intention of pursuing an independent report; UCI’s approach 
prioritised the fight against WADA and the protection of its star athlete.  
 
UCI GOVERNANCE 
From the late 1980s, UCI grew rapidly as an institution. It vested extensive powers in the 
office of president, which created an entity run in an autocratic manner without 
appropriate checks and balances.  Internal management bodies appear to have been 
devoid of any real influence and the governance structure was such that if the president 
wanted to take a particular direction, he was able to do so almost unchallenged. This style 
of management was (and sometimes still is) not uncommon in sports governing bodies, 
although this does not justify either the governance structure or the decisions that were 
taken.   
 
Lack of transparency  
One of the clearest examples of the absence of good governance within UCI is the previous 
presidential elections. In 2005, Pat McQuaid, unlike other candidates, received 
considerable benefits and other support from UCI and Hein Verbruggen.  These actions 
were strongly criticised by a UCI Management Committee member, but management 
rejected her claims and took action to quash the allegations. In the 2013 elections, Pat 
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McQuaid sought to rely on a nomination by the Moroccan and Thai Federations (the Swiss 
having withdrawn their support and the Irish having refused to nominate him), despite 
the rules providing that a candidate’s own federation should nominate him.  There are 
also unproven allegations regarding the 2013 election: a Management Committee 
member accused Pat McQuaid of corruption in a confidential report (parts of which were 
leaked to the press) and the same Management Committee member was himself accused 
of having given money to a National Federation to finance Brian Cookson’s election. These 
incidents highlight both the serious problems with UCI’s governance and the deficiencies 
in its democratic process. 
 
The CIRC also identified a lack of transparency and oversight in respect of financial 
matters, including in respect of expenses and approvals for some costly projects. 
 
Impact on anti-doping 
For a long time, the main focus of UCI leadership was on the growth of the sport 
worldwide and its priority was to protect the sport’s reputation; doping was perceived 
as a threat to this. The allegations and review of UCI’s anti-doping programme reveal that 
decisions taken by UCI leadership in the past have undermined anti-doping efforts: 
examples range from adopting an attitude that prioritised a clean image and sought to 
contain the doping problem, to disregarding the rules and giving preferential status to 
high profile athletes, to publicly criticising whistleblowers and engaging in personal 
disputes with other stakeholders. These actions severely undermined the credibility of 
UCI and therefore the reputation of the sport. However, the CIRC is not suggesting that 
UCI leadership knowingly or deliberately allowed doping and high-profile dopers to 
continue within the sport knowing or suspecting them to still be doping, but rather that 
a lack of proper institutional checks and balances within UCI, meant that these matters 
were not subjected to the rigorous scrutiny and application of the rules and best practice 
that they should have been. 
 
ANALYSIS OF UCI’S ANTI-DOPING POLICY 
1992—2006  
The doping problem was well known to the UCI leadership and it was clear to everyone 
that doping was endemic in cycling. Hein Verbruggen had acknowledged this, in principle, 
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in his campaign manifesto when running for president of UCI in 1991. After his election, 
UCI employed a strategy of diverting public opinion from the fact that UCI was 
responsible for the doping issue in cycling. Doping was portrayed by UCI leadership as 
the faulty (and surprising) behaviour of a few individuals, but not as endemic group 
behaviour or as a structural problem within its sport.  
 
Not only did UCI leadership publicly disregard the magnitude of the problem, but the 
policies put in place to combat doping were inadequate. Credit should be given to the UCI 
insofar as it was at the forefront of anti-doping in introducing new testing techniques. 
However, the science is only one part of anti-doping strategy. To have an effective anti-
doping strategy, it is essential to get the right sample from the right rider at the right time 
and to the right laboratory. In the CIRC’s view, there was not enough willingness to put 
such a system in place. The approach to doping was one of containment, with a focus on 
protecting health. Looking at the tools available to UCI to combat doping, there was no 
satisfactory commitment to push the fight against doping beyond the limits of health 
protection. Anti-doping policy was for the most part based on a predictable and 
quantitative approach. Going after the cheaters was perceived as a witch-hunt that would 
be detrimental to the image of cycling. 
 
Since UCI’s anti-doping strategy was directed against the abuse of doping substances 
rather than the use of them, only the visible tip of the iceberg was tackled. Deterrence 
was not an integral part of the strategy. Instead, the CIRC considers that the policies of 
announcing sample collections, notifying riders and leaving them unattended, gave riders 
the opportunity to adapt and to evade testing positive through medical supervision, 
whilst at the same time giving the impression to the public that cycling was trying to 
address the doping problem.  
 
The emphasis of UCI’s anti-doping policy was, therefore, to give the impression that UCI 
was tough on doping rather than actually being good at anti-doping. UCI portrayed itself 
as always being at the forefront of the fight against doping. However, there was more that 
could have been done to address the roots of the doping problem or to discuss strategies 
against doping proactively. Such an active policy was seen as an impediment to the 
development of cycling and was, therefore, not encouraged. There was little incentive for 
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self-reflection within UCI leadership or to reassess its anti-doping policy. This is true even 
when concrete problems were brought to the attention of the UCI leadership.  
 
2006/2007—today  
The period starting from 2006/2007 has been marked by steady improvements and a 
growing willingness to combat doping at its roots. The original policy of containment was 
abandoned in favour of a policy that sought to catch the cheaters. Within a short period 
of time, important changes were agreed and implemented, such as the introduction of 
out-of-competition testing, more targeted testing, the introduction of the athlete 
biological passport, and the transformation of the anti-doping unit into the Cycling Anti-
doping Foundation (CADF). Funding for anti-doping also improved, and teams and event 
organisers now contribute substantially to the funding of the anti-doping programme. All 
these measures have, so the CIRC has been credibly told, changed the behaviour of elite 
road cyclists considerably.  
 
The reason why the public has not acknowledged and given credit for these positive 
changes is probably due to the hesitant and poor leadership of UCI. Interference with anti-
doping operations, continuing disputes with other stakeholders, ineffective public 
management of crisis situations (for example the Lance Armstrong comeback, Alberto 
Contador, jurisdictional disputes, accepting donations from Lance Armstrong), general 
problems of good governance, close relationships between UCI leadership and riders (in 
particular with Lance Armstrong), obvious conflicts of interest as well as a devastating 
election campaign in 2013 have ruined UCI’s credibility in the eyes of the public, including 
in respect of anti-doping. The new leadership that took over in 2013 now seeks to avoid 
these past mistakes: relationships with other stakeholders have significantly improved 
and influence over CADF’s anti-doping operations has ceased. However, it appears to the 
CIRC that the transition to a more independent CADF also presents challenges, which are 
addressed in the Report.  
 
Anti-doping is not a static matter. Once a new level is attained, the battle is still far from 
won. Instead, the history of anti-doping is marked by constant adaptation by those who 
seek to cheat and those who seek to catch them. Therefore, a good anti-doping policy is 
distinguished by a constant effort to improve the existing tools, search for new strategies, 
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and coordinate with others in the field and to prevent the kinds of predictable routines 
that facilitate and encourage dopers to adapt. Even though UCI’s anti-doping programme 
today is one of the best among international federations, the CIRC sees room for further 
improvement. 
 
ELITE ROAD CYCLING 
 
The general view is that at the elite level the situation has improved, but that doping is 
still taking place. It was commented that doping is either less prevalent today or the 
nature of doping practices has changed such that the performance gains are smaller. The 
CIRC considers that a culture of doping in cycling continues to exist, albeit attitudes have 
started to change.  The biggest concern today is that following the introduction of the 
athlete biological passport, dopers have moved on to micro-dosing in a controlled 
manner that keeps their blood parameters constant and enables them to avoid detection. 
 
In contrast to the findings in previous investigations, which identified systematic doping 
organised by teams, at the elite level riders who dope now organise their own doping 
programmes with the help of third parties who are primarily outside the cycling team. At 
the elite level, doping programmes are generally sophisticated and therefore doctors play 
a key role in devising programmes that provide performance enhancement whilst 
minimising the risk of getting caught.  
 
Factors still exist that could be seen to encourage or facilitate doping. For example: there 
is financial instability throughout the sport (teams often depend entirely on one sponsor, 
and teams, and therefore riders, can be under huge pressure to obtain good results to 
keep sponsors or get an extension of their short-term contract); riders often train 
predominantly away from the team and might engage their own doctors (and doctors 
operating outside the sport are hard to regulate); riders who rode in an era when doping 
was acceptable continue to work in the sport which makes it hard to change the culture; 
and although the influence of the classic omerta has declined, riders are still reluctant to 
report doping or suspicious conduct to the authorities.   
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At the elite level there are now teams that have a strong anti-doping culture and that are 
trying to foster an environment in which riders can ride clean.  However, interviewees 
expressed concern that this was not the case in all teams. Ultimately, riders who dope 
have shown themselves to be highly adaptable. Consequently, anti-doping tests, 
combined with proper procedures and complemented by investigative powers of 
national authorities, are the most effective deterrent. Therefore UCI and other 
stakeholders must ensure that resources continue to be devoted to improving the anti-
doping programme. 
 
Conclusions 
It was well known to UCI that use of performance enhancing drugs was pervasive in the 
sport. The direction of UCI’s anti-doping policy was determined by UCI management until 
the late 2000s when greater operational control was given to the CADF. It was only then 
that UCI started to move away from a policy of containment and protecting the sport to 
seek instead to tackle the problem. It is fair to note that UCI took more steps as part of its 
anti-doping policy than many other international federations.  However, whilst there is a 
debate as to whether it should receive much credit for this given the scale of the doping 
problem, the more significant point is that despite adopting new tests, many of the other 
steps it took prior to 2006/2008 served to undermine anti-doping efforts. In addition, the 
governance failures and specific actions of UCI’s presidents/management seriously 
undermined UCI’s credibility. 
 
It is clear that positive developments have been made in UCI’s anti-doping policy in the 
last six years, although there is still considerable room for improvement. The Commission 
considers that in addition to addressing operational issues in anti-doping policy, one of 
the key lessons from the Report should be that good governance is an essential part of a 
strong commitment to anti-doping. As the issues described above demonstrate, good 
governance is critical not only to anti-doping, but also to the management and credibility 
of a sport more generally.  It is essential that institutions put in place clear rules that 
provide for fair processes, and which will be properly implemented by management. The 
recommendations focus on anti-doping and governance issues as well as areas for UCI to 
develop with other stakeholders, who are also essential if UCI is to combat the doping 
issue in the future. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The Commission refers readers to the full Recommendations section of the Report. 
However, some key recommendations include: 
1. Primary responsibility for controlling doping in sport lies with the sporting world. 
Only subsidiary responsibility lies with governments. The CIRC recommends that 
UCI works closely with governments/national authorities that make their 
investigative tools available to the fight against doping and that, together with 
other stakeholders, it urges other governments to have these tools in place and 
work towards closer cooperation with sports bodies on criminal matters in anti-
doping. 
2. In addition to serving any sport sanction, doctors who are found guilty of an anti-
doping rule violation should be investigated to determine whether they are fit to 
continue their general medical practice. Anti-doping bodies should have an 
obligation to inform the doctor’s professional regulatory body that he has been 
sanctioned for a sport violation so that the regulatory body may open an 
investigation against the doctor.   
3. The CIRC has observed that “public shaming” is frequently used to put pressure 
on other stakeholders. In particular, allegations that are not fully investigated or 
not investigated at all are put into the public domain by anti-doping organisations. 
Such conduct should not be employed. It infringes on fundamental rights, leads to 
a waste of resources and undermines the credibility of the fight against doping. In 
the same way that WADA-accredited laboratories are bound by a duty of 
confidentiality, the same principle should apply to anti-doping organisations in 
respect of allegations. 
4. The CIRC recommends that “prevalence studies” of doping in different countries, 
teams, levels (including amateur) and disciplines, should be undertaken by 
UCI/CADF to establish the level of doping in those different populations; this 
would enable UCI/CADF to define better how to deploy resources and support an 
effective anti-doping strategy. All the statistical data from testing should be 
integrated into these studies. 
5. UCI/CADF should move to a qualitative rather than quantitative testing plan and 
collect and integrate all available information. At present, CADF concentrates 
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solely on testing. There must also be a focus on non-analytical means of 
establishing anti-doping rule violations. The CIRC recommends that intelligence-
led testing and broader, non-analytical investigations should target individual 
riders and support staff when most likely to be engaged in doping activities, 
particularly in out-of-competition time periods. 
6. The no testing window from 11pm to 6am helps riders who micro-dose to avoid 
being caught. The CIRC is conscious of the principle of proportionality but the 
absence of night-time testing is a weakness in the current system and needs to be 
addressed. UCI/CADF should make more use of the exception contained in Article 
5.2 of the 2015 UCI Anti-Doping Rules (“serious and specific suspicion that the Rider 
may be engaged in doping”) to test at night-time. 
7. Re-testing should be an integral part of the testing programme. A coherent re-
testing strategy should be developed that is systematic and regularly undertaken, 
with additional tests when new science is available, and well publicised. 
Retrospective sample testing is perhaps as great a disincentive to riders as today’s 
testing is, even more so for the more successful riders. A sample given by a rider 
should have a mandatory re-testing programme attached to it.    
8. CIRC recommends that in order to encourage people to come forward with 
information, UCI should set up an independent whistleblower desk. UCI should 
also proactively make full use of substantial assistance provisions (every athlete 
who is sanctioned should be approached to enquire whether he is interested in 
providing substantial assistance). 
9. The most effective way of cleaning up the sport is to pursue individuals through 
investigations as soon as a suspicion is raised. UCI/CADF should make efforts to 
investigate those individuals that it believes were involved in doping in the past, 
observing the principles of due process, and make full use of the extended statute 
of limitations. 
 
The Recommendations section also contains suggestions regarding UCI’s governance 
structures. 
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BACKGROUND TO THE CIRC 
 
The Cycling Independent Reform Commission (“CIRC”, or the “Commission”) was 
established by the Union Cycliste Internationale (“UCI”) on 8 January 2014. The CIRC was 
asked to report to the UCI President at the end of its mandate on 31 January 2015. This 
deadline was extended for one month, at the CIRC’s request, and the CIRC report 
(“Report”) was given to the UCI President on 26 February 2015. 
 
The CIRC comprised three Commissioners, a Project Director and a team of specialists 
with legal, technical, investigative and analytical skills. The purpose of the CIRC was to 
assist the UCI in understanding the past endemic problem of doping in cycling, and to 
assist the UCI in making changes to improve the future of the sport.  
 
The CIRC has three main objectives, derived from its Terms of Reference:  
 
 To conduct a wide-ranging independent investigation to establish the roots, historical 
reasons, causes, mechanisms, processes, procedures, practices, patterns, networks, 
providers, instigators and facilitators that enabled the endemic problem of doping in 
cycling. 
 
 To investigate whether UCI officials directly contributed to the development of a 
culture of doping in cycling, in particular by mismanaging the testing and/or by 
covering up positive tests, and whether the UCI and other governing bodies and 
officials were implicated in ineffective investigation of doping practices.  
 
 To produce a report at the end of the CIRC mandate for the President of the UCI, that 
provides knowledge and understanding of the past endemic culture of doping in 
cycling, and provides targeted recommendations to the whole cycling community for 
the future.  
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I. METHODOLOGY 
 
The Commission was given disciplinary capacity to deal with doping violations. It 
appeared at an early stage that this would not be the only, or even the main, source of 
information. Therefore the Commission also interviewed those who came forward from 
within the sport and beyond, and reached out to individuals from stakeholders involved 
in all aspects of the sport. It also collected documentary, academic, statistical and visual 
information from a number of varied sources. 
 
The Commission was provided with electronic information by the UCI, relating to UCI’s 
affairs over many years. The Commission established an internal research and analysis 
programme to examine the data, and used the information along with all other sources of 
information to support mainly its second, but also its first objectives.   
 
Stakeholders were consulted from within the sport, including riders, managers, 
directeurs sportifs, doctors, scientists, owners, sponsors, and event organisers. From the 
sport’s administration, the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”), national anti-doping 
organisations (“NADO” or “NADOs”), international federations (“IF” or “IFs”), national 
federations (“NF” or “NFs”), former and current UCI members, and anti-doping 
laboratories were consulted.  
 
The CIRC spoke to 174 interviewees. Some of those interviews were less than half a day, 
some lasted three days or more over extended time periods and in different locations 
around the world. The interviewees have been grouped into the following categories: UCI 
affiliated individuals; cycling team personnel; NFs and IFs; third party doctors, scientists 
and laboratory personnel; event organisers; sponsors; riders and former riders; anti-
doping organisations; journalists; and national law enforcement agencies. The 
proportion of each type of interviewee is represented in the pie chart below. As each 
interview was conducted on a confidential basis, interviewees will be referred to 
anonymously throughout the Report. Annex 1 sets out the list of interviewees who agreed 
to their name being published in an annex to the Report.  
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No rider came forward to voluntarily admit an anti-doping rule violation (“ADRV”). Only 
sanctioned riders volunteered to provide the CIRC with information with the purpose of 
obtaining a reduced sanction, and these cases were dealt with according to the Terms of 
Reference. Looking back, the Commission was not surprised that this was the case, and 
the findings reflected throughout this Report indicate why.  
 
Articles 12 and 13 of the Terms of Reference specified that the investigation period shall 
focus on the period from 1998 until 2013, but the CIRC had discretion to extend the length 
of the investigation period or opt for an alternative period. The Commission decided that 
in order to fully appreciate the problems of doping in cycling, it was necessary to go back 
to cycling’s earlier days. Clearly such a project could have lasted indefinitely and draw 
from an inexhaustible source of material. Instead, the Commission has balanced the need 
for a complete picture with the mandate given to the CIRC. The Report will give a brief 
overview of the problem of doping in elite road cycling and the anti-doping measures that 
were undertaken to combat it, from cycling’s earlier days until today. 
 
The CIRC confirms that it conducted its work autonomously and that apart from the 
Terms of Reference, it did not receive any instruction from UCI, WADA or any other 
stakeholders at any stage of the process relating to the substantive nature of its work. 
Meetings with UCI were limited to discussion on the budget and logistical matters of 
relevance to the work of the CIRC. 
UCI affiliated individuals (25%) Sponsors (2%)
Team personnel (11%) Riders/former riders (15%)
International/national federa-
tions (15%)
Anti-doping organisations 
(15%)
Third party 
doctors/scientists/laboratory 
personnel (10%)
Journalists (3%)
Event organisers (2%) National law enforcement 
agencies (2%)
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II. SCOPE OF MANDATE 
 
The Commission points out it was not established to answer all questions related to 
doping, at all levels, in all areas of the sport, over the last 50 or so years. Nor is it the task 
of this Commission to cleanse the sport of its cultural doping problems. This Commission 
is in particular not intended to substitute or complement existing NADOs or Anti-doping 
Organizations (“ADO or “ADOs”). This is mentioned because from the beginning of its 
mandate, the Commission encountered all of the above expectations from many inside 
sport, who were unrealistic in what could be achieved, given the scale of the problems. 
 
Individuals asked to cooperate with the CIRC were under no obligation to participate in 
the process and several people including riders, scientists, ex-riders or former UCI staff 
members refused to be interviewed by the CIRC. The Commission also had no coercive 
measures against people who may have lied during their interview. Only UCI licence 
holders who provided false information to the CIRC could be sanctioned with the 
imposition of an up to 8-years world-wide ban. 
 
The Commission was mandated to provide its Report to the UCI President. It is within the 
sole responsibility of UCI to publish the Report. The Commission has included 
information that it considers should not be published for legal reasons in confidential 
annexes to this Report. 
 
The CIRC notes that its mandate was limited to examining the problem of doping in 
cycling, but it is clear that doping is a problem for many sports.  
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CHAPTER 1: ELITE ROAD CYCLING 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In some respects, the sport of elite road cycling has changed dramatically over the last 
few decades. However, some characteristics, deeply embedded and at the core of the 
sport, have not changed. Doping and denial found their way into cycling and, over time, 
they became cemented across the sport. This situation became the norm and impeded 
cycling’s capacity to successfully tackle its doping problems.  
 
Today, many aspects of the sport have changed for the better. The sport is trying to 
remain on an upwards trajectory, despite setbacks that have occurred. Today, the UCI 
administration is putting in place policies and initiatives, and improving external 
relationships, which are for the benefit of cycling. However, the sport continues to 
struggle with presenting a new approach to its stakeholders and the public, in part as a 
result of the huge “backstory” that cycling created for itself over the last few decades.   
 
Doping and cheating remain evident in the peloton, though it is probably not as endemic 
as it used to be. There are a good number of individuals, teams and team personnel 
striving to participate in the sport without doping. It seems that today riders have a 
choice as to whether to dope or not, whereas before there was no real choice if a rider 
wanted to be competitive in the big races. Yet there are a number who continue to cheat. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a genuine sport-wide consensus by all 
participants to reject doping. The problem is that in a climate in which doping has become 
the norm for a long period of time, ethical values can be undermined. 
 
The fans of cycling have been misled for decades. Yet they still seem to believe in the sport 
itself. The sport retains a strong fan base, which is broadening. The words of the 
International Olympic Committee (“IOC”)/ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
report (albeit on match-fixing) are pertinent to cycling and serve as watchwords to the 
sport.  
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“The spirit of sport, expressed in its unpredictability, is the one which [attracts] millions of 
people, taking part in different sport events at different levels, hoping and believing that 
they are part of a “community”, an “environment” which is characterized by fairness and 
respect of others. Destroying this spirit by illegally influencing the results or courses of 
competitions may destroy the essence of sport itself.”1 
 
It was therefore incumbent on the highest managing body to identify the strategic threat 
that was posed, and prioritise its efforts in taking all possible steps to resolve it. The steps 
taken by UCI will be examined in the UCI chapter of this Report. 
 
1.2. INITIAL COMMENTS 
 
The Commission found in the course of its work that a number of fundamental themes 
emerged on which there were significantly differing attitudes. The Commission found 
that these themes threaded through much of its collected information and considers that 
it is necessary to clarify them now, given their importance as background context to the 
rest of the Report.  
 
1.2.1. What is meant by “being clean”? 
 
There is no “one size fits all” definition from within the sport of what clean means. The 
generally accepted understanding of being clean is that an athlete does not take products 
that are on the WADA Prohibited List. Some riders will take substances on the List but, 
having not been caught, consider themselves clean.  Some will take substances that are 
on the List but are not yet detectable, and therefore believe that they are clean. Some 
riders stop doping before a big event and therefore consider themselves to be riding 
clean. All definitions have been described by riders and other stakeholders. The 
Commission heard that some riders also experiment with performance-enhancing 
substances and practices that are not yet on a banned list. 
                                                     
1 International Olympic Committee and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Criminalization 
approaches to combat match-fixing and illegal/irregular betting: a global perspective” (July 2013), p.17. 
Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/Criminalization_approaches_to_comb
at_match-fixing.pdf. 
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There is a considerable amount of spin around what being clean means to riders and 
teams. It can be used today in the same way that the phrase, “I have never tested positive” 
was sometimes used in the past to suggest that a doping rider had never doped. For the 
public, the presumption that a rider is clean has been eroded by the scandals over the 
years.  
 
The Commission notes that despite the statements from riders and teams today that they 
are clean, the Commission was informed that hardly any riders in the peloton today are 
willing to allow their samples to be used anonymously for research purposes into 
developing new methods of drug detection. A box on doping control forms today can be 
ticked to enable such testing. The Commission was told that over 95% of the time, it is 
not ticked.  
 
1.2.2. What is meant by “a culture of doping”? 
 
A culture could be defined as a series of customs, attitudes and behaviours absorbed and 
practiced by a group of people, perhaps over more than one generation, until they become 
embedded in the group as norms. A culture shapes and influences how the group and 
individuals conduct themselves.  
 
The World Anti-Doping Code (“WADA Code”) defines doping.2 A “culture of” doping 
indicates that doping was widespread in the sport, was accepted by the majority of 
participants, and had continued for a long time, in this case across more than one sporting 
                                                     
2 Article 1 of the 2015 WADA Code, defines doping as the occurrence of one or more of the ADR violations 
set out in Article 2.1 through 2.10. These violations are as follows: 
(i) Presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete’s Sample;  
(ii) Use or Attempted Use by an Athlete of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method; 
(iii) Evading, Refusing or Failing to Submit to Sample Collection; 
(iv) Whereabouts Failures;  
(v) Tampering or Attempted Tampering with any part of Doping Control; 
(vi) Possession of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method; 
(vii) Trafficking or Attempted Trafficking in any Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method; 
(viii) Administration or Attempted Administration to any Athlete In-Competition of any Prohibited 
Substance or Prohibited Method, or Administration or Attempted Administration to any Athlete Out-of-
Competition of any Prohibited Substance or any Prohibited Method that is prohibited Out-of-Competition; 
(ix) Complicity; 
(x) Prohibited Association. 
Full text available: https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/wada-2015-world-anti-
doping-code.pdf.  
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generation. Time is a key factor in the development of a culture, and also in effecting 
change. If a culture takes many years or even decades to develop, it is highly unlikely to 
be changed within only a year or two. 
 
Many individuals who were interviewed by CIRC identified the same common factors that 
contributed to a culture of doping in cycling. They stated the culture dates back a long 
time and has existed since before the Tour de France (“Tour”) started, and before the 
introduction of Erythropoietin (“EPO”). Interviewees felt the Grand Tours were different 
from other kinds of endurance sports, and other cycling competitions, and the three-week 
races required special forms of performance assistance and substances for recovery.  
 
Many riders stated that cycling is a particularly tough sport. Riders doped to be able to 
compete at the highest levels over sustained periods of time. Some stated doping helped 
them make the suffering bearable. Many also stated that there is widespread mistrust in 
competitors’ performance. If an athlete is beaten in competition it is an easy excuse to 
attribute the difference in performance to doping. Sometimes however, the explanation 
is much more simple but difficult to accept, i.e., “you cannot make a racehorse out of a 
donkey”.  
 
More recent research studies on doping in sport suggests that “…if athletes believe that 
others are taking doping substances, [they can] start using them as well, and this… feeds the 
pro-doping culture.”3 There is also the “false consensus effect” where athletes with a 
history of drug use overestimate the prevalence of drug use among other athletes.4 That 
said, from the early 1990s to the mid/late-2000s, it would have been hard to 
overestimate the prevalence of drug use in the peloton. 
 
The Commission believes the culture was born from cycling’s earliest days, where pain 
relief was taken as part of the sport’s ethos. These substances were not only not illegal, 
but were in some respects part of the folklore heroics of the sport. However, anti-doping 
                                                     
3 Morente-Sanchez et al., “Attitudes towards Doping and Related Experience in Spanish National Cycling 
Teams According to Different Olympic Disciplines,” PLoS ONE 8(8) (2013). Available: 
http://www.pilarmartinescudero.com/bibliografia_dopaje/australianos/zabala_2013.pdf.  
4 Jaime Morente-Sanchez and Mikel Zabala, “Doping in Sport: A Review of Elite Athletes’ Attitudes, Beliefs, 
and Knowledge,” (2013). Available:  
http://www.pilarmartinescudero.com/bibliografia_dopaje/australianos/actitudesdopajeZabala.pdf.  
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rules and measures were being clearly set out over 50 years ago, and the opportunity to 
rely on an old argument that doping was part of the tradition of the sport is long gone.   
 
There was a culture of doping in cycling, and today it is probably less pervasive and all-
encompassing than it was. All cultures evolve, or change, and doping is no different. 
Doping still exists, and it is expert at changing its shape. 
 
1.2.3. What is meant by “omerta”? 
 
The Commission believes this term loosely covers individual and collective attitudes and 
behaviours to keeping quiet about doping in cycling, to not exposing those who 
participated in it, and to side-lining people who did not take the same approach. A former 
directeur sportif described omerta as a system in which riders were open among 
themselves about doping, and omerta operated externally so doping was not spoken 
about in public.  
 
An academic paper highlighted that those who broke the code of silence within cycling 
were ostracised and sometimes pushed out of the sport because they were not willing to 
support or join in with doping.5 Any rider who did speak out about doping could find 
himself informally sanctioned by the rest of the peloton. By way of example, one rider 
who refused to dope with their team found that the team was ordered to ride against 
them at the next event. Christophe Bassons’ career was effectively ended when he spoke 
out against doping in the peloton at the 1999 Tour.6 Another rider stated that confessing 
was not encouraged, because it became difficult to find another team, whereas a doper 
who took his sanction often found his way back into cycling. 
 
Omerta remains an intrinsic part of the culture of the sport. Elite cycling is one of the 
toughest sports and the endurance nature of it creates a bond between riders. This leads 
                                                     
5 L. Whitaker, S. H. Backhouse and J. Long, “Reporting doping in sport: National level athletes’ perceptions 
of their role in doping prevention,” Scand J Med Sci Sports (2014) p.13. Abstract available: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sms.12222/abstract. 
6 John MacLeary, “Lance Armstrong's 'reconciliation tour' continues as disgraced former cyclist meets 
Christophe Bassons”, The Telegraph (7 December 2013). Available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/cycling/10503192/Lance-Armstrongs-reconciliation-
tour-continues-as-disgraced-former-cyclist-meets-Christophe-Bassons.html.   
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to the development of a different set of rules that become more important to that group 
than the regular norms and rules of society. Omerta was at the core of cycling behaviour, 
and was a strong “protecting force” within the sport. 
 
It was also underpinned by a litigious approach from participants and other stakeholders 
to protect vested interests that may have come under threat of discovery. Omerta has 
changed its shape over the years. Previously, it was evidenced across all the peloton, it 
was very strong irrespective of riders’ country of origin and especially prevalent in 
Europe. However, individuals do not talk about doping so openly today and the “classic” 
omerta has been punctured by an environment of mistrust and not-knowing.  
 
Omerta may have changed from being overtly practised as a cultural norm within cycling, 
to being covertly practised behind closed doors. This makes it harder to attack and 
eradicate, but does arguably indicate progress because it suggests that opinion has 
shifted to recognise that doping is not acceptable.   
 
1.2.4. What is meant by “cheating”? 
 
Cheating includes the fixing of stage or race outcomes, and can also be found in 
technological advances where small gains can be squeezed from cumulative non-legal 
technical enhancements. There have been examples of cheating in cycling since its 
earliest days. Such cheating may be becoming more significant today, as doping benefits 
are reduced.  
 
Based on interviews with current stakeholders in the cycling community, the Commission 
believes that partly as a response to improvements in anti-doping, technical cheating has 
increased. The Commission was told that today doping performance gains are perhaps 
around only 3-5%, compared to 10-15% ten years ago. Other cumulative gains derived 
from technical cheating can make up the 3% doping gains. By doping and by broader 
cheating, maximum gains can be made. 
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1.3. HISTORICAL SECTION 
 
This part of the Report provides a non-exhaustive historical narrative of the culture of 
doping in elite road cycling from earlier days to today. It examines the roots, historical 
reasons, causes, mechanisms, processes, procedures, practices, patterns, networks, 
providers, instigators and facilitators that enabled the endemic problem of doping in 
cycling. It will also examine the corresponding developments in anti-doping policy, 
science, and measures that were taken during the same period.  
 
The Commission believes it is important to go back to the earliest days, albeit briefly, as 
it helps to identify behaviours that developed and became embedded before anti-doping 
rules, regulations and entities were created. It is useful to bear in mind that the culture of 
doping grew from an approach to the sport where taking performance enhancement 
substances was not illegal and indeed was perhaps seen as “the done thing”. There is an 
element of “inheritance” referred to by interviewees. 
 
The Commission was told of many impacting factors that were woven into the doping and 
anti-doping environment. The role of sponsors will be examined, as will the funding levels 
for anti-doping research, the race calendar, and the role or impact of event organisers, 
team managers, doctors and medical staff. The law, science, technology, the role of 
education, the public and the media will be touched upon, and the disparity between 
teams and their funding streams will be discussed.  
 
The above-mentioned themes are broad, and the Commission cannot provide a complete 
history of doping and anti-doping in cycling. That said, in order to examine those themes, 
this Report will look at some of the main doping incidents and significant events. This will 
demonstrate how the culture of doping unfolded, as representative of the wider problem. 
This section will also use statistics and analysis where the data is sound enough to draw 
reliable conclusions as a means to test the narratives drawn from interviews. 
 
The Commission remained mindful of its broad mandate and its short period of time in 
existence, in deciding what it should and could look in to. Many individual incidents in 
the history of cycling merit further investigation, given the extent of the alleged doping 
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and denials that have plagued cycling for decades. The Commission was not configured 
to do this. Given the extent of its resources and time to undertake its work, the 
Commission will move rapidly through history and concentrate on more recent events. 
 
1.3.1. 1890s—1980s  
 
The earliest accounts of doping practices from the 1890s and early 1900s indicate that 
athletes would rely on various stimulants, or combinations thereof, such as alcohol, 
caffeine, strychnine, heroin, cocaine and amphetamine to alleviate fatigue and enhance 
their performance.7 In the late 19th century, one particular cycling coach was known for 
his little black bottle, the contents of which he apparently used to revive riders.8 In the 
early 1900s, endurance events lasted for days without rest.  
 
The female cyclist Margaret Gast cycled 2,600 miles in thirteen days in 1900, during 
which time she included small amounts of brandy and ale in her diet.9 In Europe, 24-hour 
cyclists drank rum and champagne for refreshment and in order to reduce the sense of 
fatigue.10 None of these stimulants were banned at the time and they were being used 
                                                     
7 See Larry D. Bowers, “Anti-Dope Testing in Sport: The History and the Science,” Vol. 26 The Faseb Journal 
3936 (2012). Available: http://www.fasebj.org/content/26/10/3933; Morente-Sanchez et al., “Attitudes 
towards Doping and Related Experience in Spanish National Cycling Teams According to Different 
Olympic Disciplines,” PLoS ONE 8(8) (2013). Available: 
http://www.pilarmartinescudero.com/bibliografia_dopaje/australianos/zabala_2013.pdf; and Mike 
Rissanen, “Beer breaks during the Tour de France. Some observations on beer and cycling in the early 
1900s,” Ludica, 17-18, (2011-2012). Available: 
https://www.academia.edu/7065151/Beer_breaks_during_the_Tour_de_France._Some_observations_on_
beer_and_cycling_in_the_early_1900s. 
8 Duncan R. Jamieson, review of “The Little Black Bottle: Choppy Warburton, the Questions of Doping, and 
the Deaths of his Bicycle Riders” by Gerry Moore Journal of Sport History Vol. 40, 1, (Spring 2013). Excerpt 
available: 
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/journal_of_sport_history/v040/40.1.j
amieson.html. Choppy Warburton was one of the best known trainers in England at that time, and trained 
a number of champions including Jimmy Michael, who Warburton sued for libel after Michael accused him 
of poisoning him during a race. See “’Choppy’ Warburton Dead: Trainer of ‘Jimmy’ Michael, the Welch 
Bicycle Rider, Passes Away”, New York Times (19 Dec. 1897). Available: 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9D07EED71630E132A2575AC1A9649D94669ED7CF. 
9 Mike Rissanen, “Beer breaks during the Tour de France. Some observations on beer and cycling in the 
early 1900s,” Ludica, 17-18, (2011-2012). Available: 
https://www.academia.edu/7065151/Beer_breaks_during_the_Tour_de_France._Some_observations_on_
beer_and_cycling_in_the_early_1900s.  
10   Mike Rissanen, “Beer breaks during the Tour de France. Some observations on beer and cycling in the 
early 1900s,” Ludica, 17-18, (2011-2012). Available: 
https://www.academia.edu/7065151/Beer_breaks_during_the_Tour_de_France._Some_observations_on_
beer_and_cycling_in_the_early_1900s.  
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without sanction. It is likely that these early practices of drugs use began to develop the 
culture of doping as a behavioural norm.   
 
By 1908, the English Jockey Club may have been the first sport organisation to ban certain 
substances.11 In 1928, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) 
became the first international sporting federation to ban the use of stimulants.12 The use 
of stimulants and doping continued across sport in those intervening 20 years and the 
recognition that something had to be done seemingly took a long time to develop. There 
were no doubt social norms of the time that shaped the pace of the anti-doping response. 
 
By 1955, there was an account of the use of Performance Enhancing Drugs (“PED” or 
“PEDs”) in cycling, and of 25 urine samples taken from riders in a 1955 race, five were 
positive for stimulants.13 Ten years later, tests conducted on Belgian cyclists showed that 
37% of professionals and 23% of amateurs were using amphetamines, while reports from 
Italy showed that 46% of professional cyclists tested positive for doping.14 Based on these 
statistics, widespread use of stimulants was evident during this era.  
 
The death of Danish cyclist Knud Jensen at the 1960 Rome Olympic Games brought 
national government and sporting bodies’ attention to the potential risks associated with 
stimulant use.  
 
In 1965, Belgium and France legislated against doping, and in 1966, the first drug tests 
were carried out at the Tour.15 They were opposed by riders, and five-time Tour winner, 
                                                     
11 Johan Lindholm, “Does Legislating Against Doping in Sports Make Sense?: Comparing Sweden and the 
United States Suggest Not,” Virginia Sports & Entertainment Law Journal, 
vol. 13 nr. 1 (Fall 2013) pp. 21-34. Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399336. The author suggests that the purpose of 
the ban was to keep the public interested in betting on horseraces. 
12 Larry D. Bowers, “Anti-Dope Testing in Sport: The History and the Science,” Vol. 26 The Faseb Journal 
3936 (2012). Available: http://www.fasebj.org/content/26/10/3933. 
13 Charles E. Yesalis and Michael S. Bahrke, “History of Doping in Sport,” International Sports Studies, vol. 
24, no. 1 (2002). Available: http://library.la84.org/SportsLibrary/ISS/ISS2401/ISS2401e.pdf. 
14 Charles E. Yesalis and Michael S. Bahrke, “History of Doping in Sport,” International Sports Studies, vol. 
24, no. 1 (2002), citing Donohoe, T., & Johnson, N. (1986) “Foul play? Drug use in sport”. Oxford:Blackwell. 
Available: http://library.la84.org/SportsLibrary/ISS/ISS2401/ISS2401e.pdf. 
15 Christopher S. Thompson, "Tour de France: A Cultural History" (2 ed., University of California Press, 
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Jacques Anquetil, who admitted to taking amphetamines, stated, “We find these tests 
degrading.”16 Jacques Anquetil led a revolt by cyclists and stopped the race the next day.  
 
By 1967, the IOC had adopted a form of anti-doping regulations and instituted doping 
controls for the 1968 Olympic Games in Grenoble and Mexico City. It also created the 
Medical Commission in 1967 “to deal with the increasing problem of doping in the sports 
world”.17 The goal of the Medical Commission was to establish an anti-doping framework 
for sport, which also covered athletes’ health, respect for medical and sports ethics, and 
equality for all athletes. The UCI established a list of doping agents in 1967.18 
 
In 1967, the Council of Europe adopted a Resolution which dealt with doping. It defined 
doping as “the administration to or the use by a healthy person, in any manner whatsoever, 
of agents foreign to the organism, or of physiological substances in excessive quantities or 
introduced by an abnormal channel, with the sole purpose of affecting artificially and by 
unfair means the performance of such a person when taking part in a competition”. It 
recommended that governments persuade sports organisations to take steps to have 
adequate regulations and to penalise offenders.19   
 
Also in 1967, the British cyclist Tom Simpson died during the Tour, on Mont Ventoux. The 
post mortem carried out on his body found amphetamines and alcohol in his blood, and 
police discovered amphetamine tablets in the pocket of his jersey and in a team support 
car.20  
 
In the 1978 Tour, Belgian champion Michel Pollentier won the Alpe d’Huez stage and took 
the yellow jersey. During a post-race drug screening, a synthetic bladder containing clean 
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urine was found connected to a tube under his armpit.21 Michel Pollentier was expelled 
from the Tour and suspended for two months.  
 
According to a former rider interviewed by CIRC, doping was not seen as a bad thing when 
he started riding in the early 1980s. He explained that the principle of injecting non-
prohibited substances to aid recovery was the same as injecting prohibited substances to 
enhance performance.  
 
After the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, a number of the U.S. men’s cycling team 
admitted that they had undergone blood transfusions prior to the Games.22 The riders 
retained their medals and were not disciplined. Apparently no rules were violated and 
they had followed the guidance of coaches and officials.23 Upon investigation by the 
United States Cycling Federation (“USCF”) a letter of reprimand and 30 day suspension 
without pay and a six months delay in salary review were imposed on the national coach, 
staff physiologist, and a letter of reprimand, removal, demotion, and request for 
resignation from various positions were imposed on the USCF Vice President, who were 
considered architects of the scheme.24 
 
In January 1985, USCF became the first sports organisation in the world to adopt explicit 
rules barring “blood boosting”. During this time, blood transfusions were also being 
administered in Europe. Francesco Moser twice broke the hour record in 1984, 
reportedly helped by Dr Francesco Conconi and Dr Michele Ferrari.25 Francesco Moser is 
reported to have admitted using – at the time not illegal – blood transfusions in 1999, 
however in 2014 he apparently stated that: “…There wasn’t any blood transfusions, before 
the first or second attempt. The benefits of altitude were enough”. Seized documents from 
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Dr. Francesco Conconi in proceedings against him apparently however showed that 
Francesco Moser had been treated with EPO around that time.26 
 
Blood doping can be defined as the use of substances and methods that enhance the 
transportation of oxygen in blood,27 thereby increasing aerobic power.28 This in turn 
elevates the athlete’s level of performance, especially in sports where endurance and 
stamina are required, and aerobic recovery is sought. Blood doping can be either 
autologous or homologous. Autologous doping involves riders injecting their own blood, 
and homologous doping involves riders injecting a donor’s blood.  
 
Anti-doping experts consider that blood doping is one of the most dangerous forms of 
doping due to the health risks associated with it and because of the clear performance 
enhancement.29 
 
Anabolic steroids were used by the Soviet Union in the 1970s to encourage muscle 
growth in strength sports and by the 1980s and early 1990s these drugs had apparently 
made their way into professional cycling.30 The winner of the 1988 Tour, Pedro Delgado, 
was found to be using probenecid, a substance used to mask the use of steroids. However, 
he received no penalty and was permitted to complete, and win, the Tour.  Pedro Delgado 
denies that he took probenecid for illicit purposes. Some sources say he took the 
probenecid to “take care of problems with his legs”31 and in an interview in 2010, Delgado 
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is quoted as saying he used probenecid “to assist draining from the kidneys”.32 Although 
probenecid was on the IOC prohibited list, it was not on the UCI list at that time. Tour 
Director, Jean-Pierre Courcol, captured the ethical gulf between what was legally 
permissible and what was within the spirit of the sport: “I know today that the letter of 
the law can replace its spirit and that one can play with the rules. So, today, I'm ashamed, 
and perhaps tomorrow, I must ask my children not to get too involved in competitive 
sports.”33  
 
In 1989, the Council of Europe published its Convention against doping.34  
 
By the end of the 1980s, doping in cycling had evolved from being unsophisticated and 
occasional to more frequent and organised. Doping was mainly used to reduce fatigue, 
enhance performance and alleviate pain but was not perceived as illegal. Evading the 
burgeoning anti-doping measures was easy. Early methods included riders’ using 
catheters at the time of doping control and substituting their urine with someone else’s 
who they knew was clean.35 Another was to drop out of a race before the finish line to 
avoid being selected for doping control.   
 
1.3.2. Late 1980s—2001: the EPO era 
 
EPO as a “Game Changer” 
 
The real revolution that emerged in the late 1980s and became prevalent in the 1990s 
was the introduction of EPO to the peloton. While some of the literature concludes that 
the 1980s, and not the 1990s, appear to be key in the rapid evolution of pro cyclists’ 
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performances,36 former riders and other actors in the sport identify the late 1980s or 
early 1990s as the period when EPO was introduced, and when the peloton started 
“flying”. At this time, riders were also using anabolic steroids, primarily for faster 
recuperation, and human growth hormone (“HGH”) had also become very popular for the 
same purpose.37  
 
Almost all whom the Commission interviewed, who were direct members of the cycling 
community, stated that the introduction of EPO into the peloton was a “game changer”. 
Taking it enabled an athlete to be competitive, particularly in the grand classification 
races. The average gains in performance varied depending on the individual’s physiology, 
but estimates put that gain at between 10-15%. Not one person the Commission spoke to 
felt EPO had no performance benefit. 
 
One academic study reports an approximately 10% improvement in VO2max (a measure 
of a person's aerobic fitness) after taking EPO.38 Another concludes that when 
haematocrit is increased from base values to around 50%, VO2max is increased by 8–
12%.39 These figures, together with riders’ comments, show the huge gain to be had.  
 
One former rider referred to two tiers of doping: “low octane” cortisone and caffeine; and 
“high octane”, EPO and blood transfusions. All riders and former riders stated that EPO 
was the key substance that provided the biggest performance enhancement.  
 
The use of EPO as a form of blood doping is particularly dangerous in lengthy cycling 
races. It thickens the blood, and race dehydration concentrates the blood further, which 
can cause clotting, stroke or heart failure. The Commission was told by former riders of 
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the need to get up in the middle of the night and ride on a fixed bicycle in their room in 
order to get the blood circulating. The media speculated that the deaths of 18 European 
cyclists in the late 1980s were related to EPO.40 Other estimates suggest that between 
1987 and 1990, approximately 20 professional cyclists died from suspected EPO abuse.41  
 
In 1988, the IOC Medical Commission received unconfirmed reports regarding the 
possible use of EPO.42 EPO was included on the IOC’s list of prohibited substances in 
1990,43 and the UCI list in 1991,44 but the fight against EPO was hampered by the lack of 
a reliable testing method. Although there was a rule banning EPO use during this period, 
the absence of a test meant it could not be enforced. This represents a stark example of 
the anti-doping regime lagging well behind, both in terms of funding and science. 
 
Despite the use of doping in cycling for over a century, it is difficult to quantify how 
prevalent the problem was, due to the reluctance of participants to speak fully and 
truthfully about doping, and the lack of objective and comprehensive data from even 20 
years ago. However, according to a 1994 report on EPO use in Italian professional cycling, 
between 60 to 80% of all riders were using EPO.45 From riders’ testimony to the CIRC, it 
is possible that this estimate may be modest for the peloton in that era, given that some 
put the percentage at 90+% across the peloton.  
 
Health and safety measures to counteract the absence of an EPO Test 
 
The Italian doctor Francesco Conconi was considered by some to be the father of Italian 
“doping physicians.”46 In the early 1990s, Conconi received over EUR 2million in funding 
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from the Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (“CONI”, the Italian National Olympic 
Committee) to carry out doping “research”, and further funding from the IOC to develop 
a test for EPO.47  
 
Francesco Conconi was a member of the IOC’s Medical Committee and President of UCI’s 
Medical Commission. Whilst he was receiving funding from CONI and the IOC to carry out 
doping research and to develop a test for EPO, Francesco Conconi was simultaneously 
providing EPO to athletes and a number of cycling stars, including Marco Pantani, Claudio 
Chiappucci and Gianni Bugno.48 Francesco Conconi failed to develop a test for EPO and at 
the end of the 1990s, the Ferrara Prosecutor’s Office indicted Francesco Conconi and two 
of his assistants for the crime of sporting fraud. Despite “the seriousness and convergence 
of all the evidence”, delays in the trial meant the case had to be dismissed in 2003 due to 
the statute of limitations.49 
 
In 1997, seven years after speculation that riders were dying from EPO overdoses, UCI 
introduced the “No Start Rule” (see below). Its stated purpose was to protect riders’ 
health and safety and to prevent further deaths from EPO. It was not an anti-doping rule, 
but a health and safety measure. Under the rule, the UCI carried out blood tests before 
and during competition and any rider with a haematocrit reading higher than 50% (for 
men) or 47% (for women) was deemed unfit for competition and prevented from 
competing for 15 days from the date of the test.50 The Commission was told that the UCI 
had originally sought a 53% limit, but riders wanted to set the limit at 50%.  
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One unintended consequence of the 50% haematocrit threshold on all riders, regardless 
of their natural levels, was that riders with haematocrit levels naturally in the low-mid 
40s could gain an advantage by using EPO up to 50%. According to one former rider, the 
introduction of the 50% haematocrit value rule was perceived by riders as legalising EPO 
up to a certain limit. He stated that if a rider had not used EPO beforehand, he had 
certainly started using it after the rule was introduced in 1997.  
 
Another rider explained he always tested himself after using EPO to ensure that he was 
not going over 50% (his natural level was 43–45%). This was done by using a blood 
centrifuge to monitor his levels. An anti-doping expert confirmed that a rider could easily 
keep his haematocrit reading below 50%. Either he would use a careful adjustment of his 
dosage, or he could use saline to dilute his blood.51 Some riders performed these 
monitoring functions themselves, others had assistance. To the extent that the rule 
served its purpose from a medical point of view, since it probably prevented EPO-related 
deaths, this was a commendable step. However, from an anti-doping perspective the 
“one-size-fits-all” approach was criticised. Very few riders told the CIRC they had a 
natural haematocrit level above 45% and so there was implicit “permission” to dope up 
to 50%. This issue will be addressed in more detail later in the Report.  
 
“EPO scandals” 
 
EPO doping was documented by numerous investigations and scandals that emerged in 
the 1990s and early 2000s, as summarized below:  
 
PDM Intralipid Affair and alleged EPO use 
The 1991 Tour was marked by the “intralipid affair”, which resulted in the entire Dutch 
PDM team, who was favourite to win that year, becoming sick and withdrawing from the 
Tour. PDM stated that the team got food poisoning from unpublicized but legal injections 
of liquid food, and that salmonella was the main suspect.52 The French doctor, Jean-Daniel 
Fleysakier is reported as saying that the riders “would have been very ill with ‘[symptoms] 
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typical of an overdose of EPO’”.53 The use of EPO by PDM was also mentioned in a 1994 
report on EPO use in Italian professional cycling.54 
 
Bologna Investigation  
In 1997, an investigation of the Italian pharmacy “Giardini Margherita” in Bologna 
revealed the alleged existence of a network of importation, production and 
administration of pharmaceutical products for athletes of various disciplines. Doctors, 
including Michele Ferrari, and 22 riders were implicated. In 2006, although previously 
sentenced for a 1-year imprisonment and a EUR 900 fine, and suspended from his medical 
profession for 11 months and 21 days (all sanctions suspended) for sporting fraud and 
abusive abuse of the pharmacist profession, the Appeals Court of Bologna acquitted Dr 
Michele Ferrari. 
 
The Festina Affair 
In 1998, a team car of the French team Festina was stopped and searched at the 
French/Belgian border and found to contain 234 doses of EPO, 80 doses of HGH and 160 
doses of testosterone.55 The car was being driven by the team soigneur, Willy Voet, who 
was arrested for smuggling drugs across the border. French police subsequently arrested 
Festina team manager Bruno Roussel and the team doctor Eric Rijkaert for drug 
trafficking and incitement to consume drugs and the  Festina team was ejected from the 
Tour.56 In subsequent legal proceedings, the French Court established that a system of 
doping was in place on the Festina team.57 Festina’s expulsion was apparently the first 
time since the Second World War that a team had been expelled from the Tour.58 The 
French police carried out raids on other teams and arrested Cees Priem, directeur sportif 
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of Dutch team TVM and four riders, who ultimately got suspended and fined by a court in 
Reims.59 TVM were expelled from the race when doping products were found in bins at 
the team hotel.  Other teams pulled out of that year's Tour, among them ONCE, Banesto 
and Risco Scotti.60 The Festina scandal made it clear to everyone that “doping was being 
systematically used within the sport of cycling”61 and caused the French newspaper Le 
Monde to talk of “the end of all our childhood dreams”.62  
 
Doping on Team Telekom/T-Mobile 
According to the 2009 Freiburg Report investigating allegations of doping on German 
Team Telekom/T-Mobile, “systematic EPO doping of Team Telekom under medical 
supervision began at the training camp in Mallorca in January 1995”.63 Two physicians at 
Freiburg University Clinic, Dr Lothar Heinrich and Professor Dr Andreas Schmid, were 
team doctors for Telekom/T-Mobile. The Report found that EPO was administered partly 
by the soigneur, Jef D’hont, partly by Dr Andreas Schmid and Dr Lothar Heinrich and 
partly by riders themselves, and at least 7 riders were involved. Bjarne Riis won the Tour 
for Team Telekom in 1996. The Interim Report stated that D’hont knew – even though 
not treated by him or the Freiburg Clinic – that Riis’ preparation included taking 4,000 
units of EPO every second day during the Tour and two units of HGH. As a result, his 
haematocrit values were at least 60% and as high as 64%.64  
 
Doping on the USPS/Discovery Channel teams 
Members of the USPS/Discovery Channel teams were alleged by United States Anti-
doping Agency (“USADA”) to have engaged in systematic doping from 1998—2005.65 In 
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the case of the USPS/Discovery Channel teams, where at least 10 riders were alleged to 
have been involved, charges were brought against six people by USADA, Lance Armstrong 
(rider), Michele Ferrari (doctor), Johan Bruyneel (team director), Pedro Celaya (doctor), 
Luis Garcia del Moral (doctor), and Jose “Pepe” Marti (trainer).66 Lance Armstrong won 
the Tour seven times (from 1999 to 2005) with the USPS/Discovery Channel teams. 
 
Organised and systematic team doping 
 
The above-mentioned investigations demonstrated systematic doping by multiple riders 
in the teams throughout the period, with the participation of team and external doctors, 
support staff and team managers.  
 
They uncovered the use of EPO, testosterone, and cortisone and of sophisticated methods 
of acquisition of drugs and detailed the timing and methods of medical administration 
and the combining of substances used. One of the more elaborate methods of EPO 
delivery was by “motoman”, a motorcycling enthusiast, whose job was to follow the Tour 
on his motorcycle and make deliveries of EPO to Pepe Marti or another USPS team 
personnel.67 One of USPS soigneur’s, Emma O’Reilly, admitted to transporting 
testosterone and disposing of a package, in which she assumes were used syringes.68 The 
Freiburg Interim Report found that EPO and other pharmaceuticals were procured by Dr 
Lothar Schmid and were either handed over to Jef D’hont at races or sent via DHL.69 Those 
investigations laid out the depth and breadth of which doping was integral to the teams’ 
success in professional cycling.  
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During that time period the provision and supply of illegal drugs appear to have come 
originally from pharmacies, private clinics and hospitals. The Commission has not found 
any evidence that pharmaceutical manufacturers supplied any team directly. Some riders 
stated, as examples of easy access, that it was easier to obtain EPO from pharmacies in 
Switzerland than from Italy, that drugs were easily acquired in Spain and Portugal, and 
riders from Belgium and the Netherlands drove to Germany to buy their drugs.   
 
One former rider estimated that 90% of EPO in Italy was stolen from pharmacies in 
hospitals. According to the Freiburg Report, the doctors involved in providing doping 
substances to the team were ordered from and delivered by German pharmacies, and in 
individual cases pharmacies abroad.70  
 
In this era, many young amateur riders, often from a lower socio-economic background, 
had a chance to gain recognition and earn good money as professional cyclists, where 
their alternatives for other types of employment were perhaps less appealing. A typical 
narrative from that period was of a gifted non-doping amateur, who had previously 
competed closely with riders from the rest of the world, turning professional. He would 
find that his former amateur competitors were now significantly faster than him, and he 
soon realized that doping was the difference, and not a hugely increased training 
schedule, advanced nutritional supplements or professional team technology. The rider 
was confronted with a stark choice, either to fall away from professional riding or dope.  
 
Those few who rejected doping and left the sport appear to share a common factor in that 
they had an alternative, perhaps a university degree or an option to pursue a career in 
another walk of life. It was also suggested that in the sport of cycling, fame and financial 
rewards are greatest in road cycling, which is why doping was most prevalent in that 
discipline and youngsters gravitated towards it. This may be in large part correct, and 
should serve as a warning indicator for other cycling disciplines.  
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Some riders stated that doping may have been prevalent in their team, but it was not 
obvious, as groups within teams could be compartmentalised. Elite riders were 
sometimes grouped together, so young riders coming in had no exposure to the senior 
team members. Some teams ensured that doping was eased into the training schedule 
when a young rider realised he was not making the grade, and others were just told they’d 
need to take “something” to compete. 
 
Some teams dealt with doping requirements through the manager initially, whilst others 
left it to the doctors to administer. Many riders were not privy to team discussions 
between managers and doctors, and the activity was compartmentalised.  
 
These investigations also highlighted the strategic and prominent role played by doctors 
during this era to “prepare athletes” for the races. The Freiburg Report found that as early 
as 1995, Dr Lothar Heinrich “was fully integrated in the doping system, and very quickly 
became the ‘local boss’ in charge.”71  In a written declaration, Dr Lothar Schmid admitted 
“Upon request, I gave the riders access to doping substances, in particular EPO”.72  
 
Blood doping through transfusions became less significant in the late 1980s with the 
arrival on the market of EPO. This produced the same effect as blood doping but by a 
simple injection, avoiding the complexity of removing, storing and transporting blood, 
and the risk of contracting infection or disease through transfusion. The introduction of 
EPO into the peloton and the absence of an EPO test were real games changers to the 
sport of road cycling. Doping became the norm in the peloton, not only to increase 
performance but also just to keep up with the rest of the peloton. Doping became 
organised, sophisticated, widespread and systematic. Evading anti-doping measures 
remained easy and gave the riders/teams a total sense of impunity. Many interviewees 
commented that without EPO, it would have been difficult for even the best riders to win 
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the Grand Tours. According to an interviewee, the Festina scandal “really shook cycling” 
and exposed these new behavioural doping patterns in the peloton that were not a secret 
to anyone within the cycling world. The sport community had no option but to react after 
being confronted with a scandal demonstrating that basic principles of fairness were not 
being respected and consequently “the essence of the sport” was being destroyed.  
 
1.3.3. 2001—2007: The peloton adapts: blood transfusions and EPO micro-dosing 
 
Anti-doping efforts strengthen 
 
The Festina scandal “highlighted the need for an independent international agency, which 
would set unified standards for anti-doping work and coordinate the efforts of sports 
organizations and public authorities.”73 The IOC convened the First World Conference on 
Doping in Sport in Lausanne in February 1999, following which the WADA was 
established on 10 November 1999. The principal aim of WADA, was to coordinate and 
harmonize the fight against doping globally. WADA established a list of prohibited 
substances and prohibited methods, and the WADA Code in 2003. In 2005, the 
International Convention Against Doping in Sport was adopted in Paris on October 19th 
(“UNESCO Convention”).74 It recognised the prevention of, and the fight against, doping 
in sport as a critical part of the mission of the sports movement and governments. 
Furthermore, it recognised the fundamental role of the WADA Code. The purpose of the 
UNESCO Convention was to bind governments to support the World Anti-Doping 
Programme and WADA.  
 
In August 2000, the IOC announced it had developed a test for EPO which it would use at 
the Sydney Olympic Games.75 The test was two-part and relied on both a blood screening 
and a urine analysis to detect EPO.76 In April 2001, UCI carried out its first EPO testing at 
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the Tour of Flanders.77 The test used by UCI was developed by the French laboratory of 
Châtenay-Malabry and relied solely on a urine sample to prove the presence of EPO.  
 
In 2000, Italy introduced legislation making doping a criminal offence which was 
considered by commentators to be “some of the most severe anti-doping legislation 
worldwide”.78 A very significant feature of this new legislation was the ability to use a 
wide range of investigative tools (not available to sports’ bodies) to investigate athletes 
and, in particular, athlete support personnel for doping violations. The ability to apply 
these wide ranging powers, including searches at the athlete’s home and telephone 
tapping, helps to uncover doping activities of both the rider and those behind the scenes. 
On 6 June 2001, 200 officers from the Italian drug squad (Nuclei Antisofisticazione e 
Sanità, “NAS”) raided the hotel rooms of the 20 teams participating in the Giro d’Italia 
(“Giro”) and found a number of banned substances, including stimulants, corticoids, 
testosterone, caffeine, adrenal and anabolic steroids; police also discovered unlabelled 
medicine bottles, syringes and vials of blood, along with a plasma/protein-based 
solution.79  
 
Numerous doping scandals 
 
In addition to the 2008 Freiburg Report and the 2012 USADA Reasoned Decision that a 
posteriori described doping patterns during this era, numerous scandals occurred that 
revealed to the public and sport authorities, new doping patterns within the peloton. This 
was assisted by the introduction in 2004 of a test for homologous blood doping, which 
was used for the first time at the Athens Olympic Games.80  
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The Hamilton and Pérez cases 
During the Athens Games, Tyler Hamilton won gold in the men’s individual time trials, 
but tested positive for homologous blood doping. Tyler Hamilton’s A sample could not be 
confirmed because the B sample could not be tested, so he kept his medal.81 Six weeks 
later, Tyler Hamilton failed a test for blood doping at the Vuelta a España (“Vuelta”) and 
was banned for two years. The same month, Spanish rider Santi Pérez also tested positive 
for homologous blood doping and was banned for two years.82 Both riders were in team 
Phonak at the time.  
 
“Oil for Drugs” Investigation 
In 2004, another significant investigation carried out by NAS uncovered the prescription 
and sale of illegal PEDs to upwards of 146 elite and recreational athletes from different 
sports, and led to the seizure of large quantities of doping products together with blood-
doping equipment.83 One Italian physician identified as playing a key role in prescribing 
and encouraging the use of PEDs was Dr Carlo Santuccione who was banned for life by 
CONI in December 2007. Several riders were also sanctioned for the use of prohibited 
substances received from Dr Carlo Santuccione and for “prohibited association” with him, 
including the winner of the 2007 Giro, Danilo Di Luca, who received a three-month ban 
for the offence.84  
 
Leinders scandal 
Dr Geert Leinders was named the chief team doctor for Rabobank team from 1996—2009 
in the American Arbitration Association decision concerning him dated 16 January 
2015.85 He was banned for life from practising as a sports doctor for doping offences 
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committed after June 2004.86 Geert Leinders was found, among others to have been in 
possession of prohibited substances and methods and to have been involved in trafficking 
blood bags of riders for blood transfusions, of trafficking testosterone, and also of the 
administration, or attempted administration to riders of blood transfusions, luteinizing 
hormone (“LH”) and cortisone.  
 
The Cofidis Scandal  
In November 2006, British cyclist David Millar and nine others, including six riders from 
the Cofidis team, went on trial in France for their alleged role in systematic team doping. 
The riders were charged with acquiring and possessing banned substances.87 A cycling 
technician, pharmacist and former Cofidis trainer, who were accused of encouraging the 
riders to dope and supplying them with PEDs, were also prosecuted.88 David Millar, had 
already served a two-year ban whilst at Cofidis in 2004 for taking EPO. 
 
Operation Puerto  
“Operation Puerto” was an investigation carried out by the Spanish Guardia Civil 
predominantly into the Spanish doctor, Eufemiano Fuentes. In May 2006, Dr Eufemiano 
Fuentes’ home was raided, and anabolic steroids, blood transfusion equipment and over 
200 refrigerated bags of blood were found.89 The Guardia Civil also used phone tapping 
to gather evidence. The trial before the Criminal Court in Madrid was limited to crimes 
under public health laws because doping was not illegal in Spain at the time.  It was 
alleged that up to 200 athletes were involved, and about 60 professional cyclists were 
named in connection with the scandal.90  
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Jesús Manzano was the first rider to testify that Dr Eufemiano Fuentes had given him EPO, 
cortisone, steroids, Actovegin, and Oxyglobin.91 Several cyclists served suspensions for 
their links to the case, including Ivan Basso, Michele Scarponi, Jörg Jaksche and Alejandro 
Valverde.92  
 
Dr Eufemiano Fuentes was convicted of endangering public health for his role in doping 
athletes and received a one-year suspended sentence, a four-year ban from practicing 
medicine and fined $6,000.93  
 
Floyd Landis and Alexander Vinokourov Cases 
2006 Tour winner Floyd Landis riding for the Phonak cycling team, tested positive for an 
unusually high ratio of the hormone testosterone to the hormone epitestosterone (T/E 
ratio). Floyd Landis was suspended from professional cycling for a period of two years 
and dismissed from his team.  
 
In 2007, Astana withdrew from the Tour after its leader Alexander Vinokourov tested 
positive for homologous blood doping.94 This was the first time since the Festina scandal 
that an entire team withdrew from the Tour.95 Alexander Vinokourov was the third rider 
to test positive for homologous blood doping, and shortly afterwards his team-mate 
Andrei Kashechkin was also caught and suspended for the same violation.96 Alexander 
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Vinokourov was subsequently banned from cycling for two years,97 then returned to 
cycling and is today the manager of the professional cycling team Astana. 
 
New doping patterns 
 
The introduction of a viable test for EPO in addition to the increased power of law 
enforcement authorities in France and Italy resulted in a change to doping methods.  
 
“Doping doctors” and athletes changed the route of administration from subcutaneous to 
intravenous. They also decreased the dosage but increased the frequency in order to 
avoid detection.98 A former rider stated that by micro-dosing and administering EPO 
intravenously, the detection window for EPO was significantly shortened. Micro-dosing 
involves an athlete taking small, barely detectable amounts of a substance. Both EPO and 
testosterone can be taken in micro-doses to avoid detection. Several riders gave evidence 
to the USADA investigation that testosterone could be taken either sublingually or 
through testosterone patches and the detection window was significantly shortened.99 
With EPO, the usual dose was 500 ml per day, which was unlikely to be detected by 
urinary EPO test, and various masking agents (proteases) could be used, although they 
were probably unnecessary at those dosage levels. EPO was also used in connection with 
blood transfusions in order to stimulate reticulocyte production following a transfusion 
and to more quickly replenish blood supply following an extraction.100  
 
Testosterone was widely used during this time period as illustrated by the Floyd Landis 
case as well as cortisone and HGH as demonstrated by the Freiburg Report.   
 
Blood transfusion also returned to the peloton as a result of the EPO test being 
introduced. The USPS team shifted from EPO to blood transfusion in the 2000 Tour as “it 
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was rumoured that a new EPO test would soon be implemented”101 and team Telekom was 
suspected to have used it around 2003.102  
 
The Commission was informed that some of the methods used in blood transfusion could 
include a rider giving 2-3 bags over a one month period, usually in winter, with or without 
using 500 ml of EPO intravenously per day. Every month the blood would be exchanged 
to maintain blood volume and prevent a decrease in performance, avoid changes in blood 
parameters, and to always have some blood available for transfusion. The maximum 
deficit was usually 3 units of blood taken over 3 weeks or longer. 
 
With transfusions, it was believed that one unit of blood was difficult to detect, and could 
be given every 5-7 days in a major Tour, with or without Human Albumin Solution to 
lower haematocrit levels. If more than one unit was given, then 1 unit (200mls) of 20% 
of Human Albumin Solution were to be given with each unit of blood. Each unit of Human 
Albumin Solution lasted for approximately 2 days and could be given repeatedly. 
Alternatively, Desmopressin could be taken at night with 1.5 to 2 litres of water in order 
to mask the blood transfusion. They were not to be taken during the morning of a race 
however, as they restricted the ability of a rider to urinate excess liquid before the start 
of a stage. For a major Tour, a first transfusion could be given after the first anti-doping 
blood test was carried out, or on departure for the Tour, if the controls were less 
organised. 
 
Frozen blood was available from clinics in Slovenia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It 
took around 10 hours to thaw before use, but could be carried in normal luggage or a cool 
box. An alternative method of transport was to administer the thawed blood and use the 
rider to “carry” it within his circulation, and it could then be removed at the destination. 
One rider provided information confirming that he would be given 2 to 3 units of blood 
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in Madrid, and he would then travel to France where the units would be removed 
immediately, to be used later throughout the Tour. 
 
Much of EPO and testosterone doping was done outside competitions as out of 
competition tests were still in their infancy and easily avoided. Autologous blood 
transfusions were taking place in and out of competition as they were undetectable. One 
example, according to Patrick Sinkewitz’s witness statement in the Freiburg 
investigations, is Dr Lothar Heinrich carrying out autologous blood doping and 
reinjecting Patrik Sinkewitz, Matthias Kessler and Andreas Klöden during the 2006 
Tour.103  
 
The involvement of law enforcement agencies in different scandals made teams very 
nervous. Riders no longer spoke openly about doping but referred to it in the third person 
or used code-names for various substances. One former rider commented that before 
Festina, people carried doping products around, and handed them to riders after races, 
but after Festina such practices vanished. Talking about doping no longer happened 
between the teams, only between riders of the same team and not as openly as before. 
 
The prominent role of “doping doctors” 
 
With the reintroduction of blood transfusion into the peloton, “doping doctors” cemented 
their key position in the teams’ doping programme during the 2001—2008 era.  
 
One rider told the Commission he had spent more than EUR 30,000 in two years with Dr 
Eufemiano Fuentes, to plan and administer his PED programme. His team arranged and 
paid for his flights to Madrid. The rider used EPO, HGH, blood doping and masking agents 
during that period under Dr Eufemiano Fuentes’ guidance. George Hincapie from USPS 
indicated to USADA that he agreed to hire Dr Michele Ferrari to assist him with his blood 
doping programme and was told that it would cost him USD 15,000 for the season.104 He 
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testified, “Dr. Ferrari told me that the team doctors would assist me with the blood doping 
program and they did.”105 
 
The recent American Arbitration Association decision against Geert Leinders 
summarised the role given  to the Rabobank doctor in the team’s doping programme such 
as keeping insulin on the team bus and having it delivered nightly to a rider, supervising 
the use of EPO, assisting in blood transfusions, assisting with the administration of LH 
and Dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA), providing advice regarding visits to a Human 
Plasma clinic for advanced blood doping, writing false medical certificates, and having 
testosterone pills manufactured and disguised to avoid detection.   
 
The following excerpt from the USADA Reasoned Decision encapsulates the 
omnipresence of an external doctor in a rider’s life: “From team training camps in Austin, 
Texas; St. Moritz, Switzerland; Alicante, Spain; Puigcerdà, Spain; and on the island of 
Tenerife in the Canary Islands, to personal training sessions and meetings with Lance at 
those camps and at other times in Austin, Texas; Girona, Spain; Valencia, Spain; Milan, Italy; 
Sestriéres, Italy; St. Moritz, Switzerland; the island of Tenerife, and along roadsides 
throughout Europe, on many occasions where Lance could be found, Michele Ferrari was 
there also”.106  
 
Dr Michele Ferrari was reported to be conservative in terms of how he recommended and 
administered doping programmes. In comparison, a number of riders characterised Dr 
Eufemiano Fuentes as the “go-to” doctor if you wanted to try new, sometimes 
“experimental”, ideas in doping.  
 
If blood is not stored and administered correctly, the transfusion can be fatal for the 
athlete. In Jesús Manzano’s case, the blood was poorly conserved, without his name on 
the bag, and it made him ill. “It didn't say 'Manzano' on it; it could have been Joe Bloggs’ 
blood,” he said. “They put 125ml into me and I began to feel bad, really bad. I was shivering; 
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I felt colder than if I'd been at the North Pole. If they'd put in half a litre, I would have gone 
home in a box”.107 
 
In the Freiburg Report, Dr Andreas Schmid was found to have acted in “gross violation of 
a doctor’s duty of care” by allowing the riders travel back from Freiburg to Strasbourg 
without further medical supervision, exposing them to a risk of “severe complications in 
the form of septic shock or a lung embolism with possible fatal consequences”.108  A former 
rider interviewed by the CIRC, commented that the Freiburg clinic positioned itself as an 
anti-doping crusader, regularly exchanging information with the Cologne laboratory. 
Using the university clinic, team Telekom/T-Mobile was told how to avoid testing positive 
and what new tests might be coming. This is another example where a party which was 
allegedly engaged in the fight against doping, was actually complicit in it and playing both 
sides for personal gain.  
 
Sponsors and German TV Withdraw 
 
In July 2007, German state networks ARD and ZDF stopped live broadcasts of the Tour 
after a positive test of German rider Patrik Sinkewitz and other Puerto-linked issues.109 
They broadcast again the Tour from 2008—2011, and finally withdrew in 2012.110  
 
Two sponsors also announced exits from the sport. Phonak’s sponsorship collapsed after 
Floyd Landis was convicted of doping in 2006, and Gerolsteiner announced in 2007 that 
it would stop sponsorship at the end of its contract, stating that recent doping scandals 
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108 “Final Report of the Expert Commission investigating the accusations of doping against doctors in the 
Sports Medicine Department of the Freiburg University Clinic” Cologne (23 March 2009, last updated 12 
May 2009) p. 7. Available: http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/2009-03-
23+Final+Report+of+Expert+Commission+Freiburg+Univ.+Clinic.ENGLISH.pdf. 
109 Deutshce Welle, “German TV Stops Broadcasting Tour de France After Doping Case” (18 July 2007). 
Available: http://www.dw.de/german-tv-stops-broadcasting-tour-de-france-after-doping-case/a-
2696396.  
110 Berno Buechel et al., “Nobody’s Innocent – The Role of Customers in the Doping Dilemma,” (2013). 
Available: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44627/1/MPRA_paper_44627.pdf. According to a recent 
press report, ARD will start live-broadcasting the Tour again from 2015; the broadcasting contract will 
apparently contain a get-out clause in the event of new doping scandals. See L’Équipe, “Le Tour revient 
sur la télévision allemande”, (4 Jan. 2015). Available: http://www.lequipe.fr/Medias/Actualites/Le-tour-
revient-a-la-tele/525689 (in French). 
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had played a part in reducing the value of cycling as a communications platform.111 Some 
other sponsors, such as Cofidis following the scandal of their team introduced a new anti-
doping policy. Riders had to agree to unannounced testing 4 to 5 times per year on urine, 
blood and hair samples, and had to tell the team if they received treatment from a third-
party doctor. 
 
The 2001—2007 era has shown how quickly the peloton managed to adapt to new anti-
doping measures by swiftly moving from an EPO-focused doping regime to a cocktail of 
EPO micro-dosing, testosterone and blood transfusions. Doping was still prevalent, very 
much the norm and organised around the central figure of the doping doctor. Following 
the Festina scandal, several team managers shifted the burden of responsibility of doping 
to the athletes, still expecting them to dope but outside the team and leaving them in the 
hands of external team doctors. Anti-doping measures and tests were still insufficient to 
tackle the doping problem: there was no test for autologous blood transfusion and out of 
competition tests were still embryonic. The fear of being caught had more to do with a 
law enforcement investigation than anti-doping tests so that countries with more relaxed 
or non-existing anti-doping legislation were favoured for training and/or living purposes.  
 
However, the combination of sponsor and TV withdrawal demonstrated that the public 
and major stakeholders in cycling were growing wary of the culture of doping that 
undermined the sport and called for major advances on the anti-doping front to give back 
to cycling the credibility it was losing. 
 
1.4. 2008–TODAY: THE END OF WIDESPREAD AND TEAM ORGANISED DOPING? 
 
The Athlete Biological Passport (“ABP”) brought about another major change in doping 
practices. Since its introduction by the UCI in 2008, being the first IF to do so, the ABP has 
been the mainstay of the anti-doping framework in cycling. Many riders advised that its 
introduction changed the doping landscape, and riders and doctors had to adapt their 
practices, processes and procedures to avoid detection. 
 
                                                     
111 Susan Westemeyer, “Gerolsteiner ends sponsorship after 2008”, Cycling News (4 Sept. 2007). 
Available: http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/news.php?id=news/2007/sep07/sep04news2.  
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1.4.1. The introduction of the Athlete Biological Passport  
 
The ABP was perhaps the biggest anti-doping innovation since the EPO test was 
introduced in 2000. The aim of the ABP was to focus on the effects of prohibited 
substances and methods on an athlete’s body, where “each athlete should become his own 
reference, meaning that individual limits should be applied instead of population limits, and 
one could use the athlete’s previous measurements as basal levels”.112  
 
Individuals were evaluated against their own levels over time, not against a “one-size-
fits-all” threshold at a single moment. If an athlete had an abnormal profile from tests 
taken during a specified period, an ADO could also target an athlete with regular anti-
doping tests or, if the evidence was compelling, pursue a possible ADRV pursuant to 
article 2.2 of the WADA Code.113 Riders told the Commission the ABP transformed the 
doping landscape, and made doping much harder.  
 
Prior to the ABP, only 3 riders were convicted of blood doping. In the first three years of 
the ABP, 26 riders were found positive for the presence of EPO stimulating agents in their 
specimens.114 In 20 out of the 26 positive cases, it was the abnormal blood profile which 
raised suspicions leading to a targeted anti-doping urinary or blood test.115  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
112 Mario Zorzoli, “Biological passport parameters”, J. Hum. Sport Exerc. Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 205-217 (2011). 
Available: http://www.jhse.ua.es/jhse/article/view/215.  
113 Mario Zorzoli and Francesca Rossi, “Case Studies on ESA-doping as revealed by the Biological 
Passport”, Drug Test. Analysis (2012). Available: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224708690_Case_studies_on_ESA-
doping_as_revealed_by_the_Biological_Passport.  
114 Mario Zorzoli and Francesca Rossi, “Case Studies on ESA-doping as revealed by the Biological 
Passport”, Drug Test. Analysis (2012). Available: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224708690_Case_studies_on_ESA-
doping_as_revealed_by_the_Biological_Passport.  
115 Mario Zorzoli and Francesca Rossi, “Case Studies on ESA-doping as revealed by the Biological 
Passport”, Drug Test. Analysis (2012). Available: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224708690_Case_studies_on_ESA-
doping_as_revealed_by_the_Biological_Passport. 
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1.4.2. Main doping incidents/cases 
 
Tour 2008 
The new test for CERA (Continuous Erythropoietin Receptor Activator “CERA”), a third 
generation EPO variant, was introduced during the 2008 Tour. Unusually, that year’s race 
was invigilated not by UCI but by the French anti-doping agency (Agence Française de 
Lutte contre le Dopage “AFLD”). The new generations of EPO, such as CERA, proved to be 
better because the release and red blood cell creation was slower which meant less 
frequent injections for a rider (a laboratory director explained to the CIRC that only 1 
injection per month would be needed in contrast to 1 to 3 injection per week with EPO 
generation 1 and 2). It appeared from documents from the Operación Puerto 
investigation that CERA was known to the peloton prior to 2006. 
 
Riccardo Riccò, Leonardo Piepoli, Bernard Kohl and Stefan Schumacher, tested positive 
for CERA,116 as did Manuel Beltran and Moises Duenas. This is a good example of anti-
doping measures reasonably quickly catching up with clandestine doping practices.   
 
One rider who tested positive at the Tour explained that he had received CERA from his 
doctor, who had got it from a person in Monaco, who in turn had acquired it from 
Germany. He had previously been using EPO in micro-doses and blood doping. He took it 
regularly in the Giro and leading up to the Tour, every 4 or 5 days, injecting it 
subcutaneously.  
 
The Mantova Investigation 
The Mantova investigation coordinated by Public Prosecutor Antonino Condorelli 
uncovered doping practices in the Lampre Team in 2009 with assistance from a 
pharmacist from northern Italy.117 It was alleged that at least 25 people were involved in 
the doping scheme, including directeurs sportifs and the teams’ general manager. The 
team management allegedly sent riders for doping from across Italy, and numerous 
                                                     
116 Andrew Hood, “Doping scandals in Europe include Giro sample re-tests and intercepted text messages 
in Spain”, Velo News (30 Oct. 2009). Available: http://velonews.competitor.com/2009/10/news/doping-
scandals-in-europe-include-giro-sample-re-tests-and-intercepted-text-messages-in-spain_99668.  
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substances were code-worded to help avoid detection by the authorities.118 The hearings 
following this investigation are ongoing and therefore there has not yet been any 
conclusion on the allegations. 
 
The Contador case 
Alberto Contador won the 2010 Tour riding for Astana. He tested positive for clenbuterol 
and was stripped of his title. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) found that 
Contador probably tested positive due to a contaminated food supplement.119 The case 
will be further addressed in the UCI section of this Report.  
 
The Padova Investigation 
The investigation coordinated by Padova public prosecutor Benedetto Roberti is focused 
on Dr Michele Ferrari’s doping activities in the period 2010-2011. 38 current and former 
professional riders have been reported as being clients of Dr Michele Ferrari.120 The 
inquiry has been running for several years and a report totalling 550 pages was 
submitted recently to CONI.  
 
USADA Reasoned Decision 
As previously discussed, USADA released their Reasoned Decision on 10 October 2012. 
The resulting confessions and public story of the USPS/Discover Channel team’s doping 
shed light on the doping activities of the American team and its key rider from 1998 until 
2005. The Reasoned Decision represents a strong step forward in the evolution of 
eradicating doping in cycling. It demonstrated that sporting legacies can be dismantled, 
even years after an athlete’s retirement, where there is the will to pursue dopers, 
supported by science and improved investigation techniques. It also showed the 
importance of whistleblowers in doping cases in addition to anti-doping tools such as 
                                                     
118 Stephen Farrand, “Report: Details of the Lampre Mantova investigation emerge” cycling news (30 Jan. 
2014). Available: http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/report-details-of-the-lampre-mantova-
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reductions of sanctions in return for cooperation, tests and the ABP, and the action of law 
enforcement agencies.  
 
The Reasoned Decision also highlighted the failure of anti-doping measures focussed 
solely on testing, to catch athletes and athlete support personnel involved in doping 
activities (USADA, WADA and UCI cumulatively tested Lance Armstrong around 200 
times). It was only with the assistance of law enforcement authorities, and despite the 
reported political pressure that led to the US federal investigation being closed, that 
USADA was able to take over the Lance Armstrong case and prosecute it. The Reasoned 
Decision also highlighted certain behaviour by the rider, such as witness intimidation or 
retaliation against witnesses. 
 
1.4.3. What is the situation in respect of doping in cycling today? 
 
It is clear from the analysis above, that doping practices have changed over time as riders 
have adapted to new anti-doping tests and new and better doping techniques were 
discovered. Today the situation in cycling is likely still changing, and, certainly, it has 
become more opaque as riders have now been forced to dope “underground”. A common 
response to the Commission, when asked about teams, was that probably 3 or 4 were 
clean, 3 or 4 were doping, and the rest were a “don’t know”.  A number of top riders, and 
others in the sport, discussed other rider’s top performances, or changes in appearance 
due to dramatic weight loss, and were unable to explain how they were achieved.  
 
One respected cycling professional felt that even today, 90% of the peloton was doping, 
although he thought that there was little orchestrated team doping in the manner that 
teams had previously employed. Another put it at around 20%. Many people simply 
stated they “didn’t know” who was clean and who was not. A lot of these discrepancies 
may be caused by the definition of doping being used by individuals (see above). 
 
The ABP was a paradigm shift in anti-doping and began to reduce the percentage 
performance gain that EPO had previously offered because riders had to take smaller 
quantities to avoid detection. This in turn gave clean riders the chance to compete and 
win, particularly in shorter stages in the Grand Tours. Gradually, 10-15% gains have 
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become a thing of the past. It has been reported that increases in performance by micro-
dosing EPO (as one form of continued doping) are now perhaps between 3-5%. This has 
had a significant impact on the doping landscape today because by reducing the 
performance gains, riders will start to believe that they can have a career riding clean. 
This is a key development in the fight against doping. 
 
However, the Astana case in 2014 is an example that shows the problem has not been 
eradicated at the higher levels. The Astana world tour and pro-continental teams 
collectively incurred five doping violations in 2014, two by the world tour team (EPO) 
and three by the pro-continental team (steroids).121  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the ability of NADOs and laboratories around the world, 
as well as the substances that are routinely tested for, differ considerably and that most 
riders know exactly what the weak spots in the various countries are and are able to 
adapt and/or take advantage of this lack of a level playing field. 
 
Doping Substances and Prohibited Methods Used  
 
The core elements to achieve performance enhancement through doping in cycling have 
remained the same over the years: firstly, increasing the blood’s oxygen carrying 
capacity, and, secondly, stimulating muscle growth and aiding muscle recovery. Over the 
years riders have adapted the substances and methods used to achieve these goals in 
response to: (i) the type of substances available and accessible on the pharmaceutical 
market (e.g., various EPO generations); (ii) specific drug detection capabilities of 
laboratories, (e.g., the switch from EPO to blood transfusions or to ozone therapy, or even 
towards the so-called “oxygen in a pill” in the form of GW1516 and AICAR); and (iii) other 
anti-doping  tools, such as the ABP which has led to micro-dosing (see below). 
 
Another way in which riders seek to improve their performance is through reducing their 
weight in order to increase their power/weight ratio. Interviewees noted cases of 
                                                     
121 The world tour team was granted a licence, provisional upon the findings of an external audit. The 
audit was to look into the circumstances of the doping cases in question to determine whether, and to 
what extent, the team and/or its management was responsible for the doping events. 
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dramatic weight loss in certain riders, which they felt could only be explained by use of 
performance enhancing products.  The Commission heard that the desire to lose weight 
might also be leading to an increase in eating disorders amongst riders. 
 
Micro-dosing and other oxygen enhancing techniques 
 
As noted above, the introduction of the ABP has had a significant effect on doping 
practices. The ABP makes it difficult for riders to use EPO or blood-transfusions to the 
extent that they were previously used because riders are now forced to ensure that their 
blood parameters stay within their normal range. Riders therefore turned to micro-
dosing of EPO, which enabled them to improve their performance to some extent whilst 
avoiding the “spikes” in blood values that could be detected by the ABP. One rider 
confirmed to the Commission that following the introduction of the ABP he was told by 
his doping doctor to only conduct transfusions of a maximum of 150—200 ml blood, 
whereas the size of the blood bags previously used by USPS/Discovery Channel and Team 
Telekom/T-Mobile (according to the Reasoned Decision and Freiburg Report) amounted 
to 500 ml. 
 
Consequently, despite improvements to the science underlying the ABP, it is still possible 
for riders to micro-dose using EPO without getting caught. The Commission also heard 
that riders are confident that they can take a micro-dose of EPO in the evening because it 
will not show up by the time the doping control officers (“DCO” or “DCOs”) could arrive 
to test at 6am. One top rider noted that riders take more risks when they are at home 
because they know they will be tested at competitions if they make the top 5. Further, it 
was commented that the variety of “biosimilar” EPOs makes it more difficult to prove 
administration under the WADA technical documents.  
 
The Commission also heard that riders are using ozone therapy, which involves 
extracting blood, treating it with ozone and injecting it back into the blood. One rider 
informed the Commission that by way of using ozone therapy he felt stronger, and that 
the muscles recovered, but that it had however not been as efficient as EPO. Several 
interviewees mentioned that AICAR, which supposedly has similar effects to EPO, has 
become popular in the peloton. 
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Steroids and HGH 
 
As the detection window for anabolic steroids is relatively long, riders today have sought 
alternative ways to try to obtain the same performance enhancing effect through 
stimulating muscle growth.   
 
One method that riders have employed has been to use HGH, or growth hormone 
releasing peptides and Gonadotropin-releasing hormone. These substances are more 
difficult to detect than steroids, although the HGH test introduced in 2012 has extended 
the detection window for certain HGH products.  
 
In order to avoid detection, riders have for some time been using testosterone patches 
and gels because they release smaller quantities and the detection time is therefore 
shorter.  These are sometimes used in combination with the HGH products mentioned 
above to increase their effectiveness. However, HGH is generally expensive and, certainly 
at lower levels of competition, it appears that riders therefore continue to use steroids. 
The Commission also heard that the same muscle enhancing effect can be gained by 
taking a combination of very small quantities of a variety of steroids. Again, by taking such 
products in such small quantities, it makes detection significantly more difficult. 
 
The Commission understands that in an effort to seek the same performance enhancing 
benefit without violating the rules, riders may also be using a homeopathic pill that could 
potentially increase their testosterone levels. 
 
Corticoids 
 
Corticoids are widely used today both to reduce pain and therefore improve endurance 
capability and to achieve weight loss to improve power/weight ratio. On the WADA 
Prohibited List all corticoids are prohibited when administered by oral, intravenous, 
intramuscular or rectal routes, but Therapeutic Use Exemptions (“TUEs”) can be 
requested for such administration. 
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One doctor stated that it was impossible to lose the weight that some riders achieve 
without assistance, and that the TUE is taken advantage of to enable this practice.122 He 
stated that riders use corticoids to “lean out” i.e. to lose weight quickly, and keep it off, 
without losing power. By way of example he explained that to lose 4kg in 4 weeks by 
using corticoids would provide a 7% power/weight improvement. He added that when 
used in large quantities and in conjunction with other substances, they supported 
performance gains. Another doctor stated that some quite recent big wins on the UCI 
WorldTour were as a result, in part, of some members of the team all using corticoids to 
get their weight down to support the individual who won (who also used the same 
weight-loss technique). It was reported that this had been a planned approach by that 
group’s management.  
 
TUEs 
 
TUEs is a complicated and delicate area.123. Interviewees reported that TUEs are 
systematically exploited by some teams and even used as part of performance 
enhancement programmes. One team doctor stated that he believed the TUE system had 
been regularly abused, particularly as previously mentioned, in the area of corticoids.  
 
Today there appears to be concern among riders about the way in which TUEs are used 
for corticoids and insulin in particular, and the extent to which they are being abused. 
One difficulty, raised by a laboratory, is that it is difficult to tell from a sample whether 
corticoids have been administered through permitted routes of administration. A former 
rider stated that taking insulin before meals helped to enhance recovery. In general, there 
was a feeling that it is too easy to obtain a TUE; one rider who had doped reported that 
he was told to ask for a TUE for triamcinolone acetonide (Kenacort) claiming that he had 
tendonitis; he had no problem obtaining the TUE. 
 
                                                     
122 “The Therapeutic Use Exemption (TUE) process is a means by which an athlete can obtain approval to use 
a prescribed prohibited substance or method for the treatment of a legitimate medical condition”. See 
http://www.ukad.org.uk/about-TUE.  
123 According to data made available to CIRC, a minimum of 550 TUEs were registered with UCI between 
2008 and 2014, of which 368 were for riders who registered only once, nearly 90 riders registered twice, 
and five registered five times or more. 
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The Commission heard different views on the use of TUEs for corticoids. According to the 
head of one laboratory, and many others interviewed, corticoids should generally only be 
administered for acute conditions, which would mean that if a rider needed to use them, 
they should not be able to compete. Certainly, on that basis a constant or long-term use 
of corticoids could not be justified medically. On the other hand, it was pointed out that 
in cases of real emergency, corticoids might be medically justified in order to enable the 
rider to compete (particularly, for example, where there is an important event coming up 
or during a competition held over several weeks in order to allow the rider to finish the 
race).  
 
The Commission heard that the problem of abuse of TUEs also exists in women’s cycling, 
where some riders would turn up at the race registration with extensive folders of TUE-
related documentation.  
 
The Commission further heard that riders and team personnel find the current system 
for TUE application much easier to abuse than during the period when only a so-called 
“Declaration of Use” had been required instead, i.e. where riders had to declare any 
corticoids used at the time of the doping control. At that time most teams had a person 
responsible, generally the team doctor, to ensure that not too many riders declared the 
use of such substances at once. 
 
In one rider’s opinion, 90% of TUEs were used for performance-enhancing purposes. 
Concern that a system of granting certificates for the therapeutic use of prohibited 
substances under medical supervision could be used by athletes to take prohibited 
substances when not medically justified, was apparently voiced in a report to a 
symposium on doping control in 1979.124 It appears that this concern has materialised 
and is a significant problem even today. 
 
                                                     
124 Marcel Reinold, “Arguing against doping: A discourse analytical study on Olympic anti-doping between 
the 1960s and the late 1980s” (7 May 2012). Available: 
https://doc.rero.ch/record/29383/files/ReinoldFinalReportIOC2011.pdf_attachment_.pdf.  
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Today, some teams aligned to the Mouvement Pour un Cyclisme Crédible (“MPCC”) have 
decided that any TUE application for intra-articular corticoid injections should be 
accompanied by an automatic 8 day rest period.125  
 
Other substances used 
 
It was clear from interviews that some riders are prepared to try a wide range of 
substances to gain an advantage. One rider, for example, told the Commission that he had 
used at least 12 different types of substances throughout his professional career, some of 
which were highly experimental and which were even designed only for horses.   
 
By way of example, GW 1516 is a substance that sends more oxygen to the muscles, burns 
fat and increases muscle mass. However, regulated development of the drug stopped 
before it was given clinical approval because it was thought to cause cancer.126 It is 
illegally manufactured today and a number of riders have been found to use it, despite 
WADA issuing a warning to athletes about its effects. The Commission heard that riders 
will use products which are only at trial stage and which are yet to receive clinical 
approval. 
 
There also appears to be an increase in the availability of “designer” steroids, which can 
be found on the internet and often originate from China.  One rider informed the 
Commission that he has been provided with a “new artificial” form of Testosterone. 
 
The Commission was also told by a rider of a “pills system” used during races in 2011, 
involving up to 30 pills daily. They were to be taken during a stage to enable better 
breathing, develop greater power and to help finish a stage strongly, as well as afterwards 
for recovery. He said team riders also took tranquilisers at night and anti-depressants in 
the morning. He believed some of his crashes were due to the effects of these drugs. He 
also stated that there was a drink given to a rider who may be able to win, which made 
the heart beat faster and which caused the body to burn sugars immediately.  
                                                     
125 See http://www.mpcc.fr/index.php/en/mpcc-uk.  
126 UKAD, “WADA issues alert on substance GW501516” (23 March 2013). Available: 
http://www.ukad.org.uk/news/article/wada-issues-alert-on-gw501516 
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The Commission has collected a long list of substances or medical products that riders 
are using today or have been using in the last few years. They are listed to demonstrate 
the breadth and extent of drugs available to professional and amateurs alike.  
 
 Some of the substances or methods used to enhance blood oxygen capacity or 
“normalise” blood values are: Aicar, Xenon gas, ozone therapy, ITPP, Gas6, Actovegin, 
various forms of EPO such as CERA, “Eprex”, EPO zeta, EPO Retacrit, Neorecormon, 
and Albumina (to normalise blood values).  
 
 Products used to increase muscle growth and recovery (in the general classes of 
anabolic substances, HGH, Growth Hormone releasing peptides and Gonadotropin-
releasing hormone) which have been reported include: Kryptocur, Lutrelef, Gonasi, 
TB-500, Glucagone, Geref, Menogon, Proviron, Deca Durabolin, Testovis, Triacana, 
Dynatrope, Monores, and Hypertropin.  
 
 Others products that have been mentioned to the CIRC are: IGF-1, Kenacort and 
Redux.  
 
These lists indicate the relentless flow of substances coming into the sport. It is obvious 
that mere rules and regulations cannot alone stem the tide; other approaches to anti-
doping are also required.  
 
Substances not on the WADA Prohibited List 
 
The Commission also heard that riders will take a wide range of non-banned substances 
to create a performance-enhancing effect. For example riders seem to be taking an array 
of painkillers and caffeine tablets, as well as nutritional supplements. Even though these 
are not currently Prohibited Substances on the WADA List, the CIRC has been told that 
the administration of some of these substances has the sole purpose of performance 
enhancement. They are therefore highlighted for completeness of the range of substances 
that riders will take to gain an advantage. Products and substances that have been 
mentioned include Viagra, Cialis and various nutritional supplements and homeopathic 
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products: Testis, Coenzyme Compositum, Spirulina, Levothyroxine, Acetylcarnitine, 
Levocarnitine, Fructose; Levomefolate calcium, beta-alanine, iron products, Vitamin B12 
and folic acids, Omega 3, and Oxazepam. 
 
Further, Tramadol, a narcotic-like pain reliever, has been in the media recently.127 The 
Commission was told by some that it is used widely because it is an extremely strong pain 
killer and is not on the banned list. Again, there was a body of opinion that if a rider 
needed to take the product, the rider should not be riding. It was also thought that 
Tramadol could cause impairment of judgement in a rider, which in turn could cause 
crashes.  
 
Sources of PEDs 
 
The traditional sources of drugs have been false prescriptions, pharmacies and hospitals, 
and riders have either obtained drugs directly or gone through intermediaries, such as 
other riders or team staff. These continue to be sources of PEDs for riders today. In Italy, 
for example, it is suspected that only half of EPO sales from pharmacies are used for the 
treatment of a medical condition, and it is suggested that the other half is used for doping 
purposes. However, it is noted that access to, and tracking of, certain drugs via 
pharmacies has been tightened up in some countries by the introduction of electronic 
systems, for example in Spain and The Netherlands.  
 
Two newer sources of PEDs are the internet and gyms, which are favoured sources for 
acquiring drugs for those without access to the right doctors. The internet has opened up 
a market in new designer steroids and allows riders to identify and obtain drugs that are 
still in clinical trials. The internet also makes it easier for riders to obtain new variants of 
drugs, for example the EPO variants, which help them to avoid detection. 
 
Riders who dope predominantly use doctors who are outside the teams today for their 
doping requirements. In some cases, the doctors and riders only communicate 
                                                     
127 Press Association, “Team Sky urges ban on Tramadol after former rider reveals usage”, The Guardian 
(28 Apr. 2014). Available: http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2014/apr/28/team-sky-urges-ban-
tramadol. 
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electronically or through intermediaries. Certain anti-aging or wellness-type clinics are 
also mentioned as operating a doping facility for riders who can afford it. The Commission 
was also told of well-known “doping doctors”, still operating in the sport today 
(seemingly through intermediaries and in other countries). Despite sanctions and public 
condemnation, they continue to have a market in which to ply their doping trade. The 
new offence of prohibited association in Article 2.10 of the 2015 WADA Code may provide 
a way to discourage riders from working with them, although it still does not address the 
underlying problem that such doctors often still have their medical licence.128  
 
It has been difficult to establish where, geographically, riders obtain PEDs today. 
Interviewees talked about drugs coming from Eastern Europe and further east, although 
this was rarely specified in any greater detail. And, through the internet designer drugs 
from China appear to have become available. However, the ability to purchase PEDs on 
the internet makes it very difficult to track the original source of products. This 
emphasises the need for ADOs to work with law enforcement and, particularly, customs. 
 
Modus operandi 
 
One of the most significant changes in doping programmes is that, at the UCI WorldTour 
level, they are no longer organised systematically by teams. Programmes today are often 
individually organised, clandestine programmes. However, the fact that cycling teams are 
not organising the programmes does not mean that they are always entirely separate or 
that riders do not have sophisticated “teams” around them, comprising predominantly 
people outside the cycling team. In these new “teams”, which are often initiated through 
introductions and facilitated by intermediaries, riders are well-protected and well-
funded. The extent of the knowledge within the team may be highly limited, with 
managers perhaps adopting a “don’t ask, don’t tell” mantra. The largely non-orchestrated 
nature of doping today was echoed by a number of knowledgeable and reliable people. 
They were of the view that there is an elite who are still doping in a sophisticated way 
today.  
 
                                                     
128 Available: https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/wada-2015-world-anti-
doping-code.pdf. 
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Some examples that have been reported by interviewees and taken from recent 
investigations emphasise that riders still need to rely on external people to help, whether 
this is purely with the medical side of the programme or simply to source PEDs for them. 
One of the key roles remains that of the doctor. Now that riders at the top level have to 
provide samples for the ABP, they need to take a more sophisticated approach to doping 
in order to avoid a positive test. Therefore, for those riders who can afford it, a 
sophisticated doping programme requires a doctor to carefully monitor their blood 
values to ensure that they stay within the parameters. The situation has moved on 
significantly from the days when riders could purchase their own centrifuge and simply 
monitor their haematocrit level. For this reason that much more emphasis needs to be 
placed on targeting and investigating athlete support personnel. 
 
Media reports on the Padova criminal investigation in Italy mention that Dr Michele 
Ferrari and others, including a rider’s agent, bankers and a lawyer, were being 
investigated for belonging to a criminal syndicate with the aim of trafficking and 
administration of doping substances, as well as tax evasion and money laundering129. The 
allegations suggest that a “package” of support was offered to riders, which included tax 
evasion advice, training and doping programmes, legal advice, false contracts, the 
involvement of tax consultancy companies to manage secondary contracts, and money 
laundering. Athletes from other sports are alleged to have been involved, and a variety of 
“service levels” were offered to cater for the elite professional through to the amateur 
with connections and money.  Most activities are alleged to have taken place in Italy and 
Switzerland (and to a more limited extent in Tenerife and Monaco).  
 
In his affidavit to USADA, Leonardo Bertagnolli confirmed that he cooperated with Dr 
Michele Ferrari from the end of 2006 until 2010. Dr Michele Ferrari’s involvement in the 
later years were mainly in relation to blood doping. In 2010, Michele Ferrari advised 
Leonardo Bertagnolli that according to him only “crazy suicidal” people would still be 
using EPO.130 
                                                     
129 Gazetto dello Sport, “Ecco il sistema Ferrari Conti svizzeri, contratti finti”, (18 Oct. 2012). Available: 
http://www.gazzetta.it/Ciclismo/17-10-2012/sistema-ferrari-%3Ccs474%3Econti-svizzeri-contratti-
finti-cosi-si-ricicla-tesoro-doping-912938790314.shtml (in Italian). 
130 United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Lance Armstrong, Reasoned Decision on Disqualification and 
Ineligibility (10 Oct. 2012) – Annex I to affidavit of Renzo Ferrante. Available: 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/Bertagnolli%2c+Leonardo%2c+Witness+Statement.pdf. 
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The Commission was also told that Dr Eufemiano Fuentes is apparently still treating 
athletes despite being banned in 2013 from practising sports medicine for 4 years.131  
 
In another example, one rider explained how he had got caught for using EPO in 2013. He 
stated that he had received the substance from an amateur rider working in local 
pharmacies in northern Italy. The rider had been using Dr Michele Ferrari’s services 
remotely, through the amateur rider who in return provided Ferrari with doping 
substances. The amateur rider ordered products from abroad that were unavailable in 
his local pharmacies, and had them delivered to a Swiss pharmacy where he collected 
them. The amateur rider told the rider that he also provided substances for professional 
riders from four pro teams.  
 
It also appears that team organised doping is more likely still to take place at lower levels 
of competition, where anti-doping efforts are less concentrated. The Commission was 
told of a team below the UCI WorldTour recently involved in doping. It was claimed that 
the team manager and sports director brought a nutritionist into the team who advised a 
selected group of riders within the team on a doping programme. The instructions were 
to administer 1000 ml of EPO Zeta every second day after 11pm at night, and alternate in 
the winter with HGH and Lutrelef, a hormone. Their haematocrit levels were to be tested 
every third day, and amounts of EPO Zeta reduced to 500 ml as the season approached. 
The nutritionist owned a gym, through which substances were procured from Eastern 
Europe. Other riders were said to have procured substances via a hospital and a 
pharmacy more locally. It was further explained that the team manager was also a senior 
person in a prominent anti-doping movement, and had later on introduced strong anti-
doping clauses in the team contracts, including the imposition of significant fines for 
anyone caught doping.  
 
As one interviewee told the Commission, another way that riders might get access to 
doping products is through their agents. This distances the rider from the doping source 
thereby minimising exposure. Agents are well connected and by representing many 
                                                     
131 According to an interviewee, Dr Eufemiano Fuentes is currently operating from South America. 
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riders can create a network to cater for all the riders’ needs, from contractual and 
financial matters to, in some cases, doping.  
 
Methods to avoid detection 
 
Over the years riders have shown themselves to be highly adaptable in their doping 
practices in order to avoid detection. It appears that many riders who dope continue to 
have in-depth knowledge of the products and how and when to take them in order to 
avoid detection.  For example, riders know that they should micro-dose in the evening 
and that they will then be fine if tested in the morning. For this reason riders no longer 
have the same fear of out-of-competition testing. One rider explained that he would take 
EPO until 3 to 4 days prior to the start of a competition and administer HGH up until 5 
days prior to competition, but would start using corticosteroid injections 3 to 4 days prior 
to the competition. 
 
Ironically, the ABP is also used by riders to avoid detection. Anti-doping experts noted 
that the fact that riders had access to their blood values, allowed them to ensure that they 
stayed within their limits when blood-doping. Interviewees also explained that riders 
deliberately schedule high altitude training camps and use oxygen tents, not only for their 
potential training effects, but also in order to explain a potential jump in their values if 
there is a test. 
 
Several interviewees also confirmed to the CIRC that riders are able to “play” the 
whereabouts system, for example by changing their whereabouts frequently and at the 
last minute or providing vague information so that they could not be found. The 
Commission was also told that riders felt that they had the comfort of being able to have 
a missed test. 
 
Amateur cycling 
 
The Commission believes that doping in amateur cycling is becoming endemic. This was 
confirmed by amateur riders, as well as professionals, managers and anti-doping 
personnel who had exposure to it. It has been caused by a combination of ease of access 
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to drugs via gyms and the internet, the reduction in costs for substances, a spread of 
knowledge in means and methods of administration, and a lack of funding for regular 
testing at the amateur level.  
 
Masters races were also said to have middle-aged businessmen winning on EPO, with 
some of them training as hard as professional riders and putting in comparable 
performances. Some professional riders explained that they no longer ride in the Gran 
Fondos because they were so competitive due to the number of riders doping.  
 
Youth cycling was mentioned as being particularly vulnerable as anti-doping testing is 
concentrated at the elite level so doping may go undetected at lower levels. If youth riders 
want to reach higher ranks, the incentives are there to dope at an early age. As a result, 
some managers try to identify good quality amateur riders in their mid-teens to sign them 
clean before they got exposed to doping.  
 
The Commission heard from a NADO that it took the view that testing at the amateur level 
was not done because “they are only amateurs and we concentrate on professionals”. 
However, other NADOs indicated that they carried out some testing at amateur level. 
Budgetary constraints restrict the amount of testing that can be done at amateur level. As 
a consequence, as amateur riders told the Commission, they know that it is highly unlikely 
that they will be tested so they know that it is easy to dope and get away with it. The more 
widespread doping at the amateur level means the concept of doping is reinforced at the 
broader amateur level i.e. within the wider fan base. Internet chat rooms provide 
significant information in the many discussions about doping.  
 
The issue of testing at amateur events raises the issue of funding in anti-doping. The 
Commission notes the comments in the 2013 WADA Report that, “The real problems are 
human and political factors. There is no general appetite to undertake the… expense of a 
successful effort to deliver doping-free sport.”132 
 
                                                     
132 Report to WADA Executive Committee on Lack of Effectiveness of Testing Programs, published on 5 
Dec. 2013, at p. 3. Available: https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/world-anti-doping-
program/lack-of-effectiveness-of-testing-programs.  
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Women’s road cycling and other cycling disciplines 
 
The Commission regrets that it did not have more time to examine all other cycling 
disciplines as it believes there are valuable parallels to be drawn and reasons to be 
examined as to why a discipline does or does not have widespread doping within it. The 
Commission did however briefly examine women’s elite road cycling. It believes that it is 
under-developed and potentially offers a great opportunity for cycling.  
 
The Commission found that doping occurs in women’s cycling, although it most probably 
is not as widespread and systematic. This is likely because far less money is available in 
women’s road racing currently. The Commission was told of doping at the highest levels 
nevertheless, and it is logical to assume that when women’s cycling is finally developed 
to a status comparable to the men’s sport, it will attract the same problems as the men’s 
unless steps are taken now to protect it from that fate. 
 
The Commission was told that women’s cycling had been poorly supported in past years, 
and was given examples where riders in the sport had been exploited financially and even 
allegedly sexually. The Commission was told that the managers were often from male 
cycling, and were not of a quality to get a job in men’s road cycling, and that glaring 
opportunities to recognise women’s cycling for its potential were tainted by a male-
dominated sport that failed to realise the potential of women’s cycling. 
 
A discipline like mountain bike is culturally very different from road cycling; they attract 
a different type of person and the sport requires different physical, technical and mental 
approaches. The Commission was told of people who had crossed disciplines, from 
mountain bike to road cycling, and how one or two mountain bikers were already doping 
before they made the transition.133 The Commission encourages UCI to investigate the 
doping situation also in other disciplines of cycling. 
 
 
                                                     
133 The Commission was told about the issues in mountain bike during the road cycling interviews, hence 
their mention in the Report.  
71 
 
1.4.4. Themes and factors that continue to encourage or facilitate doping practices 
in cycling today 
 
Having looked above at the doping situation in cycling today, from which it is clear that 
doping remains a problem for the sport, it is necessary to consider what are the factors 
that have in the past and potentially continue today to encourage riders to dope or which 
facilitate doping practices. 
 
Structure of teams  
 
Doping can continue “out of sight” because many teams’ riders spend large periods of 
time apart from their team or colleagues. They often train individually or in informal 
groups, and only come together as “the team” periodically during the racing year. The 
Commission has, for example, also been informed that one of the Astana riders, who 
tested positive in 2014, had been outside the team environment for 2 months and 11 days 
during an important preparation period, during which he was doping. The CIRC was told 
by some elite cyclists that they do not even know who most of the people in their team 
are, including even other riders, and would not be able to recognise them. They have their 
own people and rely on them for most of their requirements. This makes it harder for 
teams to exercise any degree of control or to guide riders away from the temptation to 
dope. Clearly it is harder to create a “clean culture” if riders are not together in a team 
environment.  
 
Some teams today have tried to change this approach by creating a team environment in 
which riders are expected to train with the team, use team staff and doctors rather than 
their own. The Commission was told that the teams taking this approach have seen the 
benefits, not least in terms of reducing the exposure to doping. However, it was noted by 
interviewees (both from teams that employ a new team approach and others) that the 
team cannot watch riders the whole time and cannot control what they do in their own 
time. Therefore, whilst a stronger team ethos can be helpful, it is only one of the tools. 
 
 
 
72 
 
Structure of the sport 
 
The Race Calendar and point system? 
The Commission was told on a number of occasions that the points system caused riders 
to be more likely to risk doping towards the end of the season. This was done to achieve 
better placing in order to acquire extra points to help with contract negotiations, 
particularly if they were out of contract or in cases where the team might not obtain a 
licence the following year.   
 
The Commission was told by some interviewees that the race calendar is too busy. Some 
raised the fact that the three Grand Tours, the Giro, the Tour and the Vuelta were too close 
together in the calendar, and recovery time was not sufficient to enable a top rider to 
attempt seriously all three. One doctor explained that by the end of a 3-week tour, some 
riders would find it difficult to sleep due to the toxins in their body and the extreme effects 
on the body. The fact that riders have used products to get through races since the early 
1900s, at a time when financial gain would not have been a determining factor, 
demonstrates that the degree of suffering is part of what pushes people to dope, which is 
still the case today according to a number of interviewees; however, it was also 
acknowledged that this was part of the sport and should not be an excuse. 
 
One option suggested by some riders, including those at the top of the sport, was to 
reduce the Giro and the Vuelta from 3 weeks to 2 weeks. This would allow time for 
recovery between the Grand Tours without moving their position in the calendar, which 
would allow top riders to attempt all three races. However, rearranging a calendar is a 
complex business for many sporting, financial and other reasons. Furthermore, the 
Commission is of the view that the race calendar and the point system have a negligible 
impact on doping and consequently are not an excuse for doping.  
 
Clustering 
A phenomenon that seems to have begun at least 20 years ago, and which seems as 
prevalent today, is that of riders “clustering” in certain locations. The riders may not all 
be from the same team, but they gravitate to living and/or training in certain places.  
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Some of the high profile scandals suggested that clustering occurred to facilitate doping 
programmes. Whilst there were no doubt advantages in doping terms to riders clustering, 
there appear today to be numerous considerations woven into the decision of where to 
base themselves: for example, avoiding higher tax (e.g. Monaco) and beneficial training 
environments. Ease of accessibility to an international airport, especially for a sport 
where international travel is a prerequisite, does not appear to be high on the list.  
 
It is impossible not to consider too that a weak anti-doping environment, for example 
caused by difficult accessibility for testing in certain geographical locations together with 
the close proximity to doctors, might still be factors for some.  
 
Sponsorship and financial instability of the sport 
 
The Commission was frequently told that cycling has always been too dependent on 
income from sponsorship. This has had an effect at two levels: firstly, it put pressure on 
teams to encourage doping to ensure that the team obtained results to keep the sponsor 
happy, and, secondly, in some cases the short-term nature of a sponsorship deal might 
result in short-term contracts for riders (even some elite road riders only had short-term 
contracts) which put them under a separate pressure to dope. 
 
The role and involvement of sponsors over time has been varied. It costs a significant 
amount of money to fund a UCI WorldTour team and therefore sponsors will want to see 
a return on their investment. The best return for sponsors was for their team to win and 
achieve greater exposure for the brand. This return could, depending on the levels of 
success, be significant relative to costs. For example, in 2012, one sports brand invested 
approximately USD1.5m in a successful World Team and the assessed return for the 
brand was USD 100m.134 Another major sponsor explained that its brand recognition 
over time grew from 2% in 1996, to 25% in 1999 to 45% today. 
 
It is clear that the need to obtain results to keep sponsors happy encouraged doping; 
however, there is also a question as to how involved the sponsors were, or how much 
                                                     
134 Ferrand and Beckett, “Cycling News Sponsorship Report on Pro Cycling” (2013). Available: 
https://www.tageswoche.ch/attachment/3142/Sponsorship%20Report%20Cyclingnews.pdf. 
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they knew, about the doping programmes in their teams. The CIRC spoke to a number of 
sponsors in the sport, and the extent of the sponsors’ knowledge of team or individual 
doping appears to have been varied. It has also evolved over time. Prior to the high profile 
scandals and investigations in the 2000s, it appears that some sponsors either had 
knowledge of the doping practices or took a “turn a blind eye” approach. However, by the 
mid/late 2000s sponsors viewed the risk differently and started to look at alternative 
sports as a safer and more reliable investment, despite the significant potential returns 
on investment in cycling.  
 
In terms of the different approaches of sponsors, one former rider commented that 
sponsors wanted to win, but did not want to know about doping. Another rider described 
that on one of the teams he rode with, he did not think the sponsor knew much. Another 
rider stated that the sponsor would buy the riders’ plane tickets to visit a known doping 
doctor in Spain. A former directeur sportif stated that sponsors were never included in 
discussions about doping and were left completely outside, although there was implicit 
understanding of what it took to win. According to the Freiburg Report, the investigating 
commission had no reason to believe that the two main sponsors were involved in doping 
activities.135 One sponsor told the CIRC that during their lengthy tenure funding a 
European team, they got a better hold of the team’s management in order to ensure the 
team was not doping. This included actively avoiding riders whom it was not convinced 
were clean. Unfortunately, over time, it realised that it was unsuccessful and that its 
sponsorship was in any event tarnished by other teams’ doping scandals. Despite the 
perfect fit for its marketing purposes, the sponsor withdrew from men’s road cycling. 
 
As noted above, one of the main ways to keep sponsors happy is to win races to increase 
the brand exposure.  However, it is worth noting that other methods of providing a return 
for sponsors exist.  Firstly, participation in the Tour was and remains critical for many 
sponsors. The impact on doping attitudes can be seen in the French teams, which have 
over the last 10 years generally been thought of as clean; because French teams know 
that they will be able to participate in the Tour, they are able to provide exposure for the 
                                                     
135 “Final Report of the Expert Commission investigating the accusations of doping against doctors in the 
Sports Medicine Department of the Freiburg University Clinic” Cologne (23 March 2009, last updated 12 
May 2009) at p. 9. Available: http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/2009-03-
23+Final+Report+of+Expert+Commission+Freiburg+Univ.+Clinic.ENGLISH.pdf. 
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sponsor without the pressure to dope to obtain results. Secondly, in the peloton, one 
reason why so-called “suicide breaks” might occur, was in order for riders to win front 
place exposure for their sponsor for a period during a race stage. The peloton would know 
the break was doomed from the start, and it would be largely ignored, but the riders 
making the break were ensuring the sponsor was getting TV coverage for a period. 
 
It is interesting that riders are also aware of the general pressure to keep sponsors in the 
sport, not just their own team’s sponsor, but more widely. The Commission was told that 
sometimes riders would agree to lose stages to another rider whose sponsor might have 
been considering withdrawing from cycling. In this way, the sponsor would have a stage 
win and podium exposure, perhaps putting off the withdrawal decision. The CIRC found 
no evidence that sponsors were aware of this type of behind the scenes deal, which often 
was arranged between riders during the course of a stage. 
 
By the late 2000s, some sponsors were taking active measures to reduce the risk of riders 
doping in their teams, although clearly no sponsor could guarantee the team it sponsored 
was 100% clean. Today, sponsors protect themselves through contractual provisions that 
enable them to terminate the contract for damage to reputation. Riders’ contracts also 
contain provisions that provide that their employment will be terminated if they dope. 
Some sponsors have also introduced their own procedures to ensure better oversight of 
team management, testing, and medical frameworks, in order to minimise their risk. One 
sponsor explained that it took a rider with a potentially suspicious ABP out of competition 
temporarily to conduct tests at altitude and sea level to improve their understanding of 
the ABP results to assess whether or not he was doping. In another case, a team fired a 
rider who they strongly suspected of doping, despite the potential legal repercussions for 
the team. Another spoke of the additional blood tests they perform on their team 
members, beyond those of the UCI. 
 
Another important development is that some managers have sought to manage sponsor 
expectations, for example by explaining to them that they should not expect to win long 
races, especially the grand classification races, but rather they should set expectations at 
perhaps a stage win. This approach needs to be combined with more creative approaches 
to monetising a return on investment, for example through other innovative marketing 
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and event-driven ideas associated with the team, such as the public being able to meet 
the riders, or hospitality events organised at big races. These approaches require a better 
understanding of the sport by sponsors, coupled with a stronger, more ethical 
management of the teams.  
 
The significant risk for cycling is that the number of doping scandals and damage to the 
sport’s reputation will cause both existing sponsors to leave the sport and deter new 
sponsors. This has not always been the case; in the past, sponsors have stuck by their 
teams despite the scandals, which is presumably because they considered that the 
returns still justified the investment (i.e. there is no such thing as bad publicity). However, 
it appears that attitudes to doping among sponsors are starting to change. A recent 
example of this is the exit of Rabobank from the sport. One major global sponsor of sports 
told the CIRC that cycling was a wonderful, broadly appealing sport, but that until the 
anti-doping narrative changed within the sport, it would never consider associating its 
name with men’s road cycling. However, it was interesting that the sponsor stressed that 
it did not require a 100% clean sport for a period of years before investing, but rather a 
sport that was doing all it could to tackle the doping problem.  
 
The other major source of finance for the sport is through the sale of broadcast rights. 
The financial benefits of this go to the UCI and/or event organisers. The fact that German 
television broadcasters announced in 2012 they would no longer broadcast the Tour live 
because there was insufficient public demand demonstrates that doping scandals not 
only impact team sponsors, but can also affect the appeal of the sport more broadly, and 
therefore the ability to monetise it. 
 
The relationship between sponsors and UCI also needs to be reconsidered if cycling is to 
encourage sponsors to stay in the sport. For example, the CIRC was told that better 
sharing of information about riders would be a good start, as it would enable teams to 
make more informed decisions when deciding whether to hire riders.  
 
The role of bike manufacturers, or makers of associated equipment, as sponsors is a 
complex one. Given that their whole business is cycling, they have an even more vested 
interest in its image.  Whilst this would suggest that such companies have an even 
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stronger incentive to ensure the team rides clean, it is not necessarily the case that doping 
scandals equate to fewer bike or equipment sales, nor clean victories equate to more.   
 
The Commission has been told that the role of high net worth individuals in owning a 
team, or state sponsorship/ownership, can be a complicating factor in the sponsorship 
and business aspects of cycling. The CIRC considers that the amount of money invested is 
not a contributing factor per se. What is a factor however is the way a team is structured 
and the level of checks and balances in place.  Therefore it is difficult to conclude that the 
type of investor, i.e. individual or corporate, has an impact on doping.  
 
On an individual level, top riders told the CIRC that despite having won at the highest 
level, they were sometimes unable to obtain individual contracts with bigger sponsors 
because of the broader risks for the sponsor of investing in the sport. The Commission 
was told that top paid cyclists, at the peak of their sport globally, might earn perhaps only 
10% of the income an athlete at 50th or less in world sports earning rankings.  
 
Ultimately, it is clear that sponsors take a more discerning approach to sponsoring cycling 
today. In large part this is because doping has become culturally unacceptable and 
therefore association with a “tainted” sport is now considered damaging to a brand. 
However, the rewards for sponsors in cycling are still significant, because it is a sport 
with broad appeal across society and geographically. A change in attitude from sponsors 
is necessary, but whilst teams are entirely reliant on a single sponsor to survive, the lack 
of financial stability will continue to foster an environment that pushes teams and riders 
to do all they can to achieve results. 
 
Science 
 
The 2013 WADA Report stated that whilst there was an apparent lack of success with 
testing programs, the science now available is robust and reliable. The Commission met 
a number of scientists, including some who are involved in the research and development 
of new anti-doping tests. The general view appears to be that the science behind the 
physical tests is robust; however, this should be qualified by the widespread belief that 
there needs to be greater understanding of the ABP.  
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The ABP has been one of the most significant developments in the fight against doping. 
However, as discussed further in the section on UCI’s anti-doping policies, there are many 
occasions when the medical experts reviewing ABPs are unable to reach a conclusion as 
to whether or not an abnormality has been caused by doping. Interviewees from NADOs, 
teams and laboratories commented that there needed to be more research into the 
science behind the ABP, particularly for example the effects of non-doping factors on the 
body. 
 
Further, whilst the science available today may be robust, it is clear that further scientific 
development is necessary. As seen above, new products become available and riders 
adapt their doping techniques. The fact that micro-dosing is still extremely difficult to 
detect demonstrates that there is still room for scientific development.  
 
The Commission understands there are some innovative scientific ideas out there that 
promise much for the future of anti-doping. Two examples are of new techniques for 
detecting autologous blood doping, and for detecting gene doping by identifying 
fluctuations in Ribonucleic Acid (RNA). Unfortunately, it appears that at present, it can 
take several years for new projects to be fully developed. The Commission was informed 
of three areas where innovation can be stifled and slowed: organisational administrative 
and regulatory processes can cause promising projects to be slow in coming to fruition; 
the value of project grants available can be tiny in comparison to the funds needed to 
complete a significant research project; and securing the number of tests required to 
validate research can hamper progress. Clearly one of the biggest issues here is the 
funding of research. 
 
The Commission notes the 2013 WADA report’s findings about its funding of research 
and the problems it had encountered, and, having interviewed stakeholders, 
acknowledged the complexities surrounding it. In the 2013 WADA report, it stated that a 
refocusing of its budget on Code compliance was in order, and hinted at a move away 
from research. This is a concern for the anti-doping community. The doping community 
is well-funded, with serious money to be made from it. It is clear that careful 
consideration needs to be given to how anti-doping research can be properly funded in 
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the future. In this regard, the CIRC notes that some sponsors are willing to contribute to 
anti-doping efforts, but have not found it easy to do so. 
 
Former riders/dopers coming back into the sport 
 
The Commission found a recurring theme within the sport was that doping and cheating 
were perpetuated in the sport because of the transfer of knowledge across teams. In the 
past, particularly when doping was predominantly organised by teams, the movement of 
riders and staff (from soigneurs, to doctors or managers) between teams was an easy way 
for knowledge of doping practices to spread throughout the peloton. Sometimes, these 
doping working relationships lasted for many years and could involve individuals 
working in teams or doctors outside the team.  
 
As noted above, doping is not talked about openly today and the more common issue now 
appears to be the return to the sport of riders who doped in the past and take up roles as 
directeur sportif or trainers. Many interviewees commented that they felt that it was 
difficult for the sport to change whilst individuals who rode in the doping era continue to 
have such a strong influence on the sport. This was also seen as a reason for the existence 
of the last remnants of the omerta, as older attitudes were to shun whistleblowers. 
 
Underpinning this situation over many years was the moving amongst teams of “doping 
doctors”, complicit soigneurs and other doping-versed medical and team support staff. 
This way too, doping approaches and methods were dispersed across many, if not all 
teams. Some doctors sold their services to more than one team, offering different levels 
of packages and service. 
 
It is clear that athlete support personnel continue to play an important role in the sport. 
Their attitudes to doping have a strong influence on riders and therefore all possible steps 
to investigate and sanction team staff must be pursued. It is noticeable that with a few 
high profile exceptions, there has not in the past been enough focus on ADRVs by team 
staff. The Commission notes the new provisions in the 2015 WADA Code that are 
designed to put greater responsibility on support personnel, and therefore a greater onus 
on federations like UCI to investigate them. 
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Role of doctors 
 
There have been numerous high profile examples of the significant role that doctors have 
played in the development of doping in cycling. Whilst in the earliest days riders might 
have been able to self-medicate, at the elite level, riders have relied on doctors for many 
years to devise sophisticated doping programmes that enable them to achieve 
performance enhancement without getting caught. Therefore, one issue is how to address 
the problem presented by these doctors, who today operate outside the sport and under 
the radar. A second issue is the role of team doctors today. 
 
At least 69 different doctors between 1985 and 2014 assisted in the doping of riders. The 
various investigations have revealed that many of the doctors treated a large number of 
riders at the same time and worked across teams.136 These doctors played an integral role 
in doping programmes. The Commission has heard that even doctors who are subject to 
sporting sanctions continue to work with riders today. The access to doctors with 
extensive knowledge of doping in the sport, and particularly doctors “specialised” in 
doping who seek to improve doping methods to provide greater performance benefits, 
continues to provide a huge threat to the sport. 
 
The more complicated area is the role of the team doctor. The Commission heard from a 
number of doctors who had worked in cycling for some time, who explained that they felt 
that they were put in a difficult position. A common rationalisation for doctors who had 
facilitated doping was that it was necessary, otherwise a rider would have done it himself 
without medical supervision (which in any event many did). The doctor felt that this 
could have endangered the rider’s health, and thus the doctor felt compelled to assist the 
rider in order to protect him. Doctors also explained that they could not report riders to 
the authorities as they needed to retain the trust of the riders so that the riders would 
come to them. Whilst it is clear that the medical obligations owed by medical 
                                                     
136 Information provided to the CIRC show that 46% of doctors have been involved with only one team. Of 
the remaining, 20% were involved with two or three teams, and 34% have been involved with at least 
four teams. Three well-known “doping doctors” have been involved with 19 or 20 teams, and two of them 
were mentioned in 22 and 15 incidents over 16 and 18 years respectively. Another doctor has been 
involved in 8 doping incidents over 6 years. 
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professionals can place them in conflict with their duties to the authorities, it is difficult 
to accept that this could justify participation in doping riders.  
 
A number of interviewees commented that team doctors today should be employed by 
teams only to treat the ailments of riders and team members, and to assist with physical 
sports movement issues. Riders are elite athletes and generally in excellent physical 
shape and should not need to take extensive quantities of drugs. It has also been 
suggested that team doctors should not spend all their time with teams as they de-skill. 
Some team doctors rotate in and out of teams and have regular medical jobs outside the 
sport; this is a good system. It is arguable that where doctors have other employment, 
they are less beholden to teams and better able to resist pressure to dope riders.  
 
Many of the teams that are trying to create a more “team” approach to encourage zero 
tolerance to doping, take the approach that riders are only allowed to be treated by the 
team doctor. If they do need to see a specialist, this needs to be reported to the team. 
 
The allegations that some doctors were involved in the fight against doping and also in 
facilitating doping are well documented, including in the Freiburg Report. Dr Francesco 
Conconi is alleged to have acted on both sides of the doping line in the early 1990s. He 
was apparently being paid to develop a test to detect EPO and was simultaneously being 
paid providing elite athletes with EPO to enhance their performance.137 It took perhaps 9 
or 10 years before a test for EPO was produced.  
 
Auxiliary powers of investigation 
 
Whilst the WADA Code has brought a level of consistency to sports governing bodies’ 
rules on anti-doping, there is no consistency in the approach to the use of public authority 
investigative powers in the field of anti-doping. The significance of respective 
investigative powers is evidenced by the fact that riders commented that they are far 
                                                     
137 Letizia Paoli and Alessandro Donati, “The Supply of Doping Products and the Potential of Criminal Law 
Enforcement in Anti-Doping: An Examination of Italy’s Experience,” (2013). Available: https://wada-
main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/2013-Paoli-Donati-Report-Executive-Summary-EN.pdf. 
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more scared of criminal investigations than doping controls, as it is much easier to adapt 
to the latter.  
 
The absence of such investigative tools at national level can be a factor that allows doping 
programmes to be perpetuated. The Italian investigations provide a good example of the 
significant powers that the authorities can use and which are not available to anti-doping 
organisations (such as telephone tapping, surveillance, and financial investigations). It is 
part of the shared responsibility between the sports movement and the governments that 
such investigative tools are used in the fight against doping and the information derived 
thereof shared between the competent stakeholders. The history of the fight against 
doping shows that a lot of the big anti-doping scandals have been unearthed or initiated 
by criminal proceedings. The reasons for this are manifold. The Commission, however, 
would like to stress that the use and implementation of these auxiliary powers of 
investigation cannot be a substitute for the sports movement’s efforts to fight doping or 
diminish their primary responsibility to take care of the problem.  
 
It is highly unlikely that there will be greater harmonisation of national laws on 
criminalisation of doping in the near future. The question as to whether it is for States to 
regulate sport is a complex one and States have reached different views: even in countries 
that have strong anti-doping stances and strong NADOs, it has not been considered 
necessary to criminalise doping.  
 
The Commission considers that the criminalisation of doping per se is not necessarily the 
most important factor. Rather the key is to ensure that anti-doping organisations build 
good relationships with the police and other authorities such as customs and border 
control, to benefit from their greater investigative powers. In most countries the 
production, movement, importation, distribution and supply of drugs is a crime, and 
some of the PEDs used by riders will fall under this legislation. There have already been 
cases where information from law enforcement, in countries where doping in sport is not 
a crime, has assisted the relevant anti-doping organisation. This leads on to a second 
important point, which is that law enforcement and anti-doping organisations must be 
able to share relevant information. 
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The role of the media 
  
The media has had a difficult relationship with cycling over the years. The environment 
was openly hostile, highly litigious and deeply protective of riders in an effort to protect 
the sport. This environment made it difficult, or certainly acted to dissuade, the media 
from delving into rumours of doping. One prominent team manager told the Commission 
that journalists were refused access if they wrote about doping. At the same time, the 
Commission was told of reporters who enjoyed being on the inside, mixing with athletes 
and teams, and were seduced by the environment which affected their objectivity. 
 
There are notable exceptions to the general reticence of the press to investigate and 
report on doping stories.  The journalists who did investigate and sought to inform the 
public of the extent of the doping were often confronted with law suits. It is clear that 
efforts to protect riders and ignore stories which raised strong suspicions of doping 
activity was another factor that allowed an open culture of doping to exist for so long.  
 
Anti-doping measures 
 
Riders have adapted their doping programmes in response to new anti-doping measures. 
The absence of tests to detect products for a period of time allowed use of those products 
and methods to become widespread (e.g. EPO and today micro-dosing). There is a direct 
relationship between the anti-doping tests and measures in place and the extent and 
nature of doping. This is addressed in more detail in the UCI section of this Report, but 
must be borne in mind here as a significant factor when considering the circumstances 
that continue to allow doping practices to exist in cycling. 
 
1.4.5. Other features of elite road cycling 
 
Education 
 
The Commission’s discussions with federations, NADOs, and other stakeholders have 
highlighted the many initiatives in anti-doping education in cycling. Many ideas are 
innovative, and some federations and NADOs have jointly invested heavily in education 
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programmes, often aiming at younger riders in the hope of warning them of the dangers 
before they are faced with any pressure to dope.  
 
Some education programmes encouraged riders, or prospective riders, to develop 
occupational alternatives in their lives, for example through study or training in another 
field; this had the double advantage of providing riders with a better choice if they are 
faced with a situation where they are asked to dope, as well as better preparing them for 
when their career was over. In a few countries, anti-doping education programmes are 
also directed at non-professional cyclists, where the vulnerability to dope can be as acute 
as it is professionally. Some education programmes have successfully used former dopers 
to speak to young riders about the pitfalls of doping. 
 
The Commission notes that UCI and national licensing systems at present could address 
the need for formal education in professional cycling’s team support positions. As it 
stands, it appears that a licence is granted to a person and then they are a licence holder. 
There is no specificity attached to that licence, for example for a trainer, manager, 
directeur sportif or a technical director. The levels of training and education required, for 
any of those roles, in anti-doping and broader criteria, are not formalised.  
 
MPCC 
 
The MPCC initiative is a self-help initiative aimed at improving teams’ anti-doping 
credentials. This movement asks teams to sign up to a series of voluntary rules that are 
in addition to the existing formal and enforceable anti-doping rules. As of February 2015, 
11 out of 17 UCI WorldTeams were signatories, 19 out of 19 UCI Professional Continental 
Teams, and 32 out of 145 UCI Continental Teams had joined, and 8 out of 36 UCI Women’s 
Teams had signed up. Other, non-team members of MPCC included 8 national cycling 
federations, the European Cycling Union (UEC), 6 organisers, 8 sponsors of cycling teams 
and 7 agents.138  
 
                                                     
138 See http://www.mpcc.fr/index.php/en/membres-uk.  
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The Commission commends the enterprise of MPCC. Some of the MPCC rules have been 
adopted in the mainstream UCI rules, which is indicative of the “gaps” in regulation.  
 
However, the ultimate goal must be for there to be one set of rules that regulate the sport, 
as this will ensure equality of treatment of all teams. As the leadership of MPCC noted, it 
should be out of business if the sport is doing the right thing; through the UCI adopting 
some of its rules, the move is in the right direction for this to happen. However, the 
Commission believes MPCC remains a valuable entity to cycling for the time-being.  
  
Cheating  
 
Technical Cheating 
Today’s elite road cycling equipment has never been more scientifically produced, 
brimming with technological innovation. It is developed to elicit performance gains or 
benefits for an athlete, and in the broader sense to help companies market and sell 
products within the sport. These are all good factors, as technological development is part 
of the life-blood of the sport, and innovation should be embraced. However it should also 
be carefully monitored and clearly regulated to ensure performance benefits are legal. 
 
The question is, “When does performance advantage become technical cheating?” To 
prevent technical cheating, a strong adherence to the regulations, a strong interpretation 
of the spirit of the sport, coupled with UCI’s open communication with teams and 
manufacturers of cycling equipment is desirable. A clear, unambiguous set of technical 
rules are critically important for this aspect of the sport. They require continuous review 
and update, given the pace of technological development.  
 
The Commission was told of varying efforts to cheat the technical rules, including using 
motors in frames. This particular issue was taken seriously, especially by top riders, and 
was not dismissed as being isolated. Other forms of cheating were explained, relating to 
frames construction, saddle specifications, and the wearing of illegal clothing and 
apparel. One interviewee alleged that another had heated a cycling track to elicit an 
advantage to the home team, by enabling them to use more advantageous tyres. 
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The Commission was told that funding streams to examine such allegations from 
regulatory, technical and investigative perspectives are limited and even being reduced. 
This is not ideal given technical cheating may be emerging as a more significant avenue 
for illicit gains than ever before. 
 
Fixing outcomes 
Since cycling’s earliest days, riders have agreed race or stage outcomes with other riders. 
It is often seen as part of team and individual tactics in the peloton. A good number of 
today’s top riders and former riders openly discussed these practices with the 
Commission. They were described as part of the cut and thrust of professional 
competitive cycling and were not seen by riders as in any way wrong.  
 
The motives for agreeing outcomes are many and varied. For example: for assistance in 
accumulating points in a season, to maintain a time lead, to enable a sponsor to be a stage 
winner, to prevent a rival from succeeding or simply because they were paid to lose. In 
some cases, it might be linked to doping, for example riders have deliberately lost stages 
to avoid doping scrutiny or to appear less dominant when doping. Bartering can take 
place not only between riders, but also at team level with team managers negotiating 
deals. This is despite the fact that riders have a strong incentive to place as high as 
possible because, unlike spot-fixing in sports such as football which do not affect the 
result, their placing directly affects their individual points tally and therefore their ability 
to negotiate contracts. 
 
The question for cycling is when do cycling tactics cross the line into cheating? In the past, 
there appears to be little understanding of where the line is drawn, even though some of 
the “cut and thrust” type of tactics of the peloton resulting in fixed outcomes would be 
against anti-corruption rules in other sports. Both the Council of Europe Convention on 
the Manipulation of Sports and the IOC and UNODC defined match fixing.   
 
87 
 
IOC/UNODC definition. “Match-fixing shall mean the arrangement or an irregular 
alteration of the course or the result of a sporting competition or any of its particular events 
in order to remove all or part of the uncertainty normally associated with a competition.”139   
 
Council of Europe definition. “Manipulation of sports competitions means an intentional 
arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of 
a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the 
aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself 
or for others.”140 
 
To date, there is little indication that the sport of cycling is affected by spot-fixing or 
match-fixing related to betting activity in the same way as other sports (such as football). 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to believe the sport does not lend itself to that form of 
corruption if the betting market for cycling developed. 
 
Ethics 
 
The Commission was told by some that the use of any number of non-banned substances 
to enhance performance is part of the single-minded drive for victory, which involves 
pushing the rules as far as possible. However, there is a question whether this goes too 
far when riders take products that are clearly performance enhancing, but which are 
perhaps unknown to the authorities and not yet on the WADA Prohibited List. In many 
cases the WADA Prohibited List anticipates this problem by including substances and any 
derivatives.  
 
On the one hand, it can be argued that the onus is on the authorities to identify 
performance enhancing substances and include them on the Prohibited List; sport is 
about winning and athletes should be entitled to take whatever they are legally permitted 
                                                     
139  International Olympic Committee and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Criminalization 
approaches to combat match-fixing and illegal/irregular betting: a global perspective” (July 2013). 
Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/Criminalization_approaches_to_comb
at_match-fixing.pdf 
140 Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention (1989). Available: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/sport/Source/CONV_2009_135_EN.pdf. 
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to take. As one person told the CIRC, “There is no room for ethics in sport”. The counter 
argument is that there is no room for no ethics in sport, and that sport should uphold 
strong ethical values. As one interviewee stated, it would be ethical if you can tell a 
journalist what you’re doing and feel ok about it. This is a good way of identifying and 
differentiating the ethical issue from the “follow the rules only” issue.  
 
The public too, have a role to play in the application of ethics in the sport. It was 
commented by one interviewee that “the public was responsible for doping in cycling”. 
This seemed to the Commission to be an extraordinary comment to make. However, the 
more relevant point is that expectations need to be managed. As noted above, the change 
in attitude of sponsors derives in large part from a change in public attitudes to doping 
given that marketing is driven by public views. The fans are crucial to the success of any 
sport and cycling fans are extremely passionate, highly knowledgeable, and want doping 
to be a thing of the past. It remains of great importance that all stakeholders, of which the 
public is one, get behind clean riders and teams. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Commission did not hear from anyone credible in the sport who would give cycling 
a clean bill of health in the context of doping today. However, the general view was that 
doping is either less prevalent today or that the nature of doping practices has changed 
such that the performance gains are smaller. There was a general feeling that this has 
created an environment where riders can now at least be competitive when riding clean. 
 
There has been a move away from systematic, team organised doping, and that riders 
now organise their own doping programmes, often with the help of third parties who are 
primarily based outside the teams. New anti-doping methods have forced riders to adopt 
doping techniques such as micro-dosing and, at elite level, they often have a sophisticated 
understanding of how and when to take substances to maximise the benefit whilst 
reducing the risk of getting caught. The internet has opened up quick and easy access to 
new drugs, often from Eastern Europe and the Far East, as well as to drugs that are still 
in clinical trials and substances made only for doping purposes. Together with the 
internet, gyms have provided an easy source of PEDs for amateurs and lower level riders. 
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Factors that originally encouraged riders to start doping, as far back as the late 1800s, 
still exist today. Cycling is a tough sport and the suffering that riders experience, together 
with a lack of financial stability create an environment that today still could encourage 
riders to turn to doping. The ease of access to doctors who can facilitate doping 
programmes, potentially under the influence of, or through, people who were involved in 
doping when they were riding, is another contributing factor. Ultimately, the main 
deterrent is the risk of getting caught and the sanctions (both sporting and criminal) that 
will follow; therefore the effectiveness of anti-doping methods (addressed in the UCI 
section of this Report) is essential in the fight against doping. 
 
The challenge to the UCI is huge, given that the culture of doping has not been eradicated. 
However, there have been many positive developments that evidence a desire, at least in 
some parts of the sport, to move away from the doping culture: many teams have signed 
up to the MPCC and the higher standards that it lays down, a number of teams have sought 
to change their team culture to create a “clean team” environment and ADOs and NFs 
have recognised the importance of education programmes to emphasise the health risks 
and dissuade people from doping. Only the participants themselves can decide when 
enough is enough, and act to effect change. UCI has to be ready. Cycling has the potential 
to become a sport with integrity, ethics and accountability, but it can only become so if all 
participants are prepared to contribute. 
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CHAPTER 2: UNION CYCLISTE INTERNATIONALE  
 
The Commission was asked to investigate whether UCI officials directly contributed to 
the development of a culture of doping in cycling, in particular by mismanaging testing 
and/or by covering up positive tests. The Commission was further asked to conduct a 
wide-ranging independent investigation into the allegations that implicate the UCI and 
other governing bodies and officials in respect of their investigation of doping practices.  
 
To that end, the Commission decided to examine more specifically three different areas 
within the UCI in order to provide as comprehensive and complete an answer as possible.  
Firstly, the Commission decided to undertake an in-depth analysis of the UCI structure 
and policies in anti-doping over time. Secondly, it looked at the most serious allegations 
available in the public domain that implicated the UCI and/or some of its members in 
relation to anti-doping. Thirdly, because leadership and good governance of an IF are vital 
principles for any effective anti-doping policy, it examined UCI’s structure and 
democratic process. 
 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
 
In order to understand better the UCI's role and properly assess its responsibility in the 
matter of doping, it is necessary to take into account the historical background and 
information available at that time. 
 
Many accusations and criticisms have been levelled at the UCI. The organisation was 
alleged not only to have neglected the issue of doping but also to have protected the most 
high-profile athletes, and Lance Armstrong in particular. Many interviewees spoke of 
conspiracy and corruption. Serious allegations were made which were often not followed 
up; it was these issues that the CIRC was given a mandate to investigate. 
 
Before examining the allegations in detail, a number of which have been discussed and 
commented upon in the public domain, it is useful to take note of certain facts and 
circumstances that offer an insight into the historical background and the environment 
from which these serious accusations arise. 
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2.1.1. The complexity of the sport of cycling 
 
As described in the chapter on professional road cycling, the structure of competitive 
cycling is complex and not easily compared with that of other sports. Cycling is often 
associated with the Grand Tours and more specifically with its leading event, the Tour, 
the "Grande Boucle", which is considered the most prestigious cycling event in the world, 
but also one of the most difficult in terms of endurance and the intense effort involved. 
The suffering that results from the huge efforts required of the riders means that cycling 
is a “high-risk” sport compared with others when it comes to the likelihood of doping.   
 
In cycling, a rider is both an individual athlete and a team member. Teams usually have 
no particular connection to a city or country (unlike football for example). Teams are 
made up of athletes who very often live in different countries and even different 
continents. This makes it complicated for the team management to monitor riders’ 
whereabouts. Very few teams have a structure and economic foundation that assures 
their long-term existence. Riders change teams frequently, their professional 
organisation is weak and their earning capacity, with the exception of a few star riders, is 
quite limited. 
 
The organisers of major cycling events are the most stable and economically robust 
entities in professional cycling. Among the event organisers, the French company Amaury 
Sport Organization (“ASO”) owner of the Tour and other major classic events, enjoys a 
dominant position, taking the majority of the revenue in competitive cycling. This 
influence is all the more pronounced as ASO is belonging to the same group as the main 
French-language sports newspaper (L’Équipe), which has a major influence extending 
beyond linguistic barriers. To this must be added the external support that ASO enjoys 
from France Télévision’s extensive coverage of the Tour. Given this background, when 
UCI took up a more active role in managing the sport, conflicts arose. 
 
2.1.2. UCI: rapid growth 
 
Although founded in Paris in 1900, for many years UCI was an institution with a minimal 
structure and no real power. In 1965, the IOC required that there should be two 
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federations, one for amateurs (who would be the only riders allowed to compete in the 
Olympic Games) and another for professionals. The International Amateur Cycling 
Federation (“FIAC”) was based in Rome while the International Professional Cycling 
Federation (“FICP”) had its headquarters in Brussels and then Luxembourg. These two 
federations were coordinated by the UCI from Paris. In total, these three organisations 
employed fewer than 10 people, many not even on a full-time basis. Compared with ASO, 
the teams and the sponsors, this embryonic umbrella organisation did not have much 
influence.   
 
In 1979, Hein Verbruggen became a member of the FICP Board and he was appointed 
President in 1984. In contrast to the leaders of many sporting organisations, Hein 
Verbruggen did not come from an athletic background. His background was in business 
and he had considerable experience in marketing. In 1991, he became the UCI President, 
and in 1996 he became an IOC member. The IOC abandoned the distinction between 
amateur and professional athletes and the two international cycling federations merged 
back into the UCI in 1992. This marked the start of the UCI's rapid development. In 1996 
the UCI only had some 15 employees. The federation now has a staff of over 100 if the 
Cycling Anti-doping Foundation (“CADF”) (now legally independent) is included. UCI also 
has an extensive network of external consultants.  
 
With the inclusion of professional cycling in the Olympic Games, revenue from the IOC 
and television rights started to increase dramatically.  Hein Verbruggen, with his business 
experience, understood that a celebrity rider would make cycling more attractive to 
broadcasters and consequently to sponsors. Lance Armstrong arrived at the perfect time: 
after the Festina scandal he won what was dubbed the Tour of Renewal. Lance Armstrong 
was American, which opened up a new continent to conquer, he had beaten cancer and 
the media quickly made him a global star. The UCI President recognised that this was a 
good opportunity to bolster the organisation’s plans for growth and, above all, his 
ambitions for power which would inevitably lead to conflict with other entities’ interests. 
The disputes with WADA and ASO were particularly fierce and, especially in the case of 
ASO, absorbed a lot of time and resource of UCI personnel. In all likelihood, this led to 
other major issues being neglected. Most notable among these was the issue of doping 
which had finally been thrust into public view in 1998 with the Festina affair. 
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In 10 years, UCI transformed itself into a major IF with a significant logistical structure, 
human and financial resources and a prestigious World Cycling Centre in Aigle. 
 
2.1.3. Conflict between two strong personalities 
 
Richard (“Dick”) Pound, a lawyer and former elite athlete, was elected as an IOC member 
in 1978, later becoming Vice-President. He then worked towards establishing WADA of 
which he was the first President from 1999 to 2007. There was an intense personal 
conflict between Hein Verbruggen and Dick Pound, which had negative consequences for 
the UCI and the public perception of the federation. 
 
In 2001 Dick Pound was a candidate to succeed Juan Antonio Samaranch but he was 
beaten by the Belgian Jacques Rogge, who was supported by Hein Verbruggen. It was 
reported to the CIRC that this was the main reason and starting point of the conflict 
between the two men. 
 
As will be explained below, it is the CIRC’s view that the conflict between these two men 
as well as their very different philosophies of fighting doping in sport soured the 
relationship between UCI and WADA, which adversely affected the fight against doping. 
 
2.1.4. Conflict with ASO 
 
The conflict between UCI and ASO provided headline news for several years and was 
likened to a war by senior UCI staff. The dispute absorbed a lot of time and resource of 
UCI personnel which considerably harmed the fight against doping. This power struggle 
led to an aggressive confrontation that had a negative effect on the entire world of cycling. 
As the previously diminutive UCI increased in size and ambition, it wanted to control how 
races were conducted. In 2004 it launched the ProTour which, in particular, allowed UCI 
to specify which teams could take part. Above all, UCI wanted sole control over the 
television rights for major races and, of course, to benefit financially from this. This 
inevitably met with hostility from teams that were excluded and, above all, clashed with 
the interests of the organisers of major events, primarily ASO. As noted above, ASO had, 
and still has, a dominant position in the market for professional cycling. To illustrate the 
94 
 
different strengths of the two parties, ASO's annual profit of some EUR 30 million 
approximately corresponds to the UCI's total current annual budget.  
 
Hein Verbruggen aspired to transform UCI into an important IF by giving cycling a solid 
and unified foundation. He did it as business man, in a somewhat forceful manner with a 
lack of transparency and in breach of certain sporting requirements.  
 
Through the mediation of the IOC, the conflict with ASO came to an abrupt end at a 
meeting in Beijing during the 2008 Olympic Games. However, this did not mean that all 
problems were definitively resolved and the presence of ASO, which still had a dominant 
position in professional cycling, continued to present a potential source of tension. 
 
2.1.5. Politics intervenes 
 
There is a relationship between politics and high-level sport that is not always 
particularly transparent. Elite sport involves significant sums of money; the choice of one 
country over another to host a major competition can have significant economic 
consequences for the host region. As a result, the issue becomes a question of power and 
a fight for influence (including through trading favours).  
 
When Lance Armstrong paid a visit to the French President to present a gift of a racing 
bike, it was reported that the President interrupted an important meeting to receive him. 
The same President spoke publicly in glowing terms about the American rider 
(reportedly stating that “even Astérix was taking magic potion.”)141 
 
It was reported that the French Minister of Sport brought criminal proceedings against 
the director of the AFLD, an independent institution, for defamation in relation to 
comments about the Minister's views regarding the sanction to be applied to Floyd Landis 
after he tested positive. The candidature of the city of Paris for the 2012 Olympic Games 
was also subject to political pressure. Politicians attempted to influence decisions in the 
field of anti-doping that were likely to compromise the candidate city's chances. Conflicts 
                                                     
141  Pierre Ballester, “Fin de cycle – Autopsie d’un système corrompu”, (La Martinière, 2013) p. 189. 
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arose between the UCI and the AFLD and ministers also got involved. According to some 
sources, Hein Verbruggen credited himself with being instrumental in the failure of the 
candidature of Paris for the Olympic Games. Another example is the political pressure on 
UCI to allow Lance Armstrong to participate in an event in Australia, despite the fact that 
UCI rules prohibited it. 
 
CIRC was provided with information from interviewees that indicates that the state 
authorities in certain countries, such as Kazakhstan, have intervened directly in the 
everyday affairs of teams and riders. This is not necessarily a positive development. 
 
We consider that these episodes contributed to create a climate which certainly did not 
encourage coherent action against doping. As described later in the report, other parties 
also contributed to establishing an atmosphere that was highly unlikely to produce an 
effective, combined response to the widespread doping problem. 
 
2.1.6. New challenges represented by EPO and omerta 
 
As described earlier in the report, the arrival of EPO was a pivotal moment in the history 
of doping (see above). In short, EPO was a challenge for almost all sectors of sport, 
although it was cycling that most often came under the spotlight. This was to such an 
extent that we can, in fact, talk of the pre-EPO and post-EPO eras. 
 
The challenge presented by endemic use of EPO and the Festina scandal placed the world 
of cycling in a particularly delicate situation. At this time, UCI was still at the development 
stage and did not yet have significant human and financial resources. Further, there was 
no international anti-doping agency and the response to the threat suffered from a lack 
of coordination. It was in the interests of all parties, particularly UCI and event organisers 
that the star riders were able to continue to race and that there were no doping scandals. 
 
As touched upon in the chapter, Elite Road Cycling, the omerta was an important 
component of the doping culture within the peloton. Everyone knew it existed but no one 
was allowed to speak openly about it without risking to be side-lined.    
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The extent of the doping and the lack of any effective means to detect it led to concern not 
only within the UCI, but for all actors in the sporting world. It is reasonable to suggest too 
that the rise in doping in cycling, and more broadly in many sports, reflected a 
proliferation of drugs in broader society. 
 
2.1.7. Cycling as a scapegoat?  
 
Road cycling is perhaps one of the toughest endurance sports. Consequently, road cyclists 
are particularly vulnerable to the temptation to dope, not only to improve their 
performance during a race but also to assist in recovery during long stage races. However, 
cycling is not the only sport to be affected by doping. Competition inevitably leads to some 
athletes being determined to achieve their objectives by any means possible. The UCI has 
repeatedly been the target of criticism with regards to doping. There may be justification 
for this, but it is also clear that, despite obvious failings and errors, UCI has also been a 
pioneer in the field of anti-doping.  
 
The UCI leadership has however experienced some frustration – it considers that other 
sports do little or nothing when it comes to anti-doping. This allowed these sports to 
claim that they do not have a doping problem, if there are no positive results, there is no 
talk of doping and the sport is clean. “Doping is other people” is how the French Senate 
Commission of Enquiry on the effectiveness of the fight against doping described this 
attitude.142  The Senate Commission asserted that "both statistics and the testimonies 
gathered...show that skills-based sports and those in which tactics are dominant are not 
spared from doping”.143 The statistics in question were based on WADA data and quite 
clearly showed that other sports were just as affected by doping as cycling, in some cases 
even more so, but did not attract media headlines. 
 
 
 
                                                     
142 N° 782 Sénat session extraordinaire de 2012-2013, rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête 
sur l’efficacité de la lutte contre le dopage. Available: http://www.senat.fr/rap/r12-782-2/r12-782-
21.pdf (in French). 
143 N° 782 Sénat session extraordinaire de 2012-2013, rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête 
sur l’efficacité de la lutte contre le dopage, p.24. Available: http://www.senat.fr/rap/r12-782-2/r12-782-
21.pdf (in French).  
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2.1.8. Ineffective governance 
 
In a similar way to other sporting federations, the UCI vested the office of the President 
with a wide range of powers. This was facilitated by the passive nature of the large 
majority of the members of the UCI’s governing bodies. This authoritarian management 
perhaps facilitated the rapid growth of the organisation but in the CIRC’s view it also led 
to serious problems of governance and deficiencies in internal control processes, in 
particular with regard to the direction and implementation of anti-doping policy as well 
as to the use of resources. By way of example, Hein Verbruggen, with the agreement of 
the majority of his colleagues on the Management Committee,144 chose his successor and 
found the means to ensure his election (see further below).   
 
Current events demonstrate that problems of governance are not unusual in the domain 
of sporting organisations. In addition to reviewing the organisations themselves, 
questions should also be asked of the public authorities which often, in one form or 
another, support the activities of these federations, in particular by means of tax 
exemptions. Sponsors also have a responsibility and could play a more significant role in 
the governance of sporting organisations.  
 
2.1.9. Poor communication strategy 
 
The 2012 Armstrong affair was a major blow for sport as a whole and cycling in 
particular. On this occasion, the UCI's public statements, although assisted by a specialist 
agency at great cost, was passive and inadequate. Certainly, UCI had reason to reproach 
itself. But further, the weakness and clumsiness of the UCI's reaction only served to 
reinforce and amplify criticisms and rumours about the federation. It appears to the CIRC 
that the President at the time seemed to take the view that responsibility for the whole 
affair lay with the previous president and that it belonged in the past.  
 
                                                     
144 According to documents in CIRC’s possession, Hein Verbruggen himself referred to having 
Management Committee approval, but CIRC was not able to confirm this from minutes of meetings 
around that time. 
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The poor communication strategy of the UCI was demonstrated also on other occasions 
when the UCI President called Floyd Landis and Tyler Hamilton “scumbags”145 (see 
below) or when it provided contradictory information in relation to Lance Armstrong’s 
donation146 to UCI or as to whether USADA had jurisdiction on the Lance Armstrong case 
(see below).  
 
2.2 UCI AND ANTI-DOPING 
 
Organisation and policies in anti-doping within UCI have evolved and changed 
considerably over time. This section provides in a first step an overview of UCI’s past 
organisational structure in respect of the fight against doping. In a second step, this 
section describes and evaluates the anti-doping policy undertaken by UCI for various 
periods in time. 
 
2.2.1. Organisation of the fight against doping 
 
The distribution of tasks in anti-doping matters within UCI was and still is rather 
complex. In essence, one can differentiate between two periods of organisational 
development: the period up until the creation of the CADF, and the period thereafter.  
 
2.2.1.1. Organisation prior to the creation of CADF in 2008 
 
Before 1992 all anti-doping issues were dealt with by the UCI Medical Committee. Doping 
at that time was perceived to be primarily a health issue. When anti-doping matters 
started to dominate the work of the Medical Committee, the UCI set up an Anti-Doping 
Commission (“ADC”) in 1992.147 This development took account of the fact that anti-
                                                     
145 Barry Ryan, “McQuaid: Landis and Hamilton are far from heroes” cycling news (23 Oct. 2012). 
Available: http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/mcquaid-landis-and-hamilton-are-far-from-heroes 
146 The Guardian, “UCI admits accepting Lance Armstrong donation was a mistake” (25 May 2010). 
Available: http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2010/may/25/uci-lance-armstrong-donation-mistake; 
and Stephan Farrand, “McQuaid reveals Armstrong made two donations to the UCI” cycling news (10 July 
2010). Available: http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/mcquaid-reveals-armstrong-made-two-donations-
to-the-uci 
 
147 “40 years of fighting against doping,” UCI (2001). Available: 
http://oldsite.uci.ch/english/health_sante/docs/40_ans.pdf. 
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doping was not solely a medical issue, but a more complex issue involving also legal, 
social and biochemical aspects. It was felt that this should also be reflected in the 
composition of the Commission.148 The members of the ADC initially acted on a voluntary 
basis and met about twice a year.149 In the early days the administrative staff supporting 
the ADC was minimal. It consisted of a sole anti-doping manager who was initially 
employed only part-time. The staff number increased slowly (also due to budgetary 
constraints) and eventually turned into an Anti-Doping Unit (“ADU”). By 2003 the ADU 
was headed by a coordinator and two assistants. By 2007 the ADU comprised of a head 
of department and four assistants.  
 
The head of the ADC 
 
The ADC was headed originally by a lawyer, Werner Goehner. He was succeeded by the 
ADC’s first Vice-president, Lon (also referred to as Leon) Schattenberg (2003—2006). It 
is reported, however, that Werner Goehner had a health problem and that, therefore, 
during his presidency Lon Schattenberg was acting as de facto ADC president. Even 
though the ADC was composed of three members (also during Lon Schattenberg’s 
presidency), it was Lon Schattenberg who effectively ran the ADC.150 The separation 
originally planned between medical and anti-doping was blurred, by making a doctor the 
de facto head of anti-doping, as the medical approach is determined by the code of Ethics 
of Physicians on the protection of public health.151 It is reported and appears from 
communications on file that the other members of the ADC were only sporadically kept 
up-to-date on ADC matters. Lon Schattenberg would supervise the ADU and take 
operational decisions that the ADU then implemented. Lon Schattenberg’s influence on 
the ADU’s operations was therefore considerable (even though he did not reside in 
Switzerland). Lon Schattenberg had daily contact with the ADU staff to discuss all anti-
doping matters. It is reported for example that Lon Schattenberg would decide details of 
                                                     
148 The first members in 1992 were Werner Goehner (a lawyer), Manfred Donike (a biochemist from the 
Cologne laboratory) and Lon Schattenberg (“médecin de travail”/occupational therapist). 
149 “40 years of fighting against doping,” UCI (2001) Appendix I. Available: 
http://oldsite.uci.ch/english/health_sante/docs/40_ans.pdf. 
150 Lon Schattenberg was invited to speak with CIRC but declined to do so.  
151 Art 33bis of the Swiss Medical Association states that: “In every sports medicine activity, monitoring and 
protection of the athlete's health are a priority for the doctor. The doctor knows he can be faced with a 
dilemma between the duty "to not harm" and the obligation to respect the personal responsibility of the 
athlete” (translation from French). 
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the Anti-Doping programme, such as during which races riders would be tested and who 
would be the DCO at a specific race. 
 
Lon Schattenberg is reported to have been involved in cycling before joining the UCI and 
as someone who adored the sport of cycling. He has been described by ADU/CADF staff 
as a pioneer in anti-doping; however due to his professional background (occupational 
therapist) the focus of his work was on health concerns rather than on the disciplinary 
aspects of anti-doping. The idea that the athlete’s health should play the central role in 
the fight against doping was shared and backed by UCI leadership.152 This approach has 
also been described as “old school” and led to a culture clash when Anne Gripper later 
took over the ADU in October 2006 (see below). UCI staff reported that trying to catch the 
cheaters amounted to a witch hunt in Lon Schattenberg’s opinion. Interviewees criticised 
him for effectively applying a double standard, i.e., concentrating on health aspects of 
doping, instead of catching the cheaters. Lon Schattenberg is also described as having a 
very “human” approach to anti-doping.  
 
The Legal Department 
 
Another influential figure in UCI’s anti-doping activity, even though not a member of the 
ADC, was Philippe Verbiest, a lawyer from Belgium. Philippe Verbiest had made contact 
with Hein Verbruggen in the mid 1980’s and was involved in the merger of the 
International Amateur Cycling Federation (“FIAC”) and the International Professional 
Cycling Federation (“FICP”) in 1992. Before that he had revised the UCI Anti-Doping Rules 
(“ADR”). Philippe Verbiest worked for the UCI as an external consultant until 2013. 
However, this formal status does not fully capture his true position within UCI. De facto 
he was the uncontested head of the judicial unit/legal department of UCI. In the context 
of anti-doping he was mainly involved in results management and appeals. All important 
legal decisions in this field went through him. Furthermore, he participated in all of UCI’s 
directors’ meetings.  
 
 
                                                     
152 See Zotter/Zorzoli/Schattenberg/Robinson/Saugy/Mangin, “An International Medical Follow-up 
applied to the 1,200 best professional road cyclists, 2002” (workshop paper), p. 3. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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Tasks of the ADC 
 
The ADC’s main task was to devise and organise the testing of the athletes. Results 
management was only partly under the ADC’s jurisdiction. When the laboratory reported 
an Adverse Analytical Finding (“AAF”) to the UCI, the ADU would match the number 
reported on the sample and on the laboratory form with the name of the rider on the 
sample collection form. The ADU would inform Lon Schattenberg of the AAF who would 
then review the documentation. Only in exceptional cases would Lon Schattenberg 
involve the other members of the ADC in case of an AAF. If the AAF was confirmed, the 
rider’s NF was informed who then took over the case. From that moment on, the results 
management was no longer with the ADU. The ADU was neither involved nor routinely 
informed about the further developments of the case. In relation to the Tour, results 
management was different. All AAFs were communicated directly to Lon Schattenberg 
who then contacted the relevant individuals and initiated the relevant proceedings. 
 
There were basically three key tasks in the context of anti-doping that were not dealt with 
by the ADC: (1) Once an AAF was reported to the ADC/Lon Schattenberg, a disciplinary 
proceeding had to be initiated. This “legal part” of the results management was dealt with 
by UCI’s legal department/Philippe Verbiest. Philippe Verbiest contacted the relevant 
stakeholders and informed them of the alleged ADRV (initially, i.e., 1998-2008/2009 only 
the NF was informed, and later the athlete and the NF were both informed.)153 After the 
relevant notification it was up to the NF to conduct the disciplinary hearings and, as far 
as necessary, prosecute the ADRV. (2) Once the NF had taken a decision in relation to the 
athlete, the decision was communicated back to the UCI. The legal department/Philippe 
Verbiest then checked whether the decision was in conformity with the applicable UCI 
ADR or whether an appeal would have to be lodged against the NF’s decision to CAS. (3) 
Finally, TUE applications were not dealt with by the ADC, but by another UCI department. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
153 As from 2008/2009 onwards, two notification letters were sent (to the athlete and the NF). 
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The “Health Program” 
 
For a period of time another department within UCI was also involved in anti-doping. In 
1997 the UCI became increasingly concerned that health risks associated with cycling 
were not adequately being dealt with, following riders’ deaths in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Even though the anti-doping program was an effective means of limiting the use 
of certain substances that were dangerous to the health of the athletes, its effectiveness 
was obviously limited to those products that were detectable. Therefore, the UCI 
established a Health Program in 1997 designed to check and safeguard the general health 
of the riders and also help, indirectly, in the fight against doping. The health test and the 
medical follow-up performed were seen as an important chance for doctors to open the 
discussion with the riders about all aspects of health concerns, including doping. Such 
interaction was seen by Lon Schattenberg and the leadership of the UCI as “the best way 
to fight doping”.154 
 
In order to implement the Health Program the UCI established the Sports Safety and 
Conditions Commission (“SSCC”). Lon Schattenberg was the first president of the SSCC 
and held the position until 2001. Furthermore, the UCI hired Dr Mario Zorzoli to oversee 
the Program. One of the main responsibilities of the SSCC was to organise and plan blood 
tests in order to establish certain blood parameters of the athlete.155 These blood tests 
were used to detect abnormalities in the peloton, be it health issues (e.g., extreme high 
concentrations of ferritin) or indications (but not clear proof) of doping.156 These tests 
formed the basis of the so-called “no-start rule” (according to which a rest period could 
be imposed on a rider for 15 days if certain blood parameter thresholds were exceeded). 
This practice of conducting health tests was also followed well after the EPO test had been 
                                                     
154 See Zotter/Zorzoli/Schattenberg/Robinson/Saugy/Mangin, “An International Medical Follow-up 
applied to the 1,200 best professional road cyclists, 2002” (workshop paper), p. 6. Copy on file with CIRC. 
155 The tests were taken by the Medical Inspectors. As with the DCOs (see above) there have been 
numerous complaints regarding a lack of necessary skills of this personnel, see Report of the Independent 
Observers Tour de France 2010 (28.10.2010), p. 42. Available: 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/2010-10-
28+WADA+Independent+Observers+Report+TDF+2010.pdf.  
156 See Zotter/Zorzoli/Schattenberg/Robinson/Saugy/Mangin, “An International Medical Follow-up 
applied to the 1,200 best professional road cyclists, 2002” (workshop paper), p. 6. Copy on file with CIRC; 
and UCI, “40 years of fighting against doping,” UCI (2001). Available: 
http://oldsite.uci.ch/english/health_sante/docs/40_ans.pdf 15, 17. 
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introduced. Only after the refinement of the EPO tests and installing the ABP was it felt 
that there was no longer a need to collect this data in the context of a Health Program.  
 
Some coordination took place between the Anti-Doping Program and the Health Program. 
Lon Schattenberg was head of the ADU as well as of the SSCC (and a member of the 
Medical Commission). He would select cyclists with suspect health test for In-competition 
Tests (“ICT”).157 On an operational level things were also coordinated informally, i.e. by 
the fact that, for a certain period of time, the coordinator of the ADU and the SSCC shared 
the same office within UCI. Some coordination also occurred through the fact that the UCI 
doctor participated along with the DCO in the taking of the sample.158 This provided a 
good opportunity for the exchange of information between the UCI doctor and the athlete 
and his/her support personnel, because the UCI doctor was, unlike the DCO, not 
perceived as a “prosecutor.” Information that might be relevant to doping that was 
obtained by the UCI doctor in the field was then passed on to the ADU. This practice was 
stopped at a later point in time (2012) and the taking of the samples was solely conducted 
under the authority of the DCOs (or Medical Inspector who was, however, not a UCI 
Doctor).  
 
UCI Leadership 
 
UCI’s leadership had a significant influence on anti-doping matters. It is clear that UCI 
leadership took the strategic decisions in anti-doping (e.g. funding, organisation, 
recruitment of staff, etc.). In addition UCI leadership was informed and aware of, as well 
as involved in, decisions in relation to all important anti-doping matters on an operational 
level. This is confirmed by the interviews conducted by the CIRC.  
 
The information on anti-doping operations was provided to the UCI leadership via Lon 
Schattenberg or Philippe Verbiest (depending on the nature of the information). 
Furthermore, in the relatively rare cases in which the ADC met, it is reported that Hein 
Verbruggen would be present. It is also submitted that under the presidency of Hein 
                                                     
157 See Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2003, p. 10 et seq. Available: https://wada-
main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA_IO_Report_TourDeFrance_2003_EN.pdf.  
158 According to the applicable UCI ADR testing was conducted by an Anti-Doping inspector and a Medical 
Inspector (see Art. 98 et seq 2004 UCI ADR). 
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Verbruggen “secret meetings” were regularly held between Lon Schattenberg, Philippe 
Verbiest and the president (referred to by interviewees as the “Flemish-” or “Dutch-
connection”) to discuss and decide important anti-doping matters. The then head of the 
ADU would not participate in these meetings nor in the regular UCI directors’ meetings or 
other strategic meetings or decision-making processes. It appears that during the 
presidency of Hein Verbruggen, there was little direct contact between him and the ADU 
staff. Information provided to the president would not be provided via the ADU, but 
(only) through Lon Schattenberg or Philippe Verbiest.  
 
Under the presidency of Pat McQuaid the flow of information appears to have changed 
once Anne Gripper became head of the ADU in October 2006 (and even more so when 
Lon Schattenberg left the UCI in February 2007). Secret meetings between Lon 
Schattenberg/Philippe Verbiest/(former) president continued to take place. However, 
Anne Gripper as head of the ADU had constant and direct access in respect of anti-doping 
matters to Pat McQuaid and regularly updated him on all important issues. Furthermore, 
as head of the ADU (later on the director of the CADF), she took also part in the directors’ 
or management meetings (and was kept informed and included in the flow of information 
concerning disciplinary hearing and appeals).159 
 
It appears from the interviews that the UCI leadership was not only informed of all 
relevant anti-doping matters, but that it also interfered in the decision-making. In the era 
of the presidency of Hein Verbruggen, it has been reported that he would rarely interfere 
with ADU operations directly. Only some general advice would come directly from the 
president to ADU staff. In order to implement operational decisions interviewees told the 
Commission that Hein Verbruggen would go through Lon Schattenberg or Philippe 
Verbiest who would pass the decision on to “their” staff. Through Philippe Verbiest and 
Lon Schattenberg the UCI leadership had a firm grip on the ADU operations. Neither 
Philippe Verbiest nor Lon Schattenberg acted autonomously or independently on 
important matters. It is repeatedly noted by interviewees that Lon Schattenberg and 
Philippe Verbiest would not take a single important decision without obtaining the prior 
consent of the president. In interviews conducted by the CIRC, Hein Verbruggen has been 
                                                     
159 See KPMG, UCI Governance and Independence Assessment 2013 – Summary for the Management 
Committee Members, dated 7 June 2013, p. 7. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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described as a charismatic “patron absolu”. The organisation was completely focused on 
him and he controlled every aspect of the federation through his key figures in the various 
departments (be it external or internal staff).  
 
This autocratic structure based on loyal hand-picked colleagues in key roles persisted 
also through the era of the presidency of Pat McQuaid. This is not only evidenced by the 
interviews conducted by the CIRC but also expressed in the KPMG report in which it is 
said that: “The President has taken many decisions alone or based on external advice during 
critical times…Critically important matters…are taken solely by the President.” However, 
unlike Hein Verbruggen, Pat McQuaid would communicate and interact more directly and 
openly with the ADU. It is reported that Pat McQuaid would advise the ADU staff, e.g., to 
test certain riders at a certain time or to test them more frequently, to notify an athlete 
personally of an ADRV (instead of following the usual procedure), (when) to open a 
disciplinary procedure against a rider, decide to shorten the waiting period for a come-
back to competition of a cyclist or decide to take action against a team doctor if the latter 
was not cooperative in the context of a doping control. Despite frequent interference at 
an operational level, most ADU staff at the time felt that the ADU was “rather 
independent”. The role of Philippe Verbiest in the era of Pat McQuaid was, at least up until 
2011, still very dominant. He is described by ADU/CADF staff as an “éminence grise” who 
always knew what was going on in the ADU/CADF.  
 
Unlike Hein Verbruggen, Pat McQuaid has been described by the majority of the current 
and former UCI staff as a rather “weak leader”. It has been reported that he did not manage 
to dissociate himself from Hein Verbruggen. Hein Verbruggen remained Vice-President 
of UCI, kept an office at UCI’s headquarters and was physically present a lot of the time. 
The control structure that Hein Verbruggen had installed during his presidency and that 
remained in place under the presidency of Pat McQuaid continued to report and meet 
with him. Hein Verbruggen had a strong influence on Pat McQuaid throughout the latter’s 
presidency. Emails directed at Pat McQuaid would be forwarded to Hein Verbruggen and 
answered by the latter or answered by Pat McQuaid, however, drafted by Hein 
Verbruggen. UCI staff reported that they thought that Pat McQuaid felt obliged to Hein 
Verbruggen, because the latter had put him in office. Pat McQuaid is described as being 
under Hein Verbruggen’s “umbrella” when taking important decisions. This close 
106 
 
relationship with Hein Verbruggen also meant that Pat McQuaid was not willing and 
capable “to cut” with the past and disassociate himself from Hein Verbruggen or the 
problems stemming from his presidency. Only gradually, at the end of his presidency, did 
Pat McQuaid become more independent. Nevertheless, it is reported that Pat McQuaid 
never succeeded in establishing a convincing governance style of his own.  
 
Conflicts of interest  
 
UCI leadership kept very close ties with some of the riders that were highly suspected of 
doping. This was seen as a source of conflict of interests, because UCI leadership regularly 
interfered with anti-doping operations. Conflicts of interests were present in particular 
in relation to Lance Armstrong as discussed in more detail below.  
 
Constant fights with other major stakeholders  
 
From very early on, UCI wasted a lot of its time and resources fighting other important 
stakeholders in the sport. Real or, often only, perceived conspiracies were taken as an 
excuse to stage counter-attacks and to initiate proceedings that absorbed and somewhat 
blinded the UCI leadership (see e.g. Vrijman affair, Schenk affair). This is also true for the 
relationship with ASO (see above) or with the AFLD.160 However, this is particularly true 
also for the relationship between the UCI and WADA leadership. 
                                                     
160 Relationships between UCI and AFLD were often tense. An example of this is the 2009 Tour where it 
appears that there was some kind of battle between AFLD and UCI to get or stay in control of anti-doping 
performed at the Tour. While in 2008 the AFLD was basically in control, in 2009 the controls were mainly 
under the control of the UCI. The AFLD heavily criticized UCI’s testing program at the 2009 Tour. The 
(then) President of the AFLD alleged that there had been violations of the applicable rules (see Bilan du 
déroulement des contrôles antidopage effectués lors du Tour de France 2009): “Un grand nombre d’écarts 
tant par rapport aux standards internationaux de contrôle que vis-à-vis du règlement antidopage de l’UCI 
ont pu être relevés à différents stades de la procedure.”. Translation into English: “Many differences 
between the International Standard for Testing and the anti-doping regulations of UCI have been 
identified at different stages of the procedure.” In addition, the AFLD criticised what they called the 
purely quantitative approach of UCI’s anti-doping program at the Tour (“… mener une politique 
antidopage … qui privilégient les données quantitatives (grandes nombre de contrôles urinaires et sanguins) 
qui permettent d’afficher ces chiffres impressionnants, et ceux qui privilégient des choix qualitatifs, c’est-à-
dire basés essentiellement sur le ciblage et le caractère aussi peu prévisible que possible…) (translation into 
English: “...to conduct an anti-doping policy...that emphasizes quantitative data (large number of urine 
and blood tests) that display these impressive figures, and those who prefer qualitative choice, that is to 
say, essentially based on targeting and being as unpredictable as possible…) and that UCI’s policy 
displayed favouritism to the Astana team (The World – 5.10.2009). This prompted a strong public 
reaction from UCI (see letter 5 August 2009) and a counter-reaction from AFLD (see Commentaires de 
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The history of WADA and UCI are strongly tied together. It was the Festina scandal (see 
above) that sparked the creation of WADA, which was founded in 1999. The relationship 
between WADA and UCI was from the beginning tense and is evidenced through several 
examples. One of them is the WADA Code, which resulted from several rounds of 
consultation that took place in 2002/2003. From the beginning, UCI in the shape of Hein 
Verbruggen and Philippe Verbiest strongly opposed the standard sanction of two years 
of ineligibility in case of a first ADRV that was advocated by most stakeholders of the 
Olympic Movement. Instead, UCI lobbied for much lower sanctions as has been standard 
practice within UCI (see below). As a result UCI was one of the last federations to accept 
the WADA Code. In 2004, the UCI leadership strongly criticized the WADA Code 
sanctioning regime.161 In the lead-up to the World-Anti-Doping Conference in 
Copenhagen in 2003 (where the text of the WADA Code was adopted) further events lead 
to the deterioration of the relationship, in particular the incident surrounding the 
salbutamol case of Gonzalo de Galdeano in the 2002 Tour,162 and the subsequent 
resignation in protest of Hein Verbruggen from the WADA Board.  After the Independent 
Observer Report of the 2003 Tour was released (that contained positive as well as 
negative aspects in relation of UCI’s anti-doping policy)163 the UCI decided to forbid 
WADA Independent Observers from carrying out any activities in further events.164 
Furthermore, the publication of the Independent Observer report was overshadowed by 
the fact that its contents had been leaked to the press prior to its official publication and 
contrary to the protocols established. The source of the leak could not be established.  
 
A crippling impacting factor for the relationship between WADA and UCI was, besides a 
personal conflict between Hein Verbruggen and Dick Pound, the question of what the 
                                                     
l’ALFD à la réponse de l’UCI relative au rapport sur les mesures prises contre le dopage lors du Tour de 
France 2009). 
161 See Mihir Bose, “Drugs agency under fire from big guns”, The Telegraph (11 Aug. 2004). Available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/2384475/Drugs-agency-under-fire-from-big-guns.html, 
where Hein Verbruggen is quoted as follows: “Two years' blanket ban will not work, and the judge will seek 
arguments not to give it. You may be guilty but there may be circumstantial evidence to say two years is a lot 
of time for this. The result is the guilty might go totally unpunished.” 
162 Gonzalo de Galdeano had tested positive for the substance salbutamol. UCI did not qualify this as a 
positive test contrary to the French Anti-Doping Council (CPLD), because the rider had provided a 
medical certificate. The CPLD, however, did not accept the medical certificate because the amount found 
in the athlete’s bodily specimen was not compatible with a regular use of the (authorised) asthma 
medicine. WADA sided with the CPLD and sent a letter to UCI explaining WADA’s position (19 July 2002). 
163 See Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2003, p. 32 et seq. Available: https://wada-
main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA_IO_Report_TourDeFrance_2003_EN.pdf. 
164 Independent Observers were only allowed again at the 2010 Tour. 
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proper role of WADA was in relation to sports federations and therefore to UCI. It was 
UCI’s opinion that WADA should not interfere with internal matters and affairs of 
cycling.165 According to UCI, WADA’s role was to assist sports federation, but not to 
criticise them nor interfere in the governance of the federation’s (anti-doping) policy. Of 
course it is well-known that, from the very beginning, WADA assumed a different role.166 
This inevitably lead to conflicts, since it was precisely these kinds of public discussions 
and moral finger-pointing that UCI leadership had always tried to suppress within its 
sphere of control, because it was felt that it was detrimental to the development of cycling 
(see below). WADA, however, was and remained outside UCI’s sphere of control, 
regardless of how hard UCI leadership lobbied against it. Any interference or criticism by 
WADA in relation to UCI’s anti-doping policy, or the sheer mention that cycling had a 
doping problem, was perceived by the UCI leadership as completely unacceptable and 
seemed to have been interpreted as a personal attack on the UCI leadership.167 This 
prompted excessive counter-attacks against both WADA and in particular against its 
(first) president Dick Pound. A further negative climax of the relationship arose right 
after the election of Pat McQuaid in 2005 with the so-called “Vrijman affair” (see below). 
Although Hein Verbruggen was no longer president of the UCI, the matter was handled 
mainly by him. Pat McQuaid inherited the difficult relationship between Hein Verbruggen 
and WADA/Dick Pound. Pat McQuaid did not disassociate himself from that dispute. 
Instead, it appears that he sided from the beginning of his presidency with Hein 
Verbruggen and that he did little to ease the conflict. Examples of this can be found in Pat 
                                                     
165 See Mihir Bose, “Drugs agency under fire from big guns”, The Telegraph (11 Aug. 2004). Available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/2384475/Drugs-agency-under-fire-from-big-guns.html, 
where Hein Verbruggen is quoted as follows: “Dick Pound keeps insulting governments and federations all 
the time. Thanks to Mr Pound, we get 700 times more publicity for every positive [test] than they get in other 
sports. I think people like Dick Pound should look at the facts. WADA in 2003 conducted 242 out-of-
competition tests in cycling and we had one positive. The WADA president, instead of throwing mud at the 
innocent athletes, should look at the efficiency of his own organisation. Dick Pound keeps insulting 
governments and federations all the time. Thanks to Mr Pound, we get 700 times more publicity for every 
positive [test] than they get in other sports. I think people like Dick Pound should look at the facts. WADA in 
2003 conducted 242 out-of-competition tests in cycling and we had one positive. The WADA president, 
instead of throwing mud at the innocent athletes, should look at the efficiency of his own organisation. … 
Pound is positioning WADA as the watchdog and that is not its role. It should be an aid agency for sport, not 
a police agency against sport. WADA should help us, but it is continuously shouting at us.” 
166 See Mihir Bose, “Drugs agency under fire from big guns”, The Telegraph (11 Aug. 2004). Available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/2384475/Drugs-agency-under-fire-from-big-guns.html, 
where Dick Pound is quoted as follows: “We are not just a support agency, quite the opposite…WADA is the 
international agency whose job is to report on compliance and non-compliance with the code.” 
167 CIRC acknowledges that some of the wording used in public was relatively strong. However, this is 
equally true for the responses that were being made.  
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McQuaid’s published letter to the French Ministry of Sport and Dick Pound (dated 3 July 
2006) and in his calling publicly for Dick Pound’s dismissal from WADA.168 When Anne 
Gripper came into UCI, the relationship between UCI and WADA seemed to improve for a 
short while at the working level. At the presidency level, however, the relationship was 
still negative and combative. Evidence of an improved relationship at a working level can 
be found in the common development of the ABP. However, this cooperation ended 
abruptly with the initiation of defamation proceedings by the UCI against Dick Pound 
before Swiss Courts.169 Defamation suits over anti-doping related issues were brought by 
Hein Verbruggen/Pat McQuaid also against other stakeholders in cycling and got high 
media coverage.170 It seemed to have been part of UCI’s strategy to threaten and/or serve 
their opponents or critics with legal actions, be it before state courts or ethical 
commissions (see below). Such legal actions would sometimes be preceded or 
accompanied by staged “open letters” of Hein Verbruggen’s network within the sporting 
community to important decision-makers (see e.g. Vrijman-affair, Schenk-affair). These 
actions highlight the absence of a culture of dialogue as well as an inability to accept 
different opinions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
168 See Associated Press, “UCI chief calls for dismissal of WADA chief Pound” (23 Sept. 2006). Available: 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=cycling&id=2599527. 
169 The requests read inter alia as follows: “Interdiction est faite à M. Richard W. Pound, sous menace des 
sanctions pénales prévues à l'art. 292 du Code pénal suisse pour insoumission à une décision de l'autorité, 
d'évoquer 'Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), M. Henricus Verbruggen, et/ou d'autres dirigeants ou 
collaborateurs de 'Union Cycliste Internationale, en affirmant ou en suggérant d'une quelconque manière, 
que ceux-ci ont un lien avec le dopage en ce sens qu'ils en sont des acteurs, qu'ils en sont complices, qu'ils le 
couvrent, ou qu'ils ne luttent pas à son encontre.” Translation into English: “Richard W. Pound, under 
threat of criminal sanctions provided for in s. 292 of the Swiss Penal Code for failure to respect an official 
decision, is forbidden from referring to the International Cycling Union (UCI ), Mr Henricus Verbruggen, 
and/or other leaders or employees of the Union Cycliste Internationale, claiming or suggesting in any way 
that they are linked to doping in that they are actors, they are complicit, they cover it up, or they do not 
fight against it.” 
170 See e.g. media reports of the defamation proceedings of Pat McQuaid and Hein Verbruggen against Paul 
Kimmage: Simon Mac Michael, “Pat McQuaid, Hein Verbruggen and UCI launch defamation action against 
Paul Kimmage” (30 Jan. 2012), available: http://road.cc/content/news/51325-pat-mcquaid-hein-
verbruggen-and-uci-launch-defamation-action-againsty-paul; Cycling News, “Kimmage action against 
McQuaid and Verbruggen dismissed by Swiss court” (30 Aug. 2013), available: 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/kimmage-action-against-mcquaid-and-verbruggen-dismissed-by-
swiss-court or against Floyd Landis; and Cycling News, “Swiss court finds in UCI's favour in Landis 
defamation case” (3 Oct. 2012), available: http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/swiss-court-finds-in-ucis-
favour-in-landis-defamation-case. 
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2.2.1.2. Creation of CADF and the time thereafter 
 
In March 2008 the CADF was created. As a foundation, the CADF is a legally independent 
entity from UCI according to Swiss law. The original reason for creating the CADF was to 
facilitate financial contributions to the (ever more expensive) fight against doping by 
third parties (UCI ProTeams, Continental Pro Teams and event organisers). These third 
parties did not want any money they gave for anti-doping to be handled by UCI. The 
purpose for creating CADF was to guarantee the financial independence of the Anti-
Doping Program from UCI.  
 
Continued interference from UCI leadership and effect of previous management 
decisions 
 
In the beginning, apart from financing (and the formal legal independence of CADF) very 
little changed in the organisational structure of UCI’s anti-doping framework. In 
particular, the CADF kept the former offices of the ADU at the UCI headquarters and 
operated under the UCI logo.171 The staff of the CADF originally had contracts with and 
were employed and paid by UCI. Furthermore, the CADF staff worked together with UCI 
personnel and got directions from the UCI leadership. The governance of the CADF was 
formally in the hands of a foundation board. However, the latter was chaired by Pat 
McQuaid and ultimately, the CADF was directed and controlled like any other department 
within UCI. As a result, policy and operational decisions were taken either by UCI 
leadership directly, or by the CADF with the UCI leadership’s consent.172 Pat McQuaid 
inherited a number of problems from his predecessor, which continued to plague UCI 
during his tenure.  In particular, poor relationships with stakeholders, including WADA 
and AFLD (and also USADA), continued to hamper the development of anti-doping at UCI.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
171 See Minutes of the Board of the Cycling Anti-Doping Foundation dated 2.12.2010. Copy on file with 
CIRC. 
172 See Minutes of the Board of the Cycling Anti-Doping Foundation dated 2.12.2010. Copy on file with 
CIRC. 
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Difficult Transition Period 
 
The transition from the ADU to the CADF was not easy and presented a number of 
different problems. On a legal level the new status of the CADF brought it into conflict 
with the UCI ADR, which provided that all anti-doping measures had to be taken by UCI 
(and not by an external CADF). The CADF personnel had no authority to act on behalf of, 
or to engage with, the (different legal entity) UCI.173 This problem was initially solved by 
shifting the results management function back to UCI’s legal department, which was then 
responsible for all letters and communications in anti-doping matters (to the relevant 
stakeholders). CADF was reduced to providing only the operational and logistical aspects 
of doping control to the Anti-Doping Program. In the course of redefining the 
responsibilities in results management, it appears that some AAF cases were “forgotten” 
and not followed-up in a timely manner. These were for athletes competing at the lower 
levels of competition. Once competences were clarified and appropriate protocols put in 
place (in particular with the arrival of Dominique Leroux) at the legal department (later 
on Legal Anti-doping Service) things became clearer.  
 
It is also reported that the transition (in March 2010) from the first head of the CADF 
Anne Gripper to Francesca Rossi (pharmaceutical/scientific background) did not go 
smoothly, because the handover apparently had to be effected in a couple of days. 
Furthermore, it has been reported that financial or budgetary problems surfaced in 2011 
that impacted the CADF’s Anti-Doping Program. Under Francesca Rossi’s leadership, the 
CADF overcame these budgetary problems and underwent complex and formal structural 
changes to prepare for ISO-accreditation. In 2012 the accreditation (ISO 9001:2008) was 
obtained. During this process of reorganisation a considerable number of the CADF staff 
was replaced.  
 
Move to more independence 
 
After the publication of USADA’s Reasoned Decision and the allegations contained 
therein, there was discussion as to whether CADF should acquire more operational 
                                                     
173 See also KPMG, UCI Governance and Independence Assessment 2013 – Summary for the Management 
Committee Members, dated 7 June 2013, p. 8. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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independence from UCI leadership.174 In that respect, the 2013 KPMG Report states as 
follows: “According to the statutes, the Management Committee designates CADF 
foundation board members, which can impair the independence of CADF. Until now, UCI’s 
President and General Director have been president and member of the CADF foundation 
board, creating a perception of impaired independence. In addition, it is not clear where 
CADF and UCI Legal process start and where they end, making the distinction between CADF 
and UCI departments difficult.”175 The KPMG Report recommended that UCI redefine the 
status and degree of independence of the CADF in relation to UCI and concluded, with 
respect to the lack of legitimacy/authority of the CADF in relation to the ADR, to maintain 
the ADC, “which shall be complimentary to CADF, shall regularly meet and report to the 
Management Committee.”176 
 
In light of the above, UCI decided in January 2013 as a first step to restructure the 
foundation board in order to increase the independence of the CADF. The UCI president 
was no longer chairman of the CADF foundation board. In September 2013 the foundation 
board was completely renewed.  The new members of the CADF foundation board do not 
hold any positions within UCI. The foundation meets 3 times a year. The financial 
situation of the CADF was, and still is, monitored by the CADF funding committee.177 
Members of that committee comprise representatives from teams, event organisers, 
riders and from UCI as well as the chairman of the CADF foundation board. The CADF’s 
priorities in terms of testing strategy and broad line of approach are determined through 
a contract of services with UCI. The contract is amended on an annual basis after the 
evaluation of the results obtained and the situations arising from the tests carried out.178  
 
The CADF today manages part of the UCI Anti-Doping Program for all riders of all 
disciplines in- and out-of-competition and the ABP. As part of the Anti-Doping Program 
the CADF is also involved in education and prevention activities in collaboration with UCI. 
Three main aspects of the Anti-Doping Program are still not taken care of by the CADF. 
                                                     
174 See also CADF Presentation Bergen 2013. Copy on file with CIRC. 
175 KPMG, UCI Governance and Independence Assessment 2013 – Summary for the Management 
Committee Members, dated 7 June 2013, p. 7. Copy on file with CIRC. 
176 KPMG, UCI Governance and Independence Assessment 2013 – Summary for the Management 
Committee Members, dated 7 June 2013, p. 8. Copy on file with CIRC. 
177 See also CADF Presentation Bergen 2013. Copy on file with CIRC. 
178 See www.uci.ch/clean-sport/anti-doping/. 
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First, according to the rules in force (2014) results management is still not under the 
CADF’s remit,179 and rather rests partly with the Legal Anti-Doping Service (“LADS”) and 
partly with the NFs (however see also below for the 2015 changes). The LADS is a 
department of the UCI composed of legal experts. The body intervenes (and is provided 
with scientific and administrative support by the CADF) when a potential ADR breach is 
reported to it. The LADS is a separate unit from the rest of UCI in order to afford it greater 
independence. In particular, the LADS does not receive any instructions from the UCI 
Management. Once the first part of the results management process is completed, the file 
is sent to the NF. Second, appeals in anti-doping matters (against decisions of NFs) are as 
of 2014, a matter for the LADS/external Legal Counsel and not of the CADF. Third,180 
according to the rules in force (2014) the issuance of TUEs is a matter dealt with (only on 
an administrative level) by the CADF. The CADF has access to the contact address, where 
the athletes register their TUEs, and the request for TUEs. However, the medical follow-
up of the TUE, i.e. the substantive part of the TUE process is done by UCI medical. The 
CADF may, if needed, provide administrative and scientific support to the relevant TUE 
Committee. 
 
Evaluation 
 
The organisation of anti-doping within UCI has evolved considerably over time both in 
size and structure. Anti-doping is recognised as a key issue in cycling and the 
independence of the CADF is a key element in restoring the UCI’s damaged credibility in 
anti-doping matters; independence prevents any inappropriate influence of UCI 
leadership on the Anti-Doping Program. However, CIRC is also aware that moving the 
CADF away from UCI may enable other stakeholder to have more influence on CADF 
operations. The fact that a large proportion of the CADF’s budget comes from pro teams 
(and the fact that the pro teams are represented on the financial board of the CADF) may 
create a certain dynamic whereby professional teams want to see what controls apply to 
them and thereby influence the overall testing strategy for all disciplines in cycling.  
 
                                                     
179 See also iNADO Report – Final Audit report Doping Control Program – The UCI and CADF, 25 February 
2014, p. 2. Copy on file with CIRC. 
180 See also iNADO Report – Final Audit report Doping Control Program – The UCI and CADF, 25 February 
2014, p. 2. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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It appears that CADF is ultimately striving for a type of independence that is based on the 
model of domestically operating NADOs (UKAD, AFLD, USADA, etc.). These NADOs are 
independent and operate outside the influence of organised sport. An internal CADF 
strategy paper stated that “there is no reason why such a model [like the domestically 
operating NADOs] cannot be put in place internationally…through an independently run 
organisation which has fully autonomous powers of decision making.”181 However, 
whether CADF will ever attain a level of independence equal to that of the NADOs seems 
questionable under the regime of the current WADA Code. This is particularly because 
IFs are signatories to the WADA Code and, therefore, have to comply with the 
responsibilities of the Code, i.e., are accountable for all the obligations placed on them by 
the WADA Code. It appears questionable (or would require discussion with the WADA at 
least) whether an IF could comply with these obligations under the WADA Code by simply 
externalising and shifting them to a separate legal entity and dissociating itself from it.  
 
As long as full independence cannot be obtained from UCI, tasks have to be divided 
between UCI and CADF. Furthermore, protocols must be put in place to prevent UCI 
leadership from exerting inappropriate influence on the CADF’s operations. However, 
these protocols should be intelligent, transparent and accountable and, at the same time, 
not overly formalistic, since there are also dangers associated with a formalistic approach 
to independence.  In particular: 
 There is a danger that coordination becomes more difficult at a governance 
level.182 It appears that since governance over CADF is performed through the 
CADF foundation board, whose members have no function within UCI, the 
relationship between CADF and UCI has become more formalistic and distant. The 
UCI is viewed by the CADF as “only one of their stakeholders”. 
 Difficulties may also arise at a communication level (for example in terms of 
consistency across homepages, content, press releases, interviews). It is obvious 
that on a communication level coordination must take place when communicating 
                                                     
181 See Word-UCI Independent doping Unit 21.8.2013. Copy on file with CIRC. 
182 See also iNADO Report – Final Audit report Doping Control Program – The UCI and CADF, 25 February 
2014, p. 3. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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with the public. At the moment, at least from the public perception, it is not very 
transparent who is responsible for what.183 
 Coordination and exchange of information is difficult for those 
departments/commissions both legally184 and on a practical level (within UCI and 
CADF) that must work together in anti-doping (e.g. results management, TUEs, 
appeals). It appears from the interviews that, e.g., the sharing of information and 
collaboration between CADF and the legal department/LADS proved to be an 
issue.185 
 
In view of all of the above the further move towards independence should be undertaken 
carefully. The concept of independence should not be understood in a formalistic way, 
but be smart and inclusive, with the necessary protocols and respect for the roles and 
organisational integrity of both entities. The goal should be to make any influence 
transparent, traceable and accountable without detrimental side-effects of preventing 
the necessary flow of information.186 There are certainly disadvantages to the current 
situation. The formulation of a comprehensive anti-doping strategy is complicated at the 
moment by the fact that different commissions/departments inside UCI (ADC, TUE 
Committee, LADS and the UCI Management Committee) and outside UCI (CADF) are 
involved in different parts of the decision-making process. This demands appropriate 
level of reporting and coordination. 
 
2.3. THE ANTI-DOPING PROGRAMME 
 
Evaluating UCI’s Anti-Doping Programme is a difficult task, since the question is what the 
benchmark is. In this context some interviewees pointed to the fact that other IFs had 
done or still do much less in anti-doping than the UCI and that, therefore, UCI should get 
credit for its Anti-Doping Programme. The CIRC is of the view that a comparison with 
                                                     
183 See also also iNADO Report – Final Audit report Doping Control Program – The UCI and CADF, 25 
February 2014, p. 3. Copy on file with CIRC. 
184 Passing forward information from and to CADF might pose a problem in light of the ISPPPI, because 
CADF is independent but not a signatory to the Code. 
185 See also iNADO Report – Final Audit report Doping Control Program – The UCI and CADF, 25 February 
2014, p. 3. Copy on file with CIRC. 
186 See also iNADO Report – Final Audit report Doping Control Program – The UCI and CADF, 25 February 
2014, p. 3. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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other IFs forms only a minor part of the benchmark when assessing UCI’s Anti-Doping 
Programme. The decisive factor rather is the magnitude of the doping problem with 
which UCI was faced and the knowledge UCI leadership had (or should have had) of said 
problem. In the CIRC’s view the bigger the scale of the problem, the more an IF is expected 
to do in order to solve it.  The CIRC finds that two periods of time must be distinguished 
in order to fairly assess UCI’s anti-doping policy.  
 
2.3.1. The period of containment (until 2006/2007) 
 
From 1992, the UCI had an Anti-Doping Programme in place. It was operated on a daily 
basis by the ADU, whose staff was interviewed and recruited by the UCI leadership (Lon 
Schattenberg/Philippe Verbiest/President) and supervised by Lon Schattenberg. Initially 
the staff had little expertise in anti-doping and “learned on the job”. 
 
The Health Tests 
 
The creation of the ADC happened at a time when EPO had already found its way into the 
peloton (see above). Since the late 1980s, EPO had been administered to athletes,187 and 
had allegedly resulted in the deaths of perhaps 20 riders between 1987—1990. By the 
mid-1990s, EPO was widely used by riders.188 The proliferation of EPO was enhanced by 
a number of factors (see also above): however, one of the main reasons was that the 
science lagged behind and there was no test available to detect EPO and therefore deter 
riders from taking it. In addition, EPO had a huge performance-enhancing effect in cycling 
(see above) and its use was much easier logistically and less risky to health than 
comparable methods of manipulation (e.g. blood transfusion).189 Furthermore, a number 
of cycling-specific aspects acted as a driver for the proliferation of EPO, such as the high 
mobility of riders (constant change between teams), the similar professional and cultural 
                                                     
187 Mario Zorzoli and Francesca Rossi, “Implementation of the biological passport: The experience of the 
International Cycling Union” (2010) DOI 10.1002/dta.173. Available: www.drugtestinganalysis.com. 
188 Inside the Games, “Independent Report finds 95 per cent of Dutch cyclists used banned drugs” (17 
June 2013). Available: http://www.insidethegames.biz/sports/summer/cycling/1014707-independent-
report-finds-95-per-cent-of-dutch-cyclists-used-banned-drugs.  
189 See See Zotter/Zorzoli/Schattenberg/Robinson/Saugy/Mangin, “An International Medical Follow-up 
applied to the 1,200 best professional road cyclists, 2002” (workshop paper), p. 1. Copy on file with CIRC. 
117 
 
background of riders at the time,190 and the fact that the cycling community was rather 
small and a closed shop (athletes becoming coaches and athlete support personnel – 
“incestuous”). That the peloton was EPO-infested was known to UCI leadership and is 
evidenced by the fact that as early as 1995 the UCI held a meeting with the heads of 
various laboratories to discuss with them what could be done about EPO misuse. The 
problem had also been discussed in the public domain.191 The problem grew more 
alarming when in 1996 riders informed UCI leadership that the misuse of EPO had 
spiralled out of control and that there was a serious and acute danger that riders would 
die on the Grand Tours. It was the various team doctors and managers who went to the 
UCI and begged them to start blood controls.192 It is this health aspect that made the UCI, 
and in particular Lon Schattenberg, step in, and at the end of 1996 it was decided to 
introduce and later on (1997) to implement the 50% haematocrit level together with the 
“no-start-rule” (see above).  
 
The 50%-level was chosen for health reasons193 and managed to exclude serious abuses 
of EPO at competitions (some riders previously had haematocrit levels as high as 
58/60%). It was established taking into account standard deviations in relation to the 
normal population. Most people (including riders and teams) found the 50% level 
“reasonable” (because most riders had natural haematocrit level clearly below that 
threshold). It was clear from the beginning that this health approach had little deterrent 
effect on the misuse of EPO. It was only when the rule was first introduced that blood 
tests taken in-competition caused some concern to the teams. Very quickly, the teams 
(through the expertise at their disposal) adapted a technique to stay below the 50% 
radar. Within 30 minutes one could manipulate the thresholds in order to stay within the 
limits. That the riders were adapting such techniques was clearly visible to the personnel 
performing the tests. They reported to the CIRC that while blood tests were being taken 
fresh punctures in the rider’s armpits could be observed. Furthermore, quite often the 
riders would be warned of up-coming health tests by DCOs (see below) or other persons. 
The UCI was also rather lenient in relation to the time the athletes were given to present 
                                                     
190 Cycling in the 90’s was still very much a European sport. 
191 See Sandro Donati “L’utilizzazione dell’eritropoietina nel ciclismo professionistico italiano”. Copy on file 
with CIRC. 
192 The Outer Line Perspectives on Doping in Pro Cycling – 1. Available: 
http://www.theouterline.com/perspectives-on-doping-in-pro-cycling-1-theo-de-rooij-2/.  
193 UCI was among the first IFs to introduce such a rule.  
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themselves for blood controls after being notified either directly or through the team. 
Information to the riders was also provided by laboratories. A rider also referred to the 
2002 Vuelta when allegedly his team was advised to lower the athletes’ haematocrit 
levels. The health tests were for the most part performed in the morning and were, thus, 
predictable (see below). Little targeting took place. It has been reported to the CIRC that 
only those riders who were “exaggerating” were specifically targeted, because they were 
a potential threat to cycling. 
 
It became apparent that even though the health test may have protected the lives of 
riders, it also acted as a catalyst to spread even further the use of EPO in the peloton, 
because in essence it condoned the use of EPO up to a certain limit. The message was 
basically that “you could dope, but not too much”. According to an anti-doping expert, over 
90% of the riders had a natural haematocrit level of around 42-43% and, thus, had a 
strong incentive to raise their levels closer to 50% and achieve considerable 
performance-enhancing effects without breaking the no-start rule. The Festina scandal is 
a clear example of that development. In this environment, in which nearly every rider was 
using EPO, it lost any sense of wrongdoing. Anyone who used EPO was not “cheating”, i.e. 
getting an undue advantage over his competitor; rather he was just applying the moral 
standards of the cycling community. This general feeling in the peloton is very well 
described by a statement attributed to Jan Ullrich who is reported to have been involved 
in doping.194 He allegedly stated when retiring from cycling that “he had a clear 
conscience” and that “throughout his career he had never defrauded or exploited 
anyone.”195  
 
EPO-test 
 
Since the mid-1990s the anti-doping community had concentrated on finding a test to 
detect EPO. In 2000 such a test had been developed by the French laboratory. Shortly 
after the analysis technique was developed it was introduced by the UCI (April 2001) at 
a stage when the test had not yet been validated by the WADA. The test at that time was 
                                                     
194 See e.g. CAS 2010/A/2083 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) v. Jan Ullrich & Swiss Olympic (9 Feb. 
2012). 
195 Jan Ullrich, “Ich habe ein reines Gewissen” (8 Apr. 2007). Available: 
www.focus.de/sport/mehrsport/jan-ullrich_aid_52964.html (in German). 
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cumbersome (“technician-dependent and time consuming”), expensive and not very 
robust. The lack of robustness posed a problem from a legal point of view, which is 
evidenced, inter alia, by the “Olga Yegerova,”196 and “Bo Hamburger” cases.197 
Nevertheless, the UCI was one of the first sports organisations to implement the test (and 
the first Summer Olympic IF) and in doing so took a certain degree of legal risk in 
pursuing EPO cases.198 Following the CAS decision in the Roland Meier case, the test was 
approved by the legal community.199 The analysis technique was then improved over the 
years to render it more robust. It is obvious that a robust test for EPO on its own has little 
deterrent effect on the riders. In order to uncover an ADRV a logistical structure needs to 
be put in place that collects the “right” sample from the “right” athlete at the “right” time. 
Thus, an effective deterring anti-doping policy is built upon a testing strategy (Test 
Distribution Planning) that is intelligent (targets riders that are likely or suspicious to 
dope), takes them by surprise so that they cannot “prepare themselves” for sample 
collection and is robust enough to prevent any form of manipulation when the rider is 
giving the sample. In addition, EPO can only be found in the athlete’s urine sample if the 
sample is specifically tested for it. However, samples were, and still are, only tested for a 
standard list of substances (standard menu). A test for EPO has to be specially ordered 
and paid for by the organisation that orders the test. Even after the EPO test grew more 
robust, not every sample was tested for EPO. For smaller races sometimes no EPO tests 
were performed at all. One laboratory, for example, informed the Commission that 
between January and November 2014 it conducted 278 samples for the UCI.  However 
only 29 samples were analysed for EPO.  
 
Inadequacy of ICTs  
 
The anti-doping community distinguishes between two different kinds of tests to obtain 
a sample from a rider: ICTs and Out-of-Competition Tests (“OoCT” or “OoCTs”). What is 
meant by the term “In-Competition”/ICT is not always clear. While originally the term 
referred basically to tests that were taken immediately after the competition/stage,200 
                                                     
196 BBC News “Yegorova doping case dropped” (2 Oct. 2001). Available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/athletics/1576050.stm. 
197 See CAS 2001/A/343 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) / H., (28 Jan. 2002). 
198 The same is true for the IRMS test for T/E cases (1995). 
199 See CAS 2001/A/345 M. / Swiss Cycling (28 Jan. 2002). 
200 See e.g. Art. 108 et seq. 1998 UCI ADR. 
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the term became more complex later on,201 when the In-Competition period defined a 
period starting prior to the first stage of the stage race and finishing at midnight on the 
day on which the stage race finished.202 During that time period different kinds of tests 
could be performed that were all referred to as ICT. The different kinds of tests could be 
described as “Individual Testing” (whereby an athlete would be chosen to provide a 
sample at any time and any place during the In-Competition period and without prior 
notice) and “Post-Competition Testing” (whereby at stage races and following each stage 
certain riders would have to undergo testing). As of today,203 the time frame for 
establishing whether a test should be considered in-competition remains the same. In 
addition to this, however, the UCI ADR stipulates that “for the purpose of Prohibited List, 
In-Competition is the period commencing twelve hours before a Competition in which the 
Rider is scheduled to participate through the end of such Competition and the Sample 
collection process related to such Competition”. OoCT are defined by a negative reference 
as all tests which are not ICT. 
 
It has been reported to the CIRC that for most of the period up until 2006/2007 the aim 
of the ICT was at least partially undermined by a number of deficiencies in the testing 
process. First, ICT did not take place at all international events.204 Furthermore, it has 
been submitted that when unannounced ICT were performed, they often lacked a 
surprise element enabling the athletes to “prepare” for sample collection. The reasons for 
this were various. According to the evidence available to the CIRC, UCI would routinely 
perform unannounced ICT in the evenings and not in the morning. By doing so the 
athletes had comfort that after a certain hour of the day they would no longer be tested. 
Furthermore, UCI staff explained that when the DCOs wanted to perform an unannounced 
ICT on an athlete at the hotel where the athlete was staying, the DCO would first have to 
contact the team personnel of the rider (manager/doctor) before making direct contact 
with the athlete, because the DCOs had no exact whereabouts information for the athletes 
(room, etc.).205 This enabled the teams to warn the riders of the upcoming test. 
                                                     
201 See Art. 112 et seq. UCI ADR 2004. 
202 I.e., one day before or, in the case of a major tour, three days before the starting date of the event.  
203 See definitions of “Event Period”, “In-Competition” and “Out-of-Competition” in the 2015 UCI ADR. 
204 In a CAS decision dated 7 April 2005, the Panel stated that “drug testing does not occur at all 
international events…” See CAS 2004/A/632 (7 April 2005). 
205 See Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2003, p. 20. Available: https://wada-main-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA_IO_Report_TourDeFrance_2003_EN.pdf; Report of the 
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Furthermore, the degree of cooperation of the various teams varied considerably. While 
some would have a list available that showed in which rooms their riders were staying, 
other teams would not, thus, obliging the DCOs to perform a time-consuming search.206  
 
It is reported that information about who would be tested in an unannounced ICT would 
frequently be leaked to the riders that were supposed to be tested. One source of such 
leaks were some DCOs themselves.207 Up until 2006/2007 the UCI used DCOs who were 
current or former Commissaires. These individuals were often very close to the teams.208 
Some DCOs were also appointed upon recommendations by the relevant NFs (such as, in 
particular, the FFC). The basis of such recommendations was frequently to reward certain 
people from the sports community by allowing them to attend events and being close to 
their heroes. DCOs were employed who were fans of the riders or that were appointed 
for “political reasons”. There are also serious allegations that in one country riders paid 
race officials in order not to be tested, to make sure that the samples were not analysed 
in the laboratory or that the samples would be substituted by “clean samples”. According 
to an interviewee, these payments were referred to as an “anti-doping tax”.209  
 
In addition it has been pointed out that DCOs received little training, were often not 
sufficiently qualified and not effectively monitored. In one case, it was alleged by a rider 
that information about testing was leaked from a member of the ADC itself. The CIRC 
could not corroborate this statement through other evidence.  
 
It has further been alleged that UCI staff advised team doctors what prohibited substance 
to take.  Specifically, the 2015 American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) Leinders award 
                                                     
Independent Observers Tour de France 2010 (28.10.2010), p. 43. Available: 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/2010-10-
28+WADA+Independent+Observers+Report+TDF+2010.pdf. 
206 See Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2010 (28.10.2010), p. 43. Available: 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/2010-10-
28+WADA+Independent+Observers+Report+TDF+2010.pdf. 
207 See Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2010 (28.10.2010), p. 42. Available: 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/2010-10-
28+WADA+Independent+Observers+Report+TDF+2010.pdf. 
208 The Report of the Independent Observers for the Tour de France 2010 (published 28.10.2010) still 
recommends in that respect (p. 41): “The UCI should consider the implications of using retired or active 
Commissaires as DCOs…” 
209 As CIRC received information regarding these allegations at the end of its mandate, it did not have time 
to fully investigate them. CIRC has passed details of these allegations to UCI for further investigation. 
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states: “Mr. Rasmussen testified that in either 2004 or 2005, Dr. Leinders told him that 
Mario Zorzoli recommended that Leinders give Rabobank riders DHEA because “all the 
other teams are doing it as well.””210 CIRC has investigated this statement regarding Mario 
Zorzoli (which amounts to an ADRV being committed by a UCI staff member), and at the 
time of completing its Report has been unable to confirm any allegation regarding his 
supposed advice about taking a prohibited substance.211 The CIRC considers it 
unacceptable and a severe breach of proper procedures that such serious accusations, 
based on double hearsay, were made public without the individual first being consulted 
and the allegations being fully investigated. This is all the more disturbing since this 
accusation was completely immaterial to the case investigated. In addition, CIRC notes 
that several interviewees expressed their high regard for Mario Zorzoli, both for his 
scientific expertise and his honesty. 
 
Logistical problems would also sometimes mean that unannounced ICTs were not in fact 
unannounced. At stage races several teams would often stay at the same hotel. If a team 
of DCOs arrived to perform a test on a team or a rider, this fact would not go unnoticed 
by all the others staying at the same hotel. This is even more so if the car was branded 
with certain logos or if the DCOs wore “official” clothing.212 Concurrent team testing 
seems to have been rare. Indications that a test was being prepared could also be deduced 
from the fact that the DCOs would arrive at a particular time of the day, carry 
cumbersome equipment or travel in a van (in order to transport the equipment or 
machines for blood samples). In addition, the athletes and their team personnel might 
know the DCOs (in person or by sight) from other testing occasions (at the same or from 
a previous event). In the early days, UCI would house the DCOs in the same hotels as some 
of the teams. This facilitated leaks of information. In addition, team personnel would note 
when and in what direction the DCO was heading when leaving their hotel for a doping 
control. 
 
                                                     
210 United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Geert Leinders (16 Jan. 2015) par. 44. Available: 
http://www.usada.org/wp-content/uploads/AAA_decision_Leinders_December_2014.pdf. 
211 Geert Leinders did not respond to a request for an interview.  
212 See Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2010 (28.10.2010), p. 43. Available: 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/2010-10-
28+WADA+Independent+Observers+Report+TDF+2010.pdf. 
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Problems have been reported also for post-competition ICTs. In particular, it has been 
submitted that these tests were conducted in a way that enabled manipulation of the 
samples by the athletes. Only a fairly narrow window is needed for manipulation. In 
addition the athletes were in general well-informed in relation to the various strategies 
to evade or manipulate a test.213 It is noteworthy that the UCI for a long time failed to use 
chaperones or escorts.214 Riders had to report within a certain time-slot to the doping 
control station and were left completely or partially unattended between notification of 
a post-competition control and the passing of the sample.215 Furthermore, it is reported 
that failure to report within the prescribed deadline to sample collection was dealt with 
rather leniently. UCI staff submitted that this system favoured cheating riders especially 
on the occasion of less important races, where not so much attention was focused on the 
riders. UCI justified its practice by pointing out the peculiarities of cycling and the 
additional costs that would have been incurred when using chaperones. Chaperones 
became a mandatory requirement of the Tour only in 2008.216 In addition, the riders 
randomly selected for testing in post-competition tests were usually identified quite 
some time before the end of the race.217 Their names/jersey numbers would be displayed 
at the finish-line so that they would know that they had been selected for testing once 
they crossed the finish line at the end of the race/stage.218 This of course gave the team 
personnel the possibility of calling the athlete still cycling in the race via ear-pieces to 
warn him of the up-coming testing. This in return gave the rider the possibility to 
“prepare” for the sample analysis, drop out of the race, etc. In addition, riders not selected 
for testing had the opportunity to take fast-acting stimulants during the final stages of the 
race because they knew that they would not be tested. UCI staff informed the CIRC that 
on several occasions riders selected for testing had been observed to adopt unusual 
attitudes. At the 2010 Tour, the Independent Observers noted that there was significant 
interest in the list of notification at the finish-line from team representatives, media and 
                                                     
213 The Outer Line Perspectives on Doping in Pro Cycling – 1. Available: 
http://www.theouterline.com/perspectives-on-doping-in-pro-cycling-1-theo-de-rooij-2/. 
214 See Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2003, p. 14. Available: https://wada-main-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA_IO_Report_TourDeFrance_2003_EN.pdf. 
215 See Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2003, p. 13. Available: https://wada-main-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA_IO_Report_TourDeFrance_2003_EN.pdf. 
216 However, according to statements of UCI staff this system was not welcomed by the event organizers 
because of the additional costs associated with hosting the chaperones. 
217 See also Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2003, p. 13. Available: https://wada-
main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA_IO_Report_TourDeFrance_2003_EN.pdf. 
218 See e.g. CAS 2004/A/632 (7 April 2005).  
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even the event organizer (ASO). The Independent Observers further observed that teams 
recording the notification list on a daily basis would have a running record of who the UCI 
was testing.219  
 
The above deficiencies could not be cured by in-competition testing through other 
authorities (in particular NADOs), as the IFs have full and (practically) exclusive testing 
authority for international events. Furthermore, it is in the discretion of the IF to define 
“international event”. As the UCI has a rather broad approach to what is an international 
event, NADOs cannot step in to compensate for the ICTs deficiencies. 
 
Warning Riders and Teams  
 
The deterrent effect of sample collection was further undermined by the fact that teams 
were informed on occasion what new analysis techniques would be applied at races. 
Documents on file and interviews with the CIRC show that in particular, Lon Schattenberg 
advised the teams of newly implemented detection methods. Furthermore, Lon 
Schattenberg would inform the teams also on the detection window. In one of his letters 
to the teams he says: “…even though it was announced that the urine test could only detect 
EPO in the 3-4 days after it was first taken, the laboratories have noted that in certain cases, 
it can even be detected one week later!!”220 It is evident that, as confirmed by a NADO 
representative, this practice of UCI of warning riders had an impact on the efficacy of the 
tests. In this context it was submitted that in 2008 the tests at the Tour were undertaken 
without the involvement of UCI and for the first time a new testing method was used 
without prior notice to the riders, which resulted in many additional AAFs.  
 
UCI also provided intelligence obtained through the analyses of the samples to riders. 
Instead of using this information to perform target testing on suspicious athletes, the 
athlete would be warned, and sometimes in case of important riders even invited to the 
UCI headquarters to discuss the abnormal values. This practice was ongoing for a very 
                                                     
219 Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2010 (28.10.2010), pp. 26-27. Available: 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/2010-10-
28+WADA+Independent+Observers+Report+TDF+2010.pdf. 
220 Letter dated 31 January 2002, signed by Lon Schattenberg. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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long time.221 An early example can be found in a letter dated 23 October 1997 to Kevin 
Livingstone signed by the anti-doping coordinator at the time. In the letter the athlete 
was advised that “[a]lthough we decided that the concentration…is low enough to not 
declare this case positive, we hereby would like to warn you for the future. In fact, should 
this concentration exceed…we will be obliged to ask your National Federation to open a 
procedure, according to the UCI Antidoping…Regulations.” The Report of the Independent 
Observers for the 2003 Tour stated as follows: “When the analyses, which were carried out 
immediately as soon as the samples arrived, showed abnormal profiles (abnormal values or 
trends), the UCI…let him know that he would have another test carried out during the race 
and that he would be classified as being suspect by the UCI Anti-doping Commission.”222 This 
practice continued well through 2006,223 and was consented to by the UCI leadership.224 
 
OoCT 
 
In the arsenal of tools available to fight doping, OoCT has for a very long time been 
considered vital, because unlike ICT it has the biggest deterrent effect due to its surprise 
element (when conducted diligently). Riders have told the CIRC that the phase in which 
an athlete is most likely to be caught doping is the one preceding competition, i.e. when 
he is preparing for competition. Thus, there is no effective anti-doping strategy without 
                                                     
221 See also United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Geert Leinders, (16 Jan. 2015), para. 67, 40. Available: 
http://www.usada.org/wp-content/uploads/AAA_decision_Leinders_December_2014.pdf. 
222 See Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2003, p. 7. Available: https://wada-main-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA_IO_Report_TourDeFrance_2003_EN.pdf.  
223 See e.g. the letter signed by Lon Schattenberg and Mario Zorzoli and sent to Tyler Hamilton, which 
states as follows in relation to a sample taken during the Tour de Romandie (2004): “En effet, vos valeurs 
sanguines présentaient des signes forts pouvant laisser penser `une éventuelle manipulation. Aussi, nous vous 
informons que nous porterons une attention particulière à votre suivi…durant la saison 2004…” Translation 
into English: “In fact, your blood values showed strong signs that may suggest a possible manipulation. 
Also, we inform you that we will monitor you closely during the 2004 season...” Copy on file with CIRC. 
224 See also Telegraph Sport, “Former president of the International Cycling Union Hein Verbruggen 
admits riders were tipped off” (23 Jan. 2013). Available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/cycling/9821664/Former-president-of-the-
International-Cycling-Union-Hein-Verbruggen-admits-riders-were-tipped-off.html: “Verbruggen said last 
week that the UCI turned a blind eye to his misdemeanors but now maintains they did what they could to 
warn riders who appeared to be at risk of failing doping tests because their hematocrit or red blood cell 
count was too high. ‘The UCI took the line, as did other sporting federations, to talk to racers whose blood 
test results appeared suspect,’ he was quoted as saying in an interview with the Dutch news agency ANP. 
‘That sent out a signal to those who were doping but who had yet to turn in a positive test that they risked 
getting into hot water. And if the anomaly was not down to doping that allowed the rider to have a medical 
analysis.’; see also Graham Dunbar, “UCI's McQuaid replaced on IOC panel” Associated Press (23 Jan. 2013) 
“Riders who were doping (but who had yet to fail a test) were effectively warned that they were being 
watched and that they would be targeted in future with the aim of getting them to stop doping.” Available: 
http://www.fortwayne.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130123/AP01/301239924/1032/SPORTS08 
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OoCT. The need for a sound OoCT-programme was manifest to most stakeholders. In an 
environment that adapts very quickly to new conditions it is obvious that deterrence may 
only be achieved by taking the riders by surprise. This is not achieved through routinely 
performed sample collection at competitions. The need for OoCT was also evidenced in a 
change of doping tactics. From 2001 teams started to move away from centrally 
managing doping treatments for their riders. Instead they left it up to the riders 
(combined with pressure/advice on whom to consult) to do the necessary “preparation” 
for the competition. This preparation of course occurred in the intervals in between 
competitions. One of the reasons that was given by a large number of interviewees for 
why Lance Armstrong never produced an AAF for EPO was that there was no effective 
OoCT at the time. Riders knew shortly after the new EPO test was introduced how to 
manage their EPO treatment in the out-of-competition period in order to be “clean” at the 
races. They were helped of course by the information policy of Lon Schattenberg (see 
above). Even though this insight was obvious to most stakeholders in anti-doping, CIRC 
was told that anybody expressing such a view would be treated as a “subversive” within 
UCI.  
 
It is reported that Lon Schattenberg in particular did not see any need for OoCT. The CIRC 
was told that according to him, OoCT was cumbersome and a waste of money. 
Furthermore, the whole idea of OoCT ran contrary to Lon Schattenberg’s philosophy 
which was rather based on health prevention, instead of catching cheaters. Lon 
Schattenberg had little desire to take the athletes by surprise with doping controls. 
Instead his strategy was built on warning the athletes (see above) and managing the 
health risks associated with doping. The (official) justification put forward against OoCT 
was, inter alia, that cycling provided for an intense sporting calendar and that the riders 
on the team were already sufficiently tested in-competition all year round. This argument 
is not sound from a medical point of view, because testing in competition only does not 
prevent athletes from abusing medications all year around. From an anti-doping 
perspective, however, this policy is completely counter-productive, since it enables riders 
within particular time frames to “prepare” themselves for competitions and, thus, to 
cheat. Riders have confirmed to the CIRC that certain riders had taken off a month to six 
weeks from racing and had come back “flying”, or that riders even appeared from 
“nowhere” and won major competitions. ICT are, by definition, announced tests to which 
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the athletes can easily adapt. The effectiveness of well-managed OoCT from an anti-
doping perspective is evidenced by an incident in 2003 when the Italian Cycling 
Federation carried out OoCTs on the under 23s. Out of 80 tests that were analysed in the 
Lausanne laboratory more than 50% were positive for prohibited substances. 
 
The UCI introduced OoCT in 2001. However, OoCT was not a top priority. According to 
WADA, from 2002 until 2005 of the 21,345 doping tests carried out by UCI only 2.5% 
were OoCT. The number increased thereafter. It has also been reported to CIRC that the 
OoCT were administered poorly. CIRC was told that up until 2004 there was in fact no 
obligation imposed on riders to provide whereabouts information. There was only an 
obligation on teams to provide their whereabouts prior to some competitions. Thus, 
OoCTs in effect were pre-competition tests that were absolutely predictable. With no 
system in place to locate the riders in the OoCT-period, OoCT could easily be avoided by 
the athletes. This anti-doping policy by UCI in respect of OoCT was criticised by WADA. 
The legal framework changed with the adoption and implementation of the 2003 WADA 
Code. The Code required athletes to detail their movements in three-month periods of 
time for every day of the week.  The details were supposed to enable OoCT to be carried 
out on athletes. According to a former UCI employee, UCI and the riders objected to the 
extent of whereabouts information required, on the basis that riders were constantly 
moving from race to race, making it impossible to provide exact locations for every day 
or to update whereabouts information in real time. It is only starting from 2006/2007 
that both the number of OoCT and the efficiency of the OoCT significantly improved (see 
below). In addition, the rules in place made it difficult for NADOs to test cyclists out-of-
competition, since, according to the WADA Code, the definition of the ICT-period rested 
with the IF and the NADOs were excluded from testing in the ICT-period of an 
international event. By broadly defining the ICT-period, UCI could effectively limit OoCT 
by the NADOs. 
 
Test Distribution Planning 
 
It follows from the interviews conducted by CIRC that Lon Schattenberg was in charge of 
devising the Test Distribution Plan insofar as the testing was not already laid down in the 
UCI ADR (see Post Competition Testing). Lon Schattenberg determined the plan at his 
128 
 
discretion, e.g., how many riders had to be tested for anti-doping and how these riders 
were to be selected. The UCI staff interviewed by the CIRC reported that Lon Schattenberg 
would not focus on a specific team or group of riders for testing and that he would never 
draft in advance a list of riders to be tested during the events.  
 
It was also within Lon Schattenberg’s discretion to decide when and how health tests 
would be performed whilst these were still used and he would designate the medical 
inspector for the medical tests.225 According to the staff interviewed by the CIRC the 
testing strategy in relation to the ICT-period was for the large part a routine operation 
(urine tests after the race, blood tests before the race in the morning) and frequently 
lacked targeting or sport-specific selection criteria. This was the case even though 
practice had shown that when modifying the routine, riders would return positive results. 
When for example it was suggested during the Giro in 1999 that they carry out the health 
test on riders, in a break from usual practice according to the ranking of the riders, Marco 
Pantani was caught with an elevated haematocrit level. Interestingly, this incident was, 
according to former UCI staff who were interviewed, not considered to be a success 
because they caught someone (which is telling about UCI’s attitude to anti-doping 
strategy at that time). This being said, the case was followed up according to the rules. 
Accordingly, this strategy was not used again. Instead, in the context of blood tests, the 
test distribution adopted would frequently be dictated by considerations of practicability 
and viability. If several teams were in the same hotel, then for logistical reasons all riders 
from all teams were tested. This was completely predictable. When OoCT was first 
introduced (2001), targeting criteria were rarely applied. It is reported that for this 
reason the UCI’s OoCT-programme produced so few AAFs. In the opinion of certain UCI 
staff, the testing was not effective in detecting the doping that was going on. If there is no 
good testing strategy it does not make a big difference whether one tests an athlete once 
or ten times. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
225 “UCI Information” journal no. 25 (May 1998) at p. 16. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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Sanctions 
 
An important deterrent in the fight against doping besides the risk of being caught (see 
above) is the disciplinary sanction (period of ineligibility) that is issued at the end of the 
results management process when the athlete has been proven guilty. Of course the 
purpose to deter must be balanced with the fundamental rights of the athlete. Up until 
the implementation of the WADA Code, UCI’s practice in relation to sanctions was, 
compared to other sports, rather lenient.226 Since the coming into force of the 2003 WADA 
Code the question of the appropriate length of sanction has been harmonised throughout 
the various sports. Prior to this, it was within the autonomy of the federations to draw up 
the respective rules. The UCI strongly opposed initiatives of harmonisation of sanctions 
by pointing out the following: “The standardisation of…the sanctions applicable in doping 
cases is inadequate because it does not take account of the specific nature of each of the 
sports concerned. The physical fitness required to practise this exacting discipline would 
inevitably be destroyed by a suspension that is too long. More than ever, the UCI remains 
implacably opposed to any form of cheating, but it believes that the imposition of linear 
sanctions (suspension of identical lengths) in types of sport as different as cycling, walking 
or shooting would be inequitable because the repercussions for one and the other are such 
that they cannot be compared…The relative shortness of the suspension imposed by the UCI, 
far from suggesting any leniency, or worse, a pseudo clemency for doping, is in fact the result 
of a persistent search for an approach to dealing with doping that is both effective and 
equitable.”227 Evidence on file suggests that Hein Verbruggen strongly opposed the 
concept of a “standard sanction” in the form of two years of ineligibility for a first ADRV 
as proposed by the 2003 WADA Code.  
 
 
 
                                                     
226 See e.g., CAS 1997/A/175 (anabolic agent and heavy stimulant): 1 year; CAS 1998/A/192 (anabolic 
agent): 9 months; CAS 1998/A/212 (anabolic agent): 9 months; CAS 1998/A/213 (anabolic agent): 9 
months; CAS 1999/A/239 (anabolic agent): 8,5 months; CAS 2000/A/289 (EPO): 6 months out of which 3 
months were suspended; CAS 2001/A/345 (EPO): 8 months; CAS 2002/A/358 (EPO): 1 year; CAS 
2002/A/395 (growth hormone): 6 months; CAS 2002/A/431 (heavy stimulants and 2nd infraction): 4 
years; CAS 2003/A/505 (narcotics): 6 months; failing to present to ICT (inadvertent ADRV): 1 month. 
227 “40 years of fighting against doping,” UCI (2001) p. 5. Available: 
http://oldsite.uci.ch/english/health_sante/docs/40_ans.pdf. 
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TUE 
 
During this period UCI appeared to have had a policy of accepting backdated 
prescriptions and to be rather lenient in applying the rules on TUEs. The practice was 
justified by arguing that, from a health perspective, it made little difference whether the 
prescription was provided before or after testing. Prescriptions were seen by riders as a 
means of covering up positive tests results at the competition. Even if those prescriptions 
were evidently made up (or if there were strong indications thereof), the matter was not 
investigated by the ADC. This leniency was criticised by the Independent Observers’ 
report at the 2003 Tour.228 Comparable cases, however, allegedly took place before that 
date with the examples of Laurent Brochard who won the 1997 World Championships in 
San Sebastian and tested positive for a prohibited substance, or the acceptance of a back-
dated prescription for the corticosteroid case of Lance Armstrong at the 1999 Tour. Both 
these cases will be discussed below in the chapter related to UCI allegations.  
 
This lenient approach only started slowly to change after the harmonization of the TUE 
requirements in the WADA Code. Only in 2004 did the UCI introduce a TUE process. 
 
2.3.2. Evaluation of UCI anti-doping policies and structures (to 2006/2007) 
 
The doping problem was well known to the UCI leadership and it was clear to everyone 
that doping was endemic in cycling. It is noteworthy that Hein Verbruggen in his 
programme to be elected President of the UCI in 1991 stated that “doping is the most 
important problem the sport of cycling is confronted with. In order to efficiently fight it, in 
addition to controls, sanctions and close collaboration with other sporting agencies, a 
                                                     
228 Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France, p.  29 et seq.:“The IO team reviewed the drugs 
declared in the reports and noted that 71.8% of the samples taken the riders had declared that they had 
taken a drug. In 60.6% of the samples taken, glucocorticosteroids were administered … The IO team 
confirmed that, in spite of the information from the UCI Anti-Doping Commission about the existence of 
justified medical grounds in every case where there was a positive result for glucocorticosteroids, the 
timescales between the date the sample was taken and the date entered in the health booklet when the 
substance was administered were extremely large.  The IO team calculated these differences in twenty of the 
twenty-eight positive reports with triamcinolone … The IO team could find no reliable scientific data which 
could support a urinary excretion time of this duration. On two occasions the IO team did not find that there 
was any medical justification concerning the cases showing a positive result for glucocorticosteroids.” 
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bigger place should be given to prevention as doping is a crucial problem for cycling.”229 
After 1992, similar public statements became rare.  
 
Instead, after becoming UCI president, it appears that the communication strategy was 
primarily to divert public opinion from the idea of responsibility for the doping problem 
lying with UCI. Doping was portrayed by UCI leadership as the faulty and surprising 
behaviour of a few individuals, but not as endemic group behaviour or as a structural 
problem within its sport. This is evidenced inter alia by various statements attributed to 
Hein Verbruggen in the press.230 Furthermore, the UCI portrayed doping cases as erratic 
and unethical behaviour of certain few individuals beyond its control.231 If anyone was to 
be blamed, it was others, but not the UCI.232 Essentially, UCI management seemed to be of 
                                                     
229 See Pierre Ballester, “Fin de cycle – Autopsie d’un système corrompu” (La Martinière, 2013) p. 41. 
230 See e.g. the “Cofidis affair”: ““There is no Cofidis affair and I don’t have any interest in discussing it. I’m 
surprised that this is generating so much noise, two French cyclists who are positive. I see everybody getting 
involved, politicians, etc. … I’ve also seen that there were 45 tennis players on something and I haven’t seen 
any involvement from the police or politicians there.”, cyclingnews on 28.1.2004; another example is Hein 
Verbuggen’s alleged response when being confronted with reports in L’Équipe in which Gilles Delion and 
Nicolas Aubier complained how difficult it was to ride clean in a dirty peloton, he is quoted as saying “I 
will presumably disappoint you, but I was not at all impressed, not at all, with the accounts given by riders 
like Delion and Obree. What we are dealing with here is guys at the end of their career who no longer can 
hang on. I found it cowardly, there is no other word.”  
231 Hein Verbruggen: “Jamais je pouvais m'imaginer l'ampleur du dopage dans une équipe comme Festina. 
C'était peut-être naïf de ma part, mais, quand je l'ai appris, je suis tombé de ma chaise, surtout que 
j'entretenais d'excellentes relations avec Bruno Roussel (directeur sportif de Festina, ndlr). Mais j'avais 
quand même entendu parler d'une caisse noire chez Festina. C'était une indiscrétion qui m'était parvenue 
par des coureurs qui avaient quitté l'équipe. Sur mon agenda, je note: "En parler avec Roussel. 
Malheureusement, quand je suis arrivé sur le Tour, Roussel venait de se faire arrêter. Même si j'avais su ce 
qui se passait réellement, qu'est-ce que j'aurais pu faire de plus?” Translation into English: “I could never 
have imagined the extent of doping in a team like Festina. It was perhaps naive of me, but when I learned 
about it, I fell off my chair, especially as I maintained excellent relations with Bruno Roussel (sporting 
director Festina, ed.) But at the same time, I had heard of a black box with Festina. It was an indiscretion 
by riders who had left the team that reached me. On my diary, I noted, “In conversation with Roussel. 
Unfortunately, when I arrived at the Tour, Roussel had just been arrested. Even if I had known what was 
really going on, what more could I have done?” see Jean Louis Le Touzet, “Hein Verbruggen est à la tête du 
cyclisme mondial. ‘Je ne suis pas le diable’. Le président de l'Union cycliste internationale justifie son 
action en matière de dopage, alors que l'UCI annonce aujourd'hui sa politique de suivi médical du 
peloton”, Libération (10 Jan. 2000) http://www.liberation.fr/sports/2000/01/10/hein-verbruggen-est-a-
la-tete-du-cyclisme-mondial-je-ne-suis-pas-le-diable-le-president-de-l-union-c_314896 (in French); This 
attitude remained unchanged during Pat McQuaid’s era, see Tony Farrelly, “Tyler Hamilton and Floyd 
Landis are "scumbags" says UCI president”, road.cc (23 Oct. 2012). Available: 
http://road.cc/content/news/69419-tyler-hamilton-and-floyd-landis-are-scumbags-says-uci-president. 
232 See Hein Verbruggen who was widely quoted as saying: “If the public were satisfied with the Tour de 
France riders going 25 kilometers an hour (15 miles per hour), there wouldn’t be a doping problem. But it 
wants 42 kilometers an hour, and there’s only one way to get there -- by doping.” Jonathan Mahler, “Lance 
Armstrong’s Confession Is Just the Start”, Bloomberg (17 Jan. 2013). Available: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-16/lance-armstrong-s-confession-is-just-the-start.   
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the view that doping scandals were not something that the UCI was responsible or 
accountable for.233 
 
Not only did UCI leadership publicly disregard the magnitude of the problem, but the 
policies put in place to combat doping were inadequate. It is true that the UCI adopted 
and introduced the science that was available at the time (IRMS testing,234 testing for 
haematological parameters, EPO-test). Credit must be given to the UCI insofar as it was 
at the forefront when introducing new testing techniques. The science, however, is only 
one part of the anti-doping strategy. In the context of an anti-doping strategy it is essential 
to get the right sample from the right rider at the right time to the right laboratory. In the 
CIRC’s view more could have been done to put such a system in place. The approach to 
doping was one of containment, with a focus on health protection (you may dope, unless 
it is really bad for your health). There may have been times when there were not many 
other alternatives available besides this “health protection approach”, because anti-
doping science lagged behind (e.g. when the “no-start-rule” was introduced). However, 
one would have expected that at least when the EPO-test was developed, that UCI would 
have used all its efforts and resources to close the existing 10-year gap from the time EPO 
found its way into the peloton as quickly as possible and restore the credibility of cycling. 
However, this was not the case. When one looks at the tools available to UCI (Test 
Distribution Planning, ICT, OoCT, TUE, sanctions) there was no satisfactory commitment 
to push the fight against doping beyond the limits of health protection. There was little 
effort to be a step ahead of the dopers, rethink or assess the effectiveness of the Anti-
Doping Program, change the testing strategy or to take riders by surprise in order to catch 
them out. Anti-doping policy was for the most part based on a predictable and 
quantitative approach. Going after the cheaters was perceived as a witch-hunt that would 
be detrimental to the image of cycling.  
 
Since UCI’s anti-doping strategy was directed against the abuse of doping substances 
rather than the use of them, only the visible tip of the iceberg was tackled. Deterrence 
was not an integral part of the strategy. Instead, CIRC agrees with the assessment that the 
                                                     
233 See Hein Verbruggen in relation to the Festina Scandal (above); see Pat McQuaid’s open letter to the 
French Sports Minister and to Dick Pound, dated 3 July 2006. Available: http://pedalmag.com/open-
letter-from-uci-president-mcquaid-to-lamour-and-pound/.   
234 Isotope Ratio Mass Spectrometry. 
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policies of announcing sample collections, notifying riders and leaving them unattended 
gave riders the opportunity to adapt and to evade testing positive through medical 
supervision, whilst at the same time giving the impression to the public that cycling was 
trying to address the doping problem.235 Once doping became visible in form of a rider 
testing positive the case was, if possible (e.g. through admittance of obviously back-dated 
prescriptions) “managed” away. In case an AAF had to be ascertained according to the 
rules, the available discretionary powers were used to issue relatively lenient sanctions. 
Deterrence was not part of the anti-doping strategy. All of this sent, willingly or 
unwillingly, the signal out to the peloton and the athlete support personnel that UCI 
condoned the use of doping substances as long as it stayed within acceptable medical 
limits.  
 
The emphasis of UCI’s anti-doping policy was primarily, therefore, to give the impression 
that UCI was tough on doping rather than actually being good at anti-doping. UCI 
portrayed itself as always being at the forefront of the fight against doping. However, it 
appears to CIRC that there was little impetus to address the roots of the doping problem 
or to discuss strategies against doping proactively; and it seems that such an active policy 
was seen as an impediment to the development of cycling and was, therefore, not 
encouraged. This impression of UCI’s attitudes was also echoed by riders who spoke to 
the CIRC. The CIRC heard that people who knew better and criticised UCI’s anti-doping 
approach inside or outside UCI could be threatened, silenced or did not dare to speak up. 
There appears to have been an environment in which any kind of criticism or even 
suggestion to improve the anti-doping strategy was regarded as subversive and not in the 
interests of cycling, and in which people that were vocal on anti-doping were side-lined. 
 
There was little incentive for self-reflection within UCI leadership to reassess its anti-
doping policy. This appears to have been true even when concrete problems were 
brought to the attention of the UCI leadership, and the CIRC considers that even then 
there was in general a refusal to analyse and to comprehensively investigate the matter 
and tackle the origins of that problem (e.g. DCOs, Lon Schattenberg-incident, Armstrong-
incident, criticism by WADA, etc.). The CIRC considers that this general inability to follow-
                                                     
235 The Outer Line Perspectives on Doping in Pro Cycling – 1. Available: 
http://www.theouterline.com/perspectives-on-doping-in-pro-cycling-1-theo-de-rooij-2/. 
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up doping-relevant information and to actively investigate wrongdoings dominated also 
the following years of Pat McQuaid’s presidency. 
 
A factor that is reported to have continued UCI’s institutional deficiency in the fight 
against doping is the lack of supervision over an IF’s anti-doping policy. There are 
practically no sanctions against sport organisation and IFs in particular in case they do 
not implement an effective anti-doping strategy. It is true that the WADA Code contains 
wide-reaching obligations and sanctions for individuals who are implicated in doping. 
However, little sanctions and follow-up were provided for in the WADA Code for IFs not 
honouring their obligations.236 It is the CIRC’s view that too little substantive monitoring 
of the institutional obligations of the IFs and its Anti-Doping Program was practised in 
the past under the auspices of the WADA Code. Thus, there was little incentive for an IF 
to improve its anti-doping policy. 
 
2.3.3. The period of improvements, new challenges and regular set-backs (2006—
2013) 
 
A turning point in UCI’s Anti-Doping Program is when Anne Gripper took over the ADU 
in 2006. When she came in, UCI was under intense pressure. Operación Puerto (see 
above)237 had been widely reported and the Landis scandal was all over the media. Anne 
Gripper had good contacts in the anti-doping community. Due to these contacts she was 
able to recruit people for the ADU that had previously gained experience in anti-doping 
with different ADOs. From 2006 onwards the staff recruited for the ADU/CADF is 
generally perceived internally and externally as dedicated and professional.238 Lon 
Schattenberg left in 2007 which facilitated the change of strategy in anti-doping. 
Furthermore, Pat McQuaid raised the budget for anti-doping considerably. When Lon 
Schattenberg left, it appears that Philippe Verbiest’s influence increased. It is reported 
that Philippe Verbiest always had the “ear of the president” and that he got more and more 
                                                     
236 Furthermore, it appears questionable whether the IOC would make use of its powers to exclude an IF 
from the Olympic Movement, in the event the IF was not honouring its obligations. 
237 Several UCI staff stated that this scandal had a strong impact on UCI. 
238 iNADO Report – Final Audit report Doping Control Program – The UCI and CADF, 25 February 2014, p. 
3. Copy on file with CIRC. 
135 
 
involved in political decision-making and anti-doping. The increase in workload for 
Philippe Verbiest made it necessary to enlarge the legal department.  
 
Steady improvements to the existing tools 
 
Beginning in 2006, the ADC/ADU gradually replaced a number of the existing DCO’s 
(former Commissaires) for in-competition testing. Following various training sessions a 
lot of the old UCI DCOs were dismissed. New experienced DCOs were recruited, mostly 
from NADOs and NFs and regularly trained. Today, ICT is done for important races with 
CADF-trained DCOs or in cooperation, for example, with the NADOs of the country where 
the event takes place. The problems of the ICT-program described above (see above) 
were also tackled as of 2006. Counter measures both legally as well as logistically were 
put in place to better prevent leaking of information to teams and guarantee compliance 
with the rules.239 Furthermore, chaperones were used. In addition, a more target-
oriented testing strategy was put in place. This is also evidenced by the “secret list” that 
was leaked to L’Équipe in 2011.240 The ADU (later on the CADF) would start collecting 
relevant information (riders’ competition schedule, riders’ performance, rumours, 
results from the ABP, etc.) and process them in order to better target riders for testing. 
Today nearly half of all the urine samples taken are tested for EPO (IC: 21%; OoCT: 
93%).241  
 
In addition, the ADU considerably improved the OoCT programme both quantitatively 
and qualitatively.242 Quantitatively the number of OoCTs was considerably increased 
(2007: 1457; 2008: 5007; 2009: 6473; 2012: 6578). Today close to 50% of the tests are 
OoCTs (2012: 47%). In 2012, 53% of the CADF’s budget was spent on the OoCT 
programme.243 Qualitatively, there was a continuous effort to include intelligence in 
testing. In order to conduct OoCTs the ADU contracted professional external service 
                                                     
239 However, rumors of non-compliance persisted for some time, see the 2009 AFLD report according to 
which UCI testers did not comply with the rules. Copy on file with CIRC. 
240 The “suspicious list” contained a ranking of the ten most suspicious teams for doping. 
241 See CADF business report 2012. Copy on file with CIRC. 
242 Vogelzang Committee Report on the Michael Rasmussen Case (12.11.2007), p. 14. Copy on File with 
CIRC. 
243 CADF Presentation Bergen 2013 (and CADF Business Report 2012). No figures are available for 2013 
and for 2014. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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providers. This situation still continues to be in place. Today the OoCT and test 
distribution of the UCI/CADF is regarded as being comprehensive and allowing for target 
testing.244 Some stakeholders have expressed that they feel that today UCI is a role model 
for other sports, or at least the anti-doping policy of UCI today is one of the leaders in the 
field. 
 
Improvements were also made in relation to the TUE-process. Until 2004/2005 no real 
TUE-process had been implemented by the UCI. Riders would bring the relevant medical 
prescription/certificate to the doping control and Lon Schattenberg would examine the 
prescriptions/certificates and eventually accept them. Since it was relatively easy to get 
a TUE in the past a lot of riders were using prohibited substances in order to enhance 
their performance. Interviews with the CIRC suggest that more than half of the Tour were 
“on cortisone with a prescription”. This is also backed by Pierre Bordry, former President 
of the AFLD who declared that “in 2006, more than half of the riders of the Tour had 
TUEs.”245 These problems seem to have persisted also some time thereafter. Riders 
interviewed by the CIRC would state that the “old practice” was still common at the 2007 
Giro and that a TUE could be obtained without any problems. The practice of applying for 
a TUE in order mask the use of doping substances without being sanctioned was also 
confirmed by a rider who declared to the CIRC that he himself had masked the use of 
prohibited substances through TUEs (see also above). From available information it 
appears that there was quite some tolerance in granting authorisations/exemptions to 
riders. Lon Schattenberg left UCI in 2007. The CIRC considers from its review of UCI’s 
anti-doping programme that things seem to have improved significantly on an 
operational level by late 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
244 iNADO Report – Final Audit report Doping Control Program – The UCI and CADF, 25 February 2014, p. 
3. Copy on file with CIRC. 
245 N° 782 Sénat session extraordinaire de 2012-2013, rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête 
sur l’efficacité de la lutte contre le dopage. Available: http://www.senat.fr/rap/r12-782-1/r12-782-
14.html#fn67 (in French). 
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Leap forward: ABP 
 
The ABP represents the most significant step forward in the UCI’s anti-doping 
programme. The history of the APB is best described in a paper by Francesca Rossi/Mario 
Zorzoli:246  
“Several scientists were simultaneously developing different strategies related to the 
indirect detection of blood doping. The Australian and the Lausanne groups have intensively 
explored the possibility of introducing a multiparametric marker approach that takes into 
account different factors known to influence the biological variability, such as the 
technology applied, the athlete’s gender, age, ethnic origin, and sports discipline. Contrary 
to what was applied at that time by the sporting authorities, a new concept was also taken 
into consideration: individual limits instead of population limits. As such, one could use the 
athlete’s previous measurements as basal levels with each athlete becoming his or her own 
reference. The application of subject-specific reference ranges corresponds to what some 
authors had suggested at the beginning of the last decade. An initial practical application 
called the ‘Swedish Blood Pass Project’ was developed in 2005 by Berglund. All of these 
important scientific achievements convinced WADA to evaluate the feasibility of introducing 
an athlete’s passport. The first step was the creation, in 2006, of a Haematological Working 
Group composed of scientists and representatives of international federations. These experts 
concluded that WADA could proceed with the implementation of an Athlete’s 
Haematological Passport. They recommended measurement of indirect parameters (namely 
haemoglobin concentration and Off-hr score) in- and out-of-competition in order to 
generate profiles that would be computed with the Bayesian statistical model developed by 
the Lausanne Anti-Doping Laboratory. Each value, as well as the entire sequence of results, 
was to be evaluated, in the event that an athlete’s profile Each value, as well as the entire 
sequence of results, was to be evaluated, in the event that an athlete’s profile was found to 
be incompatible with typical physiological or medical conditions, a disciplinary procedure 
against the athlete could be initiated based on the presumption that a prohibited substance 
or method had been used. It was also agreed that standardized protocols should be 
established and followed in order to decrease the variability due to pre-analytical and 
analytical conditions. These protocols would explain how blood samples should be collected, 
transported, and analyzed. A meeting took place in Paris in October 2007, between WADA, 
the French sporting authorities, and the cycling family. There it was decided that UCI would 
launch, in 2008, a pilot project for the implementation of the haematological module of the 
Athlete’s Biological Passport.”  
 
On a procedural level the ABP operates basically as follows. An assessment of the rider’s 
profile is made by a panel of three experts contacted by the Athlete’s Passport 
Management Unit (i.e. the Lausanne laboratory). If the panel of experts comes 
(independently from each other) to the unanimous conclusion that the profile of the 
athlete is indicative of an ADRV, the CADF invites the rider concerned to provide an 
explanation for the abnormal values (e.g. medical explanations, such as pathologies, or 
                                                     
246 Mario Zorzoli and Francesca Rossi, “Implementation of the biological passport: The experience of the 
International Cycling Union” (2010) DOI 10.1002/dta.173. Available: www.drugtestinganalysis.com.  
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further explanations such as training at high altitude, etc.). The expert panel will then 
reassess its previous evaluation in light of the explanations provided by the rider. In case 
the panel of experts confirms its findings, the LADS of UCI opens a disciplinary procedure 
against the rider.  
 
The ABP had and still has a significant impact on the fight against doping in cycling. This 
was confirmed by all stakeholders (experts, CADF staff, riders, support personnel) 
interviewed by the CIRC and is also evidenced by statistical data.247 The CIRC has been 
told that riders’ profiles are much more normal today in comparison to the early days of 
the ABP. Even riders that in former times showed “abnormal” (i.e. suspicious) profiles 
show a more normal profile today. In the view of the experts this is not proof that no 
blood manipulation is going on today. Instead, the consequence to be drawn from this 
data is rather, as an expert has put it, that less blood doping is going on in cycling today 
and that the techniques are more refined (micro-doses). In that respect cycling is ahead 
of other sports in which  still a much higher percentage of suspicious blood profiles (i.e. 
profiles that show much more variances) than in cycling can be detected. In summary it 
is therefore acknowledged that the ABP had a significant effect on the riders’ behaviour 
and has helped to considerably level the playing field. Athletes, NADOs and laboratories 
have told the CIRC that only little advantage can be gained by applying refined doping 
techniques that stay under the ABP radar. Therefore, it is commonly held that it is much 
easier today to compete as a clean athlete competitively. Whether this change amounts 
to a “change in doping culture” as submitted frequently seems questionable. In interviews 
with riders and athlete support personnel it appeared to the CIRC that the basic problem 
was that athletes would go to the limit of what is detectable by the laboratories and this 
has not changed. Furthermore, the incentive to try out substances that might give a 
performance enhancing effect, but are not on the prohibited list is still very present in the 
peloton. 
                                                     
247 Mario Zorzoli and Francesca Rossi, “Case Studies on ESA-doping as revealed by the Biological 
Passport”, Drug Test. Analysis (2012): “In the first three years of the UCI ABP project, 26 athletes who were 
part of the programme were found positive for the presence of ESA [erythropoiesis stimulating agents] in 
their bodily specimens (Table 1): 10 in 2008, 8 in 2009, and 8 in 2010. It is a very significant increase 
compared to 2007, the year prior to the introduction of the ABP, where only 3 athletes were convicted for 
blood doping (1 for ESA and 2 for HBT [homologous blood transfusion]). In most cases, it was the abnormal 
blood profile which raised suspicions leading to a targeted anti-doping urinary or blood test.” Available: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224708690_Case_studies_on_ESA-
doping_as_revealed_by_the_Biological_Passport. 
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There are also problems related to the way the ABP operates.  
 Adaptation of the riders: It appears that since the introduction of the ABP in 
2008 the athletes have adapted to this new tool in the fight against doping (see 
above). In light of the fact that a lot of communication is going on in the peloton, 
most riders know everything about the ABP and how it works. There is, thus, a 
suspicion that a significant number of riders is out there that are not riding clean 
(see above). It is widely acknowledged that the “normalisation” of the riders’ 
profiles is the consequence of a different doping strategy that enables the riders 
to stay below the ABP-radar. It has been submitted that the practice to make the 
ABP data immediately available to the athletes via Anti-doping Administration 
and Management System (“ADAMS”) (or any other software) is counter-
productive, since it furthers the process of adaptation by athletes. Athletes would 
be able to assess and monitor their blood values and make sure that they stay 
within pre-defined parameters through fine-tuning. In order to prevent the 
athletes from misusing the ABP-data for adaptation it has been suggested that the 
data should only be made available to the athletes with some delay. Whether this 
is the correct approach is highly disputed in the anti-doping community. Some 
oppose the delaying of the publication of the data for data protection reasons (the 
data belongs to the athlete or oppose it for medical reasons, in particular if the 
blood values could be indicative of serious illnesses). However, that fine-tuning by 
athletes is taking place is evidenced by the fact that some of the riders’ ABP 
profiles are far too constant/stable, which cannot be considered to be normal in 
light of existing natural physiological variances.   
 
 Overly lengthy procedures: It appears that a lot of ABP-proceedings take a long 
time. This is for example true for the recent Roman Kreuziger case. The rider was 
suspended after abnormalities were detected in his ABP dating back to samples 
taken in 2011 and 2012. It is no exception that riders are being sanctioned on the 
basis of the ABP-programme based on samples collected several years ago. 
Another example is the case of the rider Denis Menchov. On 14 July 2014 the UCI 
released the following statement with respect to the rider: “The Union Cycliste 
Internationale (UCI) confirms that it has imposed a 2-year ban on Russian rider 
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Denis Menchov as a result of anti-doping rule violations based on his Athlete 
Biological Passport. The rider is declared ineligible until 9 April 2015 and is 
disqualified from the Tour de France 2009, 2010 and 2012, competitions during 
which abnormalities were clearly identified. The proceedings were initiated in 2013. 
The rider has exercised his procedural rights and accepted a proposal of sanction in 
accordance with the UCI Anti-Doping Rules. WADA and RUSADA have been duly 
informed”.248 
 
It is not quite clear what the reasons are for this situation. It has been submitted 
that the most cumbersome and time consuming part of the whole ABP-process 
was, for a long time, the administrative compilation of the documentation 
packages.249 However, the expertise has also become much more difficult. This is 
due to the fact that much smaller variances in the ABP profile of riders are 
observed today (see above). Therefore the data has to be analysed carefully to 
prevent false positives. In order to qualify small variances as “abnormal” a lot of 
additional data has to be taken into account (time and place when the sample was 
taken, whether it is an ICT or OoCT, the competition schedule, results from urine 
analysis, patterns of analysis results, etc.). What the experts effectively are looking 
for is a doping scenario that explains the variances in the athletes’ ABP. All of this 
takes time and may necessitate additional investigation (additional blood or urine 
tests taken at specific times and places). Some of the delays are also due to the 
complex ABP-procedure. CADF staff interviewed by the CIRC submitted that the 
procedure could take up to 8 months. The various steps leading to the opening of 
the procedure have been described above. 
 
                                                     
248 Available: http://www.uci.ch/pressreleases/uci-statement-denis-menchov/ (emphasis added). The 
UCI was criticized for this because, inter alia: (i) there was no announcement of the opening of a 
proceeding against Menchov (contrary to the procedure adopted in other cases); (ii) the announcement of 
the sanction was inadequate (it is suggested that the UCI tried not to draw too much attention); (iii) a 
significant time lapse between the ADRV and the disqualification, see e.g. Shane Stokes, “Audio: UCI 
president Cookson rejects any suggestion of Makarov shielding Menchov”, Cycling Tips (16 July 2014). 
Available: http://cyclingtips.com.au/2014/07/audio-uci-president-cookson-rejects-any-suggestion-of-
makarov-shielding-menchov/. 
249 The burden of compiling the document package has improved a little recently. At the moment, 
document packages are no longer compiled for all the blood samples in the ABP. Rather the process 
concentrates on the “interesting” samples (mostly max around 10). 
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 Statistics: If one looks at the statistical data one observes that fewer athletes are 
being caught on the basis of the ABP today than in the early days (see above). Of 
course there are many reasons for this. First and foremost this is due to the 
adaptation of the riders to new doping techniques (micro-doses) to stay under the 
ABP-radar. These new techniques are much more difficult to detect. It has also 
been reported that the ABP-experts, at least to a certain extent, take too much of a 
conservative approach and that the lack of a plausible doping scenario is 
sometimes taken as an excuse to further investigate a case rather than bringing it 
forward as a disciplinary case. This has been described as frustrating by CADF-
staff. It appears to the CIRC, however, that, at least in principle, there are good 
reasons for a cautious approach by the experts, which seems also to be in line with 
WADA recommendations. Apparently there is little data in relation to humans 
concerning natural variances of blood parameters over time and in different 
circumstances (altitude, stress, physical exercise).250 In addition, there seems to 
be evidence that there are natural variances in the ABP of un-doped persons. Thus, 
it has been submitted to the CIRC that the search for a doping scenario is vital in 
order to protect the interests of the athletes. The amount of data available is also 
of concerns, because the more data is on file, the greater the likelihood that parts 
of the APB showing natural variances will coincide with a doping scenario. 
Therefore, it is important to look at the whole ABP and all the values and all the 
circumstances in which the data was collected. If variances are natural there will 
be no specific pattern, values will always be random. Things are different in case 
of a doping scenario because here values will vary from in and off-season, before, 
during and after races, etc. Variances will not be random at all times. At the end of 
the day the CIRC finds that it would be wrong to judge the effectiveness of the ABP 
by the number of riders sanctioned. First, it must be noted that all stakeholder 
acknowledge that the ABP has a huge deterrent effect. Secondly, the information 
gained through the ABP is a valuable source to target riders in the OoCT 
effectively. However, at this point in time there is little one can do to improve the 
ABP analytically, i.e. to make it more sensitive to doping. Improvement is only 
                                                     
250 The CIRC is well aware that athletes know this, and will use these circumstances as an excuse even if 
they are not true, i.e., claiming that they trained at altitude or slept in an oxygen tent, or (only then) 
provide certificates for medical conditions (sometimes alleging such conditions were existing for years). 
142 
 
possible by linking the information of suspicious ABP with the information 
obtained from the analytical results of urine samples as well as from investigations 
(whereabouts information, people the athlete works with, travel plans, etc.). All 
this data of course can no longer be processed manually, but needs computer 
programmes/algorithms in order to detect patterns. 
 
Improvement in relationship with certain stakeholders 
 
The working relationship with other NADO’s in relation to testing improved once Anne 
Gripper was employed in 2006. This constituted a significant break with the past, as, 
according to the interviewees, many NADOs had generally experienced conflicts and 
resistance from UCI. Nevertheless, the early years of Anne Gripper were overshadowed 
by fierce conflicts with AFLD over testing at the Tour (see above). The relationship 
between both organisations only improved slowly. Since the CADF took over the 
relationship with all NADOs, cooperation has further improved. This holds in particular 
true for the NADOs in France, UK, Norway, Canada, Flanders, Switzerland, South Africa 
and New Zealand. Some problems, however, persisted in relation to the access to the ABP 
on ADAMS. These problems appear to have been solved today through various data 
sharing agreements. The good relationship has also been acknowledged in many 
interviews that the CIRC has conducted with NADOs.  
 
Relationships between UCI’s legal department/Philippe Verbiest and the various 
NADOs/NFs on a results management-level proved to be more difficult. The UCI was, up 
until 2015, one of the few federations that delegated disciplinary proceedings for its test 
results to the NADOs/NFs. This system was unsatisfactory for multiple reasons. First of 
all, it obliged the NADOs/NFs to defend a test ordered and conducted by the UCI and pay 
the costs for the respective disciplinary proceedings against the athlete.251 Secondly, the 
NADOs, being responsible for all sports in their territory, would frequently not operate 
under the exact same rules as the UCI. Conflicts were, thus, due to and did arise. In 
addition, some of the NADOs have submitted that coordination between UCI’s legal 
department and the NADO was bureaucratic and lacked transparency. It has also been 
                                                     
251 These costs were sometimes very high.  
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submitted that delegating the disciplinary proceedings for UCI test results exposed some 
of the national bodies could give rise to bias, because they would frequently have to 
sanction a national hero and be under significant pressure.252 Difficulties in relation to 
jurisdiction arose also from Art. 10 of the UCI ADR (ADRV where no sample collection is 
involved). According thereto “UCI has jurisdiction for and these Anti-Doping Rules shall 
apply to any anti-doping violation committed by a License-Holder where no Sample 
collection is involved and that is discovered: (i) by the UCI, by one of its constituents or 
member Federations, by one of their officials, officers, staff members, members, License-
Holders, or any other body or individual that is subject to the regulations of the UCI or one 
of its member Federations; or (ii) by a body or individual that is not an Anti-Doping 
Organization.” Frequently disputes arose over who discovered what and who had 
jurisdiction over non-analytical cases.253 The Lance Armstrong case (see above) is only 
one example of this.254 The CIRC acknowledges and welcomes that these problems have 
been better dealt with in the new UCI ADR 2015.255  
 
The relationship between UCI with the various laboratories was and is being described 
as very good. UCI was and is responsive to new analysis techniques available in the 
laboratories. Furthermore, UCI also provides doping relevant information to the 
laboratories and shares information on anti-doping activities with the laboratories 
through international scientific journals as well as workshops. 
 
Ongoing Challenges 
 
The above changes were implemented after 2006 in a difficult environment. Difficulties 
were due to budgetary restrictions, but also to UCI leadership. It is reported that Lon 
Schattenberg and Hein Verbruggen (who was no longer president of the UCI, but still 
around), unlike Pat McQuaid, were reluctant to embrace Anne Gripper’s “NADO-like” 
                                                     
252 Conflicts of interest have been reported, e.g., for the Contador case. An exception to this rule, however, 
is the case of USADA and Lance Armstrong. 
253 See e.g. CAS 2008/A/1528 & 1546 (21 Jan. 2009); CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402 (31 May 2010); CAS 
2007/A/1362 & 1393 (5 May 2008). 
254 See United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Lance Armstrong, Reasoned Decision on Disqualification and 
Ineligibility (10 October 2012) p. 156 et seq. Available: 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/ReasonedDecision.pdf. 
255 See in particular Art. 7 and 8.1 et seq. 2015 UCI ADR. 
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approach.  Furthermore, the relationship between UCI leadership and WADA leadership 
remained, for quite some time, particularly bad and progressively deteriorated (see 
above) to a point where employees of both organisations were not allowed to 
communicate with each other. Another source of difficulty was the bad relationship with 
ASO. There was constant speculation and accusations that one organisation was trying to 
harm the other through leaks of information to the public.256  
 
Another important stakeholder with which UCI entertained particularly bad relations 
was USADA, which started the investigation against Lance Armstrong and was initially 
not supported by UCI in doing so. UCI did not or only reluctantly provided information to 
USADA in the course of its investigations and, in addition, also contested USADA’s 
jurisdiction in order to protect Lance Armstrong from being pursued (see above). 
Eventually, UCI decided for the sake of its own public image to remain neutral on the issue 
of jurisdiction and to publicly distance itself from Lance Armstrong. In this climate of 
hostility between the two entities, USADA took the dispute a step further by publishing 
its Reasoned Decision on the internet.  
 
The 2012 USADA Reasoned Decision and the 2015 AAA Leinders award contained a 
number of alleged wrongdoings of UCI (see Mario Zorzoli-case below; Floyd Landis 
allegations below and Martial Saugy case).257 This manner of publishing allegations of 
ADRVs committed by third parties which are either not fully investigated or at all (public 
shaming), is not in line with the WADA Code. The WADA Code requires, in principle, that 
the ADO uncovering an ADRV either initiates anti-doping proceedings itself or provides 
the respective information to the competent ADO. Making allegations of ADRVs by 
disciplinary bodies in public is not provided for as a tool to combat doping in the WADA 
Code, since this touches upon sensitive issues such as personality rights of the persons 
involved and the right to be heard. The CIRC is of the view that if an ADO is not capable of 
                                                     
256 See e.g. the Rasmussen incident.  
257 See Cycling News, “Lausanne laboratory gave Armstrong key to beating EPO test, says Tygart” (10 Jan. 
2013). Available: http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/lausanne-laboratory-gave-armstrong-key-to-
beating-epo-test-says-tygart; Owen Gibson, “Lance Armstrong: lab director denies helping cyclist beat 
drug tests”, The Guardian (11 Jan. 2013). Available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2013/jan/11/lance-armstrong-lab-director-drug-tests; and Cycling 
News, “Saugy denies telling Armstrong how to avoid EPO positive” (11 Jan. 2013). Available: 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/saugy-denies-telling-armstrong-how-to-avoid-epo-positive.  
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conducting further investigations on its own, it should forward the information so far 
collected to the competent authority that is capable of doing so. Posting these allegations 
into the public domain is unacceptable. A coordinating and/or leadership role to follow-
up on such information in case no appropriate ADO can be found to deal with the 
allegations could be given to WADA who should then decide what would be the best way 
forward considering the seriousness of the allegations while safeguarding the respective 
persons’ fundamental rights. 
 
Besides this difficult environment, implementation of improved anti-doping practices 
faced other legal and logistical obstacles that were not always easy to overcome: 
 
 Whereabouts information and missed tests: the ADU started to operate a 
whereabouts system (that later on was taken over by the CADF). The collection of 
riders’ whereabouts information was a paradigm shift both for the ADU-staff and 
the athletes. However, the system was also burdensome. This was true in respect 
of the information that had to be collected and managed from the athletes. 
Furthermore, the ADU was confronted with the fact that in order to administer the 
whereabouts system it was using a 20th century paper based fax and letterbox 
system with riders that were living in the 21st century and who were highly 
mobile. It appears that whereabouts filing, at least in the beginning, was not done 
consistently. Things started to improve only slowly, i.e. once ADAMS was 
implemented in 2007 and made compulsory for inserting the riders’ whereabouts 
information (the implementation for the entire peloton was completed in 2008).  
 
The system was also not only burdensome for the athletes, but also for CADF/UCI 
because of the results management that went along with it. The ADU had to 
evaluate and assess the individual explanations given by the athletes in case of a 
missed test. The administrative burden was high and in order to cope with it the 
ADU initially adopted a “more lenient attitude because in administrative terms the 
research required to find and explain the reasons for a missed test take a great deal 
of time and are very expensive.”258 Despite the directions given in WADA’s 
                                                     
258 See “Minutes CADF-council meeting” (10 Sept. 2009). Copy on file with CIRC. 
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applicable International Standard it took the ADU/CADF considerable time to put 
protocols in place on how to deal with whereabouts failures and when and how to 
accept justifications provided by riders on filing failures. Because of this lack of 
transparency, it was reported that decisions taken in that respect were sometimes 
considered not to be just and fair. 
 
The lack of protocols and the rather lenient approach in the context of results 
management concerning missed tests resulted in the so-called “Rasmussen 
incident” in 2007. Michael Rasmussen was wearing the yellow jersey in the 2007 
Tour, when it was announced that he had been suspended from the Danish 
national cycling team for the forthcoming UCI World Championships and 2008 
Beijing Olympic Games. Michael Rasmussen was also suspended by his team. The 
reason for his suspension was that he had provided wrong information on his 
whereabouts for a three-week training session during which he was supposed to 
be in Mexico but was spotted in Italy, and was unavailable for testing during that 
period. Michael Rasmussen had three missed tests/filing failures. According to UCI 
ADR a disciplinary proceeding should have been initiated against the rider. 
Furthermore, Michael Rasmussen would not have been eligible to participate in 
the 2007 Tour, because of Art. 220 UCI ADR, which provided as follows: “In case of 
a recorded warning or a missed test in a period of 45…days before the start of a 
Major Tour, the Rider is not allowed to participate in that Tour.” Despite these 
provisions only a warning was issued against Michael Rasmussen and his team 
(after consultation between ADU and Lon Schattenberg). Available information 
suggests that the decision to issue a warning, contrary to the UCI ADR, was taken 
autonomously by the ADU/ADC without interference from UCI leadership. It 
appears that the ADU/ADC was scared of the legal consequences deriving from a 
strict application of the rules and that it did not want a “new style” doping issue 
hit the headlines prior to the Tour. Problems relating to the consistent handling of 
missed tests/filing failures persisted until 2011259 when UCI’s legal services/LADS 
                                                     
259 Another case where problems arose in relation to the handling of missed tests/whereabouts 
information is the case of Gregory Baugé, who was sanctioned after three violations of whereabouts 
failures. See also Le Monde, “Dopage : Grégory Baugé, suspendu et déchu de son titre mondial pour 
manquement aux obligations de localisation” (6 Jan. 2012). Available: 
http://www.lemonde.fr/sport/article/2012/01/06/dopage-gregory-bauge-suspendu-et-dechu-de-son-
titre-mondial-pour-manquement-aux-obligations-de-localisation_1626615_3242.html (in French).  
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took over the results management and created and implemented databases, logs 
and electronic filing systems. 
 
 OoCT: the applicable rules for OoCT provide that the athletes must file 
whereabouts information (if they are in the RTP). In particular, athletes must 
provide a time-slot of 60 minutes (between 06:00 and 23:00) per day when they 
are available for testing. It has been submitted that the 60-minute time-slot was 
dangerous, as athletes and their doctors could regulate the doping administration 
around it. This fear is not far-fetched considering the skill of athletes to adapt their 
doping schemes to the regulatory framework. The whereabouts-system is also 
being put to test when riders change their whereabouts repeatedly and at the very 
last minute. This increases the logistical difficulties for the DCO to reach the 
athletes. Finally it has been submitted that NADOs have experienced a significant 
rise in missed tests or filing failures, since the rules provide for three strikes before 
being sanctioned. Thus, riders prefer having a missed test or a filing failure instead 
of risking an AAF. 
 
 Chaperone system: UCI started to systematically use chaperones in 2008.  
However, it took some time for the chaperones to serve their purpose. Part of the 
reason for this, at least for post-competition ICT, was due to sport-specific 
logistical obstacles. For example, chaperones had to be well-positioned at the 
finish-line of the race in order to be able to identify and notify the riders selected 
for sample collection. Frequently riders would cross the finish-line in a pack of 30-
50 or even more riders, at a fairly high speed with their faces or numbers on their 
jerseys being barely visible. Furthermore, the riders would not automatically stop 
at the finish line, but slow down for another 100 – 500 metres. Quite often, the 
finish area would be packed with coaches, fans, team personnel and cars. In such 
a context it was not easy for a chaperone to make contact with the rider and to 
monitor all of his movements.260 Proper education of chaperones and experience 
was crucial for the chaperone system to work effectively.261 It took a while to put 
                                                     
260 See e.g. CAS 2009/A/1744 (27 July 2009).  
261 See iNADO Report – Final Audit report Doping Control Program – The UCI and CADF, 25 February 
2014, p.7. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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such a system in place. By 2010 it was acknowledged that the chaperone-system 
was, in principle, working well.262 
 
 External service providers: the use of external service providers was, at least in 
the early days, not by itself a sufficient guarantee for the required quality standard 
of testing. It has been repeatedly reported that there were problems with the 
behaviour of some of the DCOs recruited by external companies when carrying out 
an anti-doping control. Some of these problems seem to persist today. The 
external companies, in principle, chose their personnel autonomously. Neither the 
UCI nor the ADU/CADF had an influence on the recruitment policy of the service 
providers. The requirement for certification as well as the fact that the market for 
external anti-doping services is competitive helped to improve the situation. 
Furthermore, constant monitoring of the quality of the respective service 
providers is necessary. There is also a certain danger that the Test Distribution 
Plan as well as the testing strategy is weakened or watered down on an 
operational level by these profit-orientated external service providers, since these 
service providers must balance the testing requirements of their principal with 
costs-aspects. It comes as no surprise that some service-providers implement the 
anti-doping strategy of the ADU/CADF more stringently or apply more efforts than 
others. This is evidenced by the fact that some of the companies would, on average, 
declare more often than others that the athlete could not be reached at the 
venue/place indicated according to the whereabouts information. 
 
 Gaining field knowledge: gathering field knowledge from the peloton to further 
improve the testing strategy is a difficult task. This sport specific information of 
what is going on in the peloton is difficult to access for the anti-doping community 
(ADU/CADF, NADOs), because they are perceived as “prosecutors” and, thus, little 
information is passed on from the peloton to “the other side”. It appears to the 
CIRC that some opportunities were and are still missed to get access to this 
information: 
                                                     
262 Report of the Independent Observers Tour de France 2010 (28.10.2010), p. 9. Available: 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/2010-10-
28+WADA+Independent+Observers+Report+TDF+2010.pdf. 
149 
 
 
- Whistleblowers: after Operación Puerto became public a few riders that 
had been discovered to be involved in the scandal decided to confess and 
contacted the UCI. These riders were in a difficult situation. One of the 
riders has put it as follows: “At the moment, confessing is not encouraged 
and it is then difficult to find another team.  Effectively a life ban is imposed 
by the teams (not by the relevant authority).  Teams run by the same people 
- all in cycling for a long time and part of the omerta.  At the moment the 
incentive to confess is zero.” However, the information provided from 
whistleblowers is important and necessary in order to improve the Testing 
Program. In addition, it might also provide intelligence for targeting 
specific riders or traffickers. There is evidence that the information 
provided by riders confessing to UCI was also used by the ADU/CADF for 
improving anti-doping testing strategies. However, it also seems that the 
primary focus of UCI was on the (difficult) disciplinary aspects of the cases, 
i.e. on deciding on the appropriate sanction for such riders. The focus, thus, 
was on the individual aspect of the case rather than tackling and 
investigating the structural problems of doping and the doping networks 
behind the individual cases. Furthermore, the general attitude in the 
context of disciplinary sanctions was to be strict on whistleblowers. There 
was no general strategy to actively encourage whistleblowing. Instead, 
riders reported that the message sent out by UCI leadership in case they 
went public was ambiguous and hostile. An example of this can be found 
when Bernhard Kohl went public. In relation to this incident Pat McQuaid 
is quoted in the press as follows: “I would not put a lot of faith in what he 
[Kohl] says. It is always guys who get caught and thrown out who start 
reflecting a little bit, preparing a book, and they come out with anything. 
Unless we have proof, we can not go and do anything.”263 Another example 
is the rider Jesús Manzano who went public with his claims of doping in the 
Kelme team and started the trial of Dr Eufemiano Fuentes (see above). In 
this context Hein Verbruggen is cited as follows: “I was extremely, unhappily 
                                                     
263 Gregor Brown, “UCI president McQuaid defends Menchov”, cycling news (30 May 2009). Available: 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/uci-president-mcquaid-defends-menchov.  
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surprised by Mr. Pitallier’s statements saying he found it scandalous to 
sanction Mr. Manzano. Why not sanction a cheater for the simple reason that 
he decided to talk? We have to remember that it’s the cheaters that are 
talking. If they’re protected by the directors, we have to ask ourselves some 
questions.”264 When Floyd Landis finally told the public about his doping 
practices, Hein Verbruggen is quoted to have responded to him as follows: 
“Now here comes a person like you (and with your records!) who tells me I 
am dishonest and even repeats this in public. What mentality one must have 
to do things like that to other persons?”265 Furthermore, Pat McQuaid is 
alleged to have qualified Tyler Hamilton and Floyd Landis, the two cyclists 
whose revelations did a lot to bring Lance Armstrong down, as 
“scumbags”.266 UCI-staff submitted that there were no directions by UCI 
leadership and no general policy guidelines to discourage riders from 
coming forward. However, UCI staff also declared that they were 
overwhelmed by these cases and had no time and resources to implement 
general guideline policies in order to make whistleblowing an integral part 
of fighting doping. Rather they dealt with them, depending on their 
resources, on a case by case basis. It has been felt that as a consequence of 
this lack of policy, athletes were discouraged from disclosing information 
to UCI instead of coming forward and, thus, that an important opportunity 
had been missed. The proper policy seems to the CIRC to be to routinely 
contact and invite riders that have tested positive to give “substantial 
assistance” on helping to prosecute other athletes or athlete support 
personnel in return for a reduction on sanctions. The substantial assistance 
strategy has been further enhanced in the new WADA Code. Some NADOs 
rightly seem to make extensive use of this possibility and, thus, gain 
impressive field knowledge and information for further investigations. The 
CIRC encourages the UCI/CADF to do the same. However, the CIRC also 
                                                     
264 Cillian Kelly, “Hein Verbruggen: personification of the Omerta”, crank punk (6 Dec. 2013). Available: 
http://crankpunk.com/2013/12/06/hein-verbruggen-personification-of-the-omerta/.  
265 Cillian Kelly, “Hein Verbruggen: personification of the Omerta”, crank punk (6 Dec. 2013). Available: 
http://crankpunk.com/2013/12/06/hein-verbruggen-personification-of-the-omerta/. 
266 Tony Farrelly, “Tyler Hamilton and Floyd Landis are "scumbags" says UCI president”, road.cc (23 Oct. 
2012). Available: 
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acknowledges the necessity to carefully weigh and assess the information 
that is obtained through such plea bargaining. In particular before making 
allegations gained through plea bargaining public, allegations need to be 
corroborated and assessed. Such information should not be lightly 
accepted as truth, since riders have an incentive to distort the facts of their 
story in search of the highest sanction reduction possible. 
 
- Antennas in the peloton: most of the ADU/CADF staff do not have a specific 
cycling background with links into the peloton. This may be good in 
relation to independence. However, this may be detrimental in respect of 
information gathering in the field even considering that the CADF-
personnel might have a lot of (important) exchanges with NADOs and other 
ADOs (see above). It appears that CADF personnel are hardly ever in the 
field (even the ICT and OoCT are mostly performed by third persons, little 
first-hand knowledge in that respect). It is a challenge for ADU/CADF staff 
to spot and pick up information in the field,267 which is even more difficult 
in view of the fact that the ADU/CADF is perceived in the field as a 
prosecutor. At the end of the day CADF is, in relation to “what is going on 
in the peloton”, very much dependent on external antennas. An important 
source for “ground information” is the UCI itself, which has a lot of sport 
specific knowledge and on ground information. The desire for 
independence of the CADF, however, has made the flow of this kind of 
information (particularities of training, race calendars, informal contacts 
into the field, rumours in the peloton, etc.) more difficult. There is a certain 
danger that following CADF’s move to independence it is being cut off from 
important UCI sources of information and is operating in isolation. This 
fear has been expressed inside UCI/CADF. However, this perception has 
also developed outside. 
 
                                                     
267 It is unlikely that this challenge will be adequately addressed by creating a new pool of experts that 
will only meet twice a year to give inputs/information to the CADF, see CADF Presentation Bergen 2013, 
slide 22. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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 Investigations: the Anti-Doping Programme is usually described in a process-
oriented way. According thereto certain tasks have to be undertaken (e.g. planning 
of ICT and OoCT, ABP, TUEs, investigations, results management, appeal, 
education, etc.). It is important to specialise in and focus on these various modules 
of anti-doping in order to improve things. However, there is also the danger that 
the big picture is lost through this kind of compartmentalisation. Information 
collected in one of these modules may also be vital for devising the best strategy 
in other modules. This is particularly true when devising the Test Distribution 
Plan or testing strategy, which should reflect a qualitative approach, i.e. a strategy 
based on intelligence rather than on a quantitative approach. The CADF has only 
started to implement such a system. When devising its Test Distribution Plan it 
tries to take various limited sources of information into account (information from 
riders coming forward to UCI and providing information,268 observing the 
behaviour of riders, their results, their contractual situation with the teams, 
observations made by DCOs during doping control, information or suspicious 
results from the ABP/testing or if and to what extent the riders comply with their 
filing duties in respect to whereabouts information). However, the CADF concedes 
that much more could be done in a much more systematic and more 
comprehensive manner. CADF looks in this respect to UK Anti-doping (“UKAD”) 
as a model for implementing an investigative department. As from January 2015 
CADF plans to employ an analyst/intelligence coordinator with a criminological 
professional background in order to help devise and implement intelligent testing 
strategies. In addition an investigative software programme will be used that links 
and evaluates historical data of teams, riders and team managers. Furthermore, 
the CIRC is of the view that there should be a reporting system in place according 
to which investigations are launched as soon as certain structural failures are 
reported in the field of anti-doping (problems with DCO, external service-
providers, etc.). There must be a professional follow-up in all cases in which 
deficiencies or irregularities are made aware to the UCI. In order to further such 
investigations, it should be made mandatory for staff, licence holders and other 
                                                     
268 CADF participates in these interview sessions. 
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members of organs of UCI and its federations and subsidiaries to cooperate with 
these investigations. 
 
 Focusing on top road cyclists: the focus of UCI’s effort has had the effect that part 
of the doping problem has shifted to layers below the top road cyclist level. It has 
been reported by riders and ADOs that the doping problem has grown more 
prominent in the group of U23 riders and particularly within continental teams. 
In this group of cyclists there are many athletes that want to turn professional 
and/or look for good contracts and are, thus, particularly vulnerable to doping. 
Furthermore, it is reported that a lot of doping is going on in the Masters 
categories and among amateurs. This finding is corroborated also by the situation 
in Italy.  In Italy the amateur sport is monitored by the Commission for the 
Monitoring and Control of Doping and the Protection of Health in Sporting 
Activities (“CVD”). It appears that the percentage of AAF in relation to the samples 
taken by the CVD is significantly higher than by the NADO (CONI). 
 
 Corticosteroids: there is widespread dissatisfaction within the anti-doping 
community with the way the problem of corticosteroids is handled. The practice 
to allow certain routes of administration is generally perceived as problematic and 
provides a loophole for athletes to mask a prohibited use of that substance.  The 
introduction by UCI of the corticosteroids test at the 1999 Tour highlighted the 
prevalence of its use in the peloton as 26 riders were found to have been using 
corticosteroids during that Tour. Corticosteroids are used primarily as an anti-
inflammatory and for pain relief. They can be administered locally, or systemically 
through a pill or intravenously. Classic side-effects include digestive and 
neuropsychiatric complications, susceptibility to infections, problems with skin, 
movement and vision, and endocrine complications, as well as tendon rupture 
following corticoid infiltration. Long term corticoid use may have a negative effect 
on bones, leading to an increased risk of osteoporosis and fractures as well as 
osteonecrosis.269  
                                                     
269 Laboratoire Suisse d’Analyse du Dopage, Glucocorticosteroids (or corticosteroids or corticoids). 
Available: http://www.doping.chuv.ch/en/lad_home/lad-prestations-laboratoire/lad-prestations-
laboratoire-liste-methodes/lad-prestations-laboratoire-liste-methodes-corticos.htm. 
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 TUE Committee: the report issued by iNADO on 25 February 2014 contains the 
following conclusion: “[t]he UCI Doctor handles and makes decisions on all TUEs 
and demonstrated simple cases and other more complicated cases during the audit. 
A TUE Committee was appointed several years ago but does not appear to be used. 
The International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions requires a TUE 
Committee to be established and for this Committee to review TUE applications”.  On 
the basis of this consideration a specific recommendation was formulated to the 
UCI and CADF, namely that “[t]he TUE Committee should be revitalized, allowing 
them to review TUEs, thus also ensure that limited access to ADAMS is secured to 
medical personnel for the purpose of reviewing the TUE applications only”.270 
 
 In June 2014, the UCI was criticized for having granted a TUE to Chris Froome at the 2014 
Tour de Suisse. At the centre of the criticism was the procedural issue raised already by 
iNADO in its report that the TUE had not been issued by a “TUE Committee”, but by a 
single UCI staff member.271 The TUE itself had not been covered up or hidden, since it was 
properly entered into on ADAMS. Thus, WADA had access to it and could have, in case it 
did not agree with the issuance of the TUE, reversed UCI’s decision. Following this 
incident the practice was changed within UCI and a TUE Committee composed of 6 
members was set up on 1 July 2014.272 Despite being raised at the beginning of 2014, it 
took another high-profile incident before the deficiency was addressed. 
 
 Unequal treatment: the concern was frequently voiced in interviews that the 
current anti-doping policy in place provides for unequal treatment. This however 
is detrimental for the fight against doping and the level of acceptance of the 
stakeholders involved. In this context several points have been raised: 
 
                                                     
270 See iNADO Report – Final Audit report Doping Control Program – The UCI and CADF, 25 February 
2014, p. 7. See also p. 2 of the same Report. Copy on file with CIRC. 
271 See e.g. Shane Stokes, “Audio: UCI president Cookson rejects any suggestion of Makarov shielding 
Menchov”, Cycling Tips (16 July 2014). Available: http://cyclingtips.com.au/2014/07/audio-uci-
president-cookson-rejects-any-suggestion-of-makarov-shielding-menchov/; and Velo News, “UCI accused 
of allowing Froome unfair use of corticosteroids” (15 June 2014). Available: 
http://velonews.competitor.com/2014/06/news/uci-accused-allowing-froome-unfair-use-
corticosteroids_331970  
272 See Terms of Reference of the TUE Committee attached.  
155 
 
- Different testing capacities: it has been pointed out that one of the reasons for 
unequal treatment rested with the fact that the various laboratories had not 
the same testing capacities. It is true that WADA enforces certain minimum 
levels on WADA-accredited laboratories. However, it is equally true that some 
laboratories are able to detect smaller thresholds of prohibited substances 
than others. Thus, depending on where a sample is analysed it may turn out to 
be an AAF or not. The Alberto Contador case at the 2010 Tour is a good 
example for this,273 as it was reported to the CIRC, only the Cologne laboratory 
was at that time capable of detecting the minuscule thresholds of clenbuterol 
in Alberto Contador’s sample.  
 
 It appears to the CIRC that to a certain extent the question where a sample ends 
up being analysed is not the result of a targeted strategy. Instead, it appears to 
be, at least in some instances, the result of a budgetary-driven decision. The 
laboratories are in competition with each other for sample analysis. Since 
testing is a cost-sensitive issue, a decision by an ADO where to send a certain 
sample for analysis is often not based solely on whether or not the laboratory 
in question has the best performance level. Instead, samples are frequently 
sent to the laboratory that provides the cheapest but not necessarily the best 
services. The CIRC, however, finds that any anti-doping policy should try to 
focus first and foremost on a qualitative approach. 
 
- Differing testing menu: some of the prohibited substances and methods that 
are allegedly being used today are not routinely tested for in the laboratories, 
which only analyse a certain standard menu. Substances not included in the 
standard menu, for which there are tests, are only tested for upon request and 
charged extra. In principle, IFs are routinely informed what new tests have 
been developed by the laboratories. However, IFs very often stick with the 
standard menu and do not request extra tests also for cost reasons. For 
example, it has been reported to the CIRC that a certain doping product was 
being used by cyclists of a certain country. The CIRC inquired with laboratories 
                                                     
273 See CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386 (6 February 2012). 
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whether there was a robust test to detect that substance. Laboratories 
affirmed that some of the laboratories (however not in the country of the 
riders) were able to detect that substance, provided that this was requested by 
the ADO and paid for additionally. Depending on the capacities of a laboratory 
where the sample ends up being analysed and depending on whether or not 
the ADO ticks off the box for specific additional testing for that substance, the 
doping athlete will be caught or not. It appears that the likelihood for this will 
very much depend on the kind of links the respective ADO has into the peloton 
and on whether or not there are budgetary restrictions. To sum up, it appeared 
to the CIRC that the likelihood of a rider testing positive when competing in an 
event of the country where the laboratory was not able to perform the specific 
extra test was small. Some of these deficiencies will hopefully disappear once 
the new technical document of WADA (Technical Document for Sport Specific 
Analysis) will be applied.274    
 
- Variances in sanctions: it has been submitted to the CIRC that there is 
inequality also in relation to sanctions. It is true that there is a striking 
difference when looking at the period of ineligibility of the sanction against 
Lance Armstrong and certain riders that have testified against him. The range 
goes from 6 months up to a lifetime ban. CIRC is of the view that this difference 
in treatment can hardly be justified by looking at the gravity and/or 
seriousness of the ADRVs in question.275 It appears to the CIRC that the doping 
practices of Lance Armstrong were not any different to those of many other 
riders. CIRC has had the opportunity to interview a lot of other riders and team 
personnel who have confirmed that the peloton was for a long time doping 
infested and that more or less identical doping practices were adopted 
throughout the peloton. All of this is of course no excuse or justification for 
Lance Armstrong’s behaviour and there cannot be a shadow of a doubt that 
                                                     
274 See WADA publishes Technical Document for Sport Specific Analysis (2 Oct. 2014). Available: 
https://www.wada-ama.org/en/media/news/2014-10/wada-publishes-technical-document-for-sport-
specific-analysis. 
275 The Reasoned Decision states that Lance Armstrong’s achievements: “were accomplished through a 
massive team doping scheme, more extensive than any previously revealed in professional sports history”, 
United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Lance Armstrong, Reasoned Decision on Disqualification and 
Ineligibility (10 Oct. 2012) p. 5. Available: http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/ReasonedDecision.pdf. 
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such behaviour warrants a harsh sanction. However, equal treatment is a 
fundamental principle on which the fight against doping and its acceptance by 
all stakeholders is based. At the end of the day, the difference in treatment can 
only be justified by the fact that some of the riders, contrary to others, chose 
to break the omerta. Whether this alone is justification enough for such a 
difference in treatment has been questioned by many people the Commission 
spoke to. By adopting the WADA Code the anti-doping community has decided, 
in the CIRC’s view correctly, that the advantages of obtaining information 
through plea bargaining with athletes must be given priority over the principle 
of equal treatment of athletes. Of course this entails a great responsibility for 
ADOs that use this important tool in the fight against doping. They must offer 
the same opportunity to come forward with valuable information to all 
athletes alike and adopt similar protocols when it comes to rewarding the 
athletes with reductions/suspension on sanctions for the information 
provided. 
  
- Little interest in Athlete Support Personnel: it appears that in the past the 
UCI/CADF’s Anti-Doping Program was concentrated on testing athletes and to 
a far lesser extent to investigate ADRVs of athlete support personnel. One of 
the reasons for this is that ADRVs of athlete support personnel can only be 
detected through investigations. However, so far the UCI/CADF did not have a 
functioning investigation unit. Limiting the anti-doping strategies to athletes 
causes inequality to a certain extent, because it is hardly justifiable to pursue 
only athletes for an ADRV, but not the athletes support personnel that were 
involved in the same infractions. The CIRC encourages the UCI to investigate 
also past ADRVs of athlete support personnel within the statute of limitation 
period, if this support personnel is still working in cycling. It causes a great 
deal of inequality if some of them are sanctioned by individual NADOs and a 
large part of other athlete support personnel are allowed to continue working 
with teams and athletes. 
 
 Sanctions: the WADA Code allows signatories little manoeuvring in relation to 
sanctions. According to Art. 23.2.2 of the 2015 WADA Code the provisions on 
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sanctions “must be implemented by Signatories without substantive change.” 
However, it is compatible with the WADA Code to strengthen the responsibilities 
of cycling teams in relation to anti-doping and to provide sanctions for the team in 
case team members are found to have committed an ADRV. The CIRC welcomes 
the new provision on suspension in Art. 7.12 UCI ADR which provides, inter alia, 
as follows: “If two Riders and/or other Persons within a Team registered with the 
UCI  are notified within a twelve-month period of an Adverse Analytical Finding for 
a Prohibited Method or a Prohibited Substance that is not a Specified Substance, or 
receive notice of an asserted anti-doping rule violation arising from an Adverse 
Passport Finding or Atypical Passport Finding after a review under Article 7.5 or 
other asserted anti-doping rule violation as per Articles 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 or 2.10, 
the Team shall be suspended from participation in any International Event for a 
period determined by the President of the UCI Disciplinary Commission or a member 
of the Disciplinary Commission, taking into account all the circumstances of the case. 
The suspension shall not be less than 15 days and not more than 45 days.” 
 
Retesting 
 
UCI is one of the few IFs that perform long-term storage of samples, in order to allow re-
analysis of suspicious samples with new technical means. In interviews with CIRC riders 
and other stakeholders, they have acknowledged that this anti-doping tool has a strong 
deterrent effect. However, it appears to the CIRC that until now there is no 
comprehensive strategy for retesting samples (what athletes, what events, how far back 
in time. Actions seem erratic and only minimum level.) The lack of strategy has also been 
reported to the CIRC by other stakeholders. Retesting is only done on specific request by 
the IFs. Such requests appear to be seldom. 
 
Evaluation of UCI anti-doping policies and structures (after 2006/2007) 
 
 The time period starting from 2006/2007 is marked by steady improvements and 
a growing willingness to combat anti-doping at its roots. The original policy of 
containment is abandoned in favour of a policy that tries to catch the cheaters. 
Within a short period of time important changes were decided and implemented, 
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such as the introduction of OoCT, better targeting of the testing, the introduction 
of the ABP and the transformation of the ADU into the CADF. Funding of anti-
doping has equally improved. In particular, teams and event organisers contribute 
substantially to the funding of the anti-doping programme. All these measures 
have, so the CIRC has been credibly told, changed the behaviour of elite road 
cycling considerably. The CIRC considers that the reason why the public has not 
acknowledged and credited these positive changes the way it should have, is 
probably due to what CIRC views as hesitant and poor leadership of UCI. Constant 
directions from management in relation to anti-doping operations, persisting 
disputes with other stakeholders in the field of anti-doping, poor public 
management of crisis situations (e.g. comeback of Lance Armstrong, Alberto 
Contador, jurisdictional disputes over Reasoned Decision, accepting donations 
from Lance Armstrong), general problems in good governance, close relationships 
between UCI leadership with riders (in particular with Lance Armstrong) 
displaying obvious potential conflicts of interest and a devastating election 
campaign in 2013 have ruined UCI’s public credibility also in anti-doping. The new 
leadership that came into power in 2013 tries to avoid these past mistakes. 
Relationships with other stakeholders have significantly improved, influence on 
CADF’s anti-doping operations has ceased. However, it appears to the CIRC that 
the transition to more independence of the CADF has some challenges too. The 
concept to divide tasks between several units/departments within and outside of 
UCI is understandable when looking at past interferences from UCI leadership. 
However, the rather complicated division of tasks renders coordination more 
difficult and seems to hamper the flow of information. 
 
 Anti-doping is not a static matter. Once a new level is attained, the battle is far 
from won. Instead the history of anti-doping is marked by a constant adaptation 
of those that seek to cheat and those that seek to catch them. Therefore, a good 
anti-doping policy is marked by the constant strive to improve the existing tools, 
search for new strategies, coordinate with others in the field and to prevent all 
kinds of routines that facilitate and encourage adaptation. Even though UCI’s anti-
doping programme today belongs to the best ones among IFs, the CIRC sees room 
for further improvement. This is true for information gathering through 
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investigation. CIRC welcomes the idea of the CADF to install an intelligence unit to 
better target doping athletes and to pursue non-analytical ADRVs. In addition, the 
CIRC is of the view that the tool of re-testing has not been sufficiently explored and 
applied. The CIRC encourages the UCI/CADF to look more into ADRVs of athlete 
support personnel. The CIRC is alarmed by interviews according to which CADF’s 
concentration on elite road cycling has pushed the bulk of the anti-doping 
problems to other levels, such as the amateurs, the Continental Teams, young 
riders turning professional. In this regard coordination is needed between NADOs 
and the CADF to avoid blank spots on the sporting map.  
 
 UCI/CADF staff involved in anti-doping is generally held in high regard. However, 
UCI/CADF are encouraged to install proper reporting so that they are able to 
better check and assess the quality of personnel employed by it and external 
service providers. 
  
 Findings through the ABP take a long time. The CADF is encouraged to examine 
whether the process can be accelerated and what additional information, e.g. 
through investigation, could be used to facilitate the search of a doping scenario. 
Furthermore, UCI/CADF is encouraged to examine together with other 
stakeholders what can be done to further prevent the leaking of information into 
the public. This seems to be an ongoing problem. 
 
2.4. FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING IRREGULARITIES BY THE UCI WITH REGARDS TO 
DOPING 
 
CIRC investigated three types of allegation concerning irregularities by UCI in relation to 
doping, which are taken from open sources or direct testimony:  
 Allegations of corruption;  
 Allegations of breaches of the ADR; and  
 Allegations concerning the preferential treatment of certain riders.  
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2.4.1. Allegations of corruption 
 
The CIRC recognises that the definition of corruption varies across different jurisdictions.  
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a 
frequently used definition that covers a broad range of corrupt activities is "the abuse of 
a public or private office for personal gain".276  However, it is noted that the CIRC is not 
tasked with any prosecutorial role, and therefore the definition is provided merely to give 
context to the allegations below. 
 
2.4.1.1. Disappearance of Lance Armstrong's positive test result at the 2001 Tour 
de Suisse 
 
In their affidavits provided to USADA, Tyler Hamilton and Floyd Landis277 declared that 
Lance Armstrong had told them separately that he tested positive at the 2001 Tour de 
Suisse. Lance Armstrong allegedly went to UCI’s headquarters and managed to make the 
positive test disappear. Floyd Landis also claimed that this was as a result of a financial 
agreement with Hein Verbruggen.  
 
On the basis of the documents in our possession, as well as oral testimony and results 
from the Lausanne laboratory for the 2001 Tour de Suisse, the CIRC has compiled the 
following facts: 
 
 On 1 April 2001, UCI approved a test for EPO by means of urinary analysis alone, 
developed by the Châtenay-Malabry laboratory. This test was used for the first 
time at the end of the Flèche Wallonne on 8 April 2001 and resulted in the Swiss 
rider Roland Meier testing positive on 18 April 2001. Meier appealed to CAS 
against the decision of Swiss Cycling in August 2001 to apply an eight-month 
suspension. The Danish rider Bo Hamburger tested positive for EPO as a result of 
an OoCT on 19 April 2001. Bo Hamburger had not been sanctioned by the anti-
                                                     
276 See http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/41194428.pdf, p. 22.  
277 Affidavit of Floyd Landis, p. 4, and Affidavit of Tyler Hamilton, pp. 13-14. See United States Anti-Doping 
Agency v. Lance Armstrong, Reasoned Decision on Disqualification and Ineligibility (10 Oct. 2012). 
Available: http://cyclinginvestigation.usada.org/  
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doping committee of the Sports Confederation of Denmark by August 2001,278 
which led the UCI to lodge an appeal with CAS. 
 
 The EPO test was used during the Tour de Suisse from 19-28 June 2001 and 
samples were analysed by the Lausanne laboratory. Lance Armstrong was tested 
five times during the 2001 Tour de Suisse: on 19 June, 20 June, 26 June, 27 June 
and 28 June 2001. Only three samples were tested for EPO: those of 19, 26 and 27 
June 2001. The report of the analyses of doping tests by the Lausanne laboratory 
noted a negative result for these three samples. It was added that negative meant 
“according to the procedures implemented to examine the samples, the 
investigations did not reveal the presence of doping agents that appear on the list of 
substances prohibited by the regulations”. With regard to the A samples of 19 June 
and 26 June 2001, the laboratory made the following comment: “strong suspicion 
of the presence of recombinant erythropoietin (not all the criteria for a positive 
result were fulfilled)”. In the analytical report sent to UCI  regarding the A samples 
of 19 June and 26 June 2001, the Lausanne laboratory indicated that for an A 
sample to be declared positive, the results of the analysis would have to equal or 
exceed 80%;279 an A sample for which the result is over 70.2% but under 80% is 
declared strongly suspect. This report also mentioned a result of 75.1% for sample 
A-106209 and 70% for A-106106. It added that “such results have never been 
obtained in the examined non-doped population”. The report concluded that these 
samples were therefore declared negative but with the suspicion of the presence 
of recombinant EPO. As the concept of “suspicious results” was an informal 
process, it is possible that other suspect results were identified which were not 
reported. 
                                                     
278 CAS 2001/A/343 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) / H, which states: “By letter of 16 May 2001 the 
DCU requested that the B sample be tested. The analysis of the B sample began on 5 June 2001 at the IUML. It 
was divided into two parts for testing. These resulted in levels of 82.4% and 78.6% rEPO respectively. By 
letter of 8 June 2001 IUML informed the Appellant that the results of the B sample were positive and 
therefore confirmed the results of the A sample. The complete laboratory report was sent to the Appellant by 
normal post on 22 June 2001. On 9 August 2001 the Doping Tribunal of the National Olympic Committee and 
Sports Confederation of Denmark acquitted the Respondent of doping. The decision was faxed to the 
Appellant on 17 August 2001.” 
279 At that time (before the validation of the EPO test by WADA), laboratories had different  practices: i.e. 
the Châtenay Malabry laboratory only considered those above 85% as positive results, those between 80 
and 85%  as unclassifiable, and those below 80% as negative (according to Françoise Lasne statement to 
the French Senate). 
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 Several sources indicated that Lance Armstrong and his entourage were informed 
by the UCI of these suspect test results shortly after receipt of the results by the 
laboratory. This policy of informing riders who had suspect values will be 
discussed in the chapter on allegations concerning the ineffective nature of the 
anti-doping policy.  
 
 On 28 January 2002, the CAS issued its ruling on the Bo Hamburger and Roland 
Meier cases. For Roland Meier, the CAS confirmed the eight-month suspension but 
reduced the fine from CHF 4,000 to CHF 2,000 “to take into account the rider's 
difficult financial situation”. For Bo Hamburger, CAS stated that “the laboratory had 
not applied the same criteria for the analysis of the A sample as for the B samples”. 
The CAS noted that one of the two samples used for the counter-analysis had 
provided a result below 80%, in other words, below the threshold allowing the 
use of exogenous EPO to be positively confirmed. “In neither case was the 
credibility of the test seriously questioned even though it appeared that the analysis 
procedure was relatively complex and required greater care than other analytical 
anti-doping procedures”, emphasised the CAS. According to the CIRC's sources, the 
positive results for Roland Meier and Bo Hamburger and the counter-analysis for 
Bo Hamburger in June 2001 during the Tour de Suisse made a lot of noise in the 
professional cycling community and from 2002, cyclists began to micro-dose. 
 
 On 2 May 2002, Lance Armstrong sent a letter to Hein Verbruggen. This contained 
a cheque for USD 25,000 from Lance and Kristin Armstrong, dated 5 May 2002, 
and payable to the UCI. “I understand that the UCI is currently asking all of the 
professional trade teams to make a donation in support of further out-of-
competition drug testing…In an effort to speed up this process along and to show my 
commitment to this effort, I enclose my personal donation to the cause in the amount 
of USD 25,000. Please use these funds in any way you deem appropriate to continue 
the fight for drug-free sport and to eradicate those who cheat from within our 
ranks”. Lance Armstrong added: “While we both agree that the underlying science 
is very encouraging, I am not confident that the test has gone through the rigorous 
clinical analysis that is necessary to ensure it is 100% accurate…I stand with you in 
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support of more and more out-of-competition testing. And, I stand ready to help in 
any way I can. I am confident that you will put my donation to furthering our parallel 
goals”. 
 
 On 27 May 2002, a UCI internal note signed by Hein Verbruggen requested that 
the donation of USD 25,000 from Lance Armstrong should be allocated to the 2002 
budget of the Council for the Fight Against Doping (CFAD) and recommended that 
it should be used for testing juniors and under-23 categories. CFAD members were 
officially notified of this on 29 August 2002. 
 
 The UCI cashed the cheque on 28 May 2002 and the UCI President Hein 
Verbruggen sent an official letter in response to Lance Armstrong to thank him for 
his donation: “As discussed on the phone, we would like to spend this money in 
controls of the Juniors and -23 categories. The money will be added to our budget 
that has been established this year and that is composed of contributions from the 
UCI (over 50%), share of riders’ prize money, National Federations, teams and 
organizers. This budget is managed by our CLCD (Conseil de Lutte Contre le Dopage) 
[Council for the Fight Against Doping]…The CLCD will be informed of your donation 
and the fact that this 2002 budget increase will be geared towards testing the 
younger age categories”. It is not clear whether the telephone contact between 
Lance Armstrong and Hein Verbruggen took place before or after receipt of the 
cheque by the UCI. 
 
 The Critérium du Dauphiné Libéré was held from 9-16 June 2002. UCI was 
informally advised by the Châtenay-Malabry laboratory of “suspect” EPO tests 
during the event. The laboratory did not provide reports of the analyses 
considered “suspect” in terms of values approaching the threshold value. 
However, the UCI was informed that one (or more) of these suspect test results 
belonged to Lance Armstrong. 
 
 On 4 July 2002, before the start of the Tour in Luxembourg, UCI asked Martial 
Saugy, Director of the Lausanne laboratory to meet with Lance Armstrong to 
defend the EPO detection method to him, in particular following criticism of the 
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reliability of the method after the CAS ruling in the Bo Hamburger case. A few 
months earlier, Martial Saugy had already made a presentation during the Medical 
Congress of Italian Cycling to all the team doctors and other doctors present, to 
defend the EPO test. On the matter of whether the presentation by Martial Saugy 
to Lance Armstrong, which was the same as that used during the Medical Congress, 
provided the latter with information that would allow him to circumvent the 
analytical detection procedures for the use of doping substances and EPO in 
particular, an independent analysis by the Director of the Montreal Doping Control 
Laboratory concluded that this was not the case. 
 
 On 19 August 2002, Lance Armstrong met Hein Verbruggen at the new UCI 
headquarters in Aigle and visited the World Cycling Centre. Following this visit, 
communications between Lance Armstrong and the UCI suggest that he intended 
to discuss with his wife the possibility of setting up an annual donation to be 
directed towards the development of cycling for younger riders. The CIRC has not 
found any evidence to confirm whether any such donations were ever made.  
 
Conclusion 
 
On the basis of the information in its possession, the CIRC can conclude that Lance 
Armstrong did not test positive for EPO or any other doping substance during the 2001 
Tour de Suisse.  
 
CIRC has not found any indication of a financial agreement between Lance Armstrong and 
Hein Verbruggen or, as would follow from the absence of evidence of a positive test, of 
any attempts by UCI to conceal a positive test by Lance Armstrong at the 2001 Tour de 
Suisse.  
 
CIRC confirms that on 5 May 2002, Lance Armstrong made a donation of USD 25,000 to 
UCI for the fight against doping and that Lance Armstrong visited Aigle on 19 August 
2002, three months after Lance Armstrong's donation of USD 25,000 to UCI. Discussions 
were held about the possibility of a further donation to the World Cycling Centre, but this 
does not appear to have materialised.  
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CIRC has not found any evidence of corruption in relation to a positive test by Lance 
Armstrong during the Tour de Suisse in 2001, as alleged by Tyler Hamilton and Floyd 
Landis in their affidavits to USADA as part of the Reasoned Decision. CIRC considers that 
it is unfortunate that such serious accusations can be made public, without UCI first being 
consulted and the allegations being thoroughly investigated.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, CIRC considers that UCI did not act prudently in accepting a 
donation from an athlete, all the more so given the rumours about him doping.  
 
2.4.1.2. Lance Armstrong and payment for the Vrijman Report 
 
In the summary of “A Report on Corruption in the Leadership at the Union Cycliste 
Internationale (UCI)” published by Velonews on 9 September 2013,280 an allegation was 
made that Lance Armstrong had contributed to financing the Vrijman Report. This report 
had been commissioned by the UCI from the Dutch lawyer Emile Vrijman after the 
publication of an article by the newspaper L’Équipe entitled “Le mensonge Armstrong” 
(“The Armstrong Lie”) on 23 August 2005. The article accused Lance Armstrong of having 
tested positive for EPO during the 1999 Tour following a retrospective analysis of his 
samples carried out by the Châtenay-Malabry laboratory.  
 
On the basis of an analysis of the documents in the Commission’s possession as well as 
oral testimony, CIRC has attempted to determine if payments were made by Lance 
Armstrong to UCI to finance the Vrijman report. CIRC has been able to determine the 
following facts: 
 
 Discussions took place, from January 2005, between UCI and Lance Armstrong's 
entourage over a contribution of USD 100,000 by Lance Armstrong for the fight 
against doping for which UCI had to draw up proposals. On 16 March 2005, an 
agreement was reached for the purchase of a Sysmex blood testing machine.  The 
invoice for CHF 76,616, not including VAT, for a Sysmex XT-2000i was sent to UCI 
                                                     
280 Velonews, 29 September 2013. Available: http://cdn.velonews.competitor.com/files/2013/09/UCI-
Dossier-document.pdf. 
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on 6 July 2005 and paid by the federation on 26 August 2005 from the budget of 
the SSCC under the heading “funds paid by Lance Armstrong”. The invoice was sent 
to Lance Armstrong by UCI on 3 November 2005 with a promise to come back with 
proposals for the remaining USD 38,000.  After several reminders from UCI on 1 
June 2006, 28 December 2006 and 4 January 2007, USD 100,000 was credited to 
the UCI account from Lance Armstrong's bank account on 5 January 2007. CIRC 
has not managed to identify proposals made to Lance Armstrong by UCI for the 
allocation of the remaining USD 38,000, nor has it determined how this money 
was spent.  
 
 L’Équipe published its article on 23 August 2005 and Emile Vrijman was confirmed 
as the independent investigator by UCI on 30 September 2005. With regards to 
payment of Emile Vrijman's fees, UCI documents show payments by UCI to two 
legal practices for which the lawyer worked, on 29 September 2005 and 5 April 
2006. Disputes then arose between the UCI and the Scholten law practice about 
outstanding fees. The latter claimed that EUR 136,775.65 had not been paid by 
UCI.281 After several months of negotiations, the two parties agreed to arbitration 
in December 2006. The arbitrator’s first decision was issued in May 2007 and was 
revised in July 2007, requiring UCI to pay EUR 70,046.00 (out of the outstanding 
EUR 136,775.65) to Scholten/Vrijman. The amount due plus interest was to be 
fully paid to Scholten/Vrijman by August 2007.   
 
 On 11 April 2008, Hein Verbruggen, then UCI Vice-President, requested Lance 
Armstrong to contribute USD 100,000 to the financing of the ABP.  The CIRC has 
found no evidence to prove that Lance Armstrong complied with this request. The 
CIRC has not found any other evidence regarding payments made by Lance 
Armstrong to UCI or any of its members.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
281 Considerable payments had been already made by UCI. 
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Conclusion 
 
In view of the above, CIRC has not found any evidence to corroborate the above-
mentioned allegations that Lance Armstrong helped to finance the Vrijman Report. Lance 
Armstrong made a commitment to pay USD 100,000 to UCI for the fight against doping 
and, among other things, for the purchase of a Sysmex XT-2000i machine before the 
publication of the article in L’Équipe that ultimately gave rise to Emile Vrijman's mandate. 
Besides a temporal correlation between the actual payment by Lance Armstrong to UCI 
in January 2007 in respect of his promise to make a donation to the fight against doping 
and the discussions between UCI and Scholten/Vrijman on the payment of outstanding 
fees between December 2006 and July 2007, CIRC has found no relationship between the 
two financial transactions.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, once again CIRC notes that UCI did not act prudently in 
soliciting and accepting donations from an athlete, and all the more so from an athlete in 
respect of whom there were suspicions of doping.  
 
2.4.1.3. Allegations of corruption in the “Report on Corruption in the 
Leadership at the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI)” 
 
A dossier outlining allegations of corruption against UCI president Pat McQuaid and his 
predecessor Hein Verbruggen was commissioned by Igor Makarov and compiled by two 
private investigators during the 2013 presidential campaign and handed over to the UCI 
Ethics Commission at the beginning of 2014.282 This report is confidential, although a 
summary of it was made available in the press and referred to as the “Makarov Report”. 
CIRC will therefore only make reference in its report to allegations that are publicly 
known, in order to respect the confidentiality of the dossier.  
 
In the course of its investigations, CIRC looked into allegations made in the dossier. While 
CIRC is not allowed to comment publicly on the confidential allegations and their veracity, 
it recommends that the UCI Ethics Commission or an independent body with 
                                                     
282 Igor Makarov is a member of the UCI Management Committee, the owner of the team Katusha and 
President of the Russian Cycling Federation.  
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investigative powers set up by UCI investigate further some of the leads identified by the 
Commission and handed over to the UCI Ethics Commission. The Commission’s findings 
in respect of allegations that found their way into the public domain have been outlined 
in the report.  
CIRC considers that this type of conduct is entirely unacceptable: for a member of UCI to 
engage private investigators to draw up a report and publicly refer to the existence of 
that report, which included allegations               against an electorate candidate, at the 
time of the upcoming Presidential elections, and when also failing to give the report to 
the appropriate organs within UCI (until after the elections). This “strategy of suspicion 
and public shaming” is particularly inappropriate as it comes from members of the UCI 
Management Committee.  
2.4.2. Allegations of breaches of the UCI ADR 
2.4.2.1. 1996 and 1999 cases 
CIRC has received information from three interviewees concerning positive tests by three 
cyclists, who were from the same country and practiced the same discipline between 
1996 and 1999, that were deliberately concealed by the UCI leadership.  
At that time, laboratory results were sent solely to IFs (except in the case of the Olympic 
Games when the IOC was also sent a copy). Only IFs could match up a sample number to 
an athlete's name.   
Conclusion 
CIRC did not discover information on positive tests for the three athletes in question in 
the UCI archives and does not have further information to confirm or refute the reported 
allegations.  
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2.4.2.2. 1997 Laurent Brochard case (lidocaine) and 1999 Lance Armstrong 
case (corticosteroids) 
 
As discussed above, UCI appeared to have had a policy of accepting backdated 
prescriptions and being rather lenient in applying its rules on TUEs. The 1997 Laurent 
Brochard case and 1999 Lance Armstrong case were clear examples of this policy and are 
particularly significant given the justification provided by UCI in respect of their anti-
doping procedural rules. 
 
Laurent Brochard 
 
French rider Laurent Brochard was crowned Road World Champion in San Sebastian, 
Spain, in October 1997. The former Festina soigneur Willy Voet and former Festina Sport 
Director Bruno Roussel both state in their books,283 that Laurent Brochard tested positive 
for lidocaine during the World Championships. They assert that Brochard had not 
recorded that he had a therapeutic exemption on the form during the medical control, 
that a medical certificate was requested by UCI and that a backdated medical prescription 
was supplied to, and accepted by, UCI.    
 
At that time, Article 43 of the UCI Anti-doping Examination Regulations stated: “If the 
rider has any comments to add, he shall note them – or have them noted by the Examining 
Doctor – on the form. The rider must indicate on the form any drugs listed on the list of 
classes of doping substances and methods which he has taken but which may not be taken 
into consideration under the medical conditions specified in the same list. If he has not and 
any such substance is found by the laboratory, the test result shall be considered as positive 
and the rider shall be sanctioned even when he produces a medical certificate after the test.” 
 
Lidocaine was on the list of categories of doping substances and methods. 
 
The fact that Laurent Brochard provided a backdated medical certificate was not 
contested by UCI.  UCI President Hein Verbruggen commented in a March 1999 interview 
                                                     
283 Willy Voet, "Massacre à la chaîne" (Calmann-Lévy, 1999),"Breaking The Chain" (Yellow Jersey, 2002). 
Bruno Roussel, "Tour de Vices" (Hachette Littérature, 20/06/2001). 
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for Vélo Magazine: “A product was discovered that is allowed if you can provide a medical 
certificate. You journalists view everything with suspicion but we react with a bit more 
pragmatism. What difference does it make if the certificate is presented before or after the 
control? Is the former more credible? And even if it is backdated, what does that change? 
Brochard had a certificate to explain the minimal quantity of the product that had been 
revealed in his sample so he was not positive.”284 
 
Lance Armstrong 
 
At the beginning of the 1999 Tour, UCI advised all teams that they would begin testing for 
corticosteroids. The 1999 UCI ADR were applicable to the Tour pursuant to Article 4 of 
the ADR: “these Regulations and these alone shall apply to the events mentioned in Article 
8 [Note: the Tour de France was one of those events]. They shall be binding upon all National 
Federations which may neither deviate therefrom nor add thereto”. Corticosteroids were 
included on the list of categories of doping substances and methods under the Classes of 
Substances Subject to Certain Restrictions, adopted by the UCI President upon the 
proposal of the ADC and effective from 1 May 1999. The list further adds that “the use of 
corticosteroids is prohibited, except when used for topical application (auricular, 
opthmalogical or dermatological) inhalations (asthma and allergic rhinitis) and local or 
intra-articular injections. Such forms of utilisations can be proved with a medical 
prescription”. The above-mentioned article 43 of the UCI ADR also applied during the 
1999 Tour.  
 
Lance Armstrong was tested 15 times during the 1999 Tour and four of these tests were 
positive for corticosteroids, on 4, 14, 15 and 21 July 1999. According to witness 
statements, soon after being informed by the French Laboratory about the positive tests, 
direct contact was initiated between high-level UCI officials and the Armstrong 
entourage, during which the latter was advised to produce a medical certificate. On his 
doping control form of 4 July 2014 the word “nil” (“néant” in French) was indicated in the 
section on “remarks from the controlled rider and medicine taken”. A medical prescription 
dated 3 July 1999, the day before the first positive test and written in the past tense “the 
                                                     
284 Translation from French. Copy on file with CIRC.  
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rider has been using during the 2 and 3 of July…” was then provided to UCI for a 
corticosteroid cream. The medical certificate was clearly created after Lance Armstrong 
tested positive as confirmed by several interviewees and Lance Armstrong himself during 
his interview with Oprah Winfrey, which was broadcast on 17 January 2013.  
 
According to data provided by UCI during the 1999 Tour, Lance Armstrong was one of 26 
riders who tested positive for corticosteroids. They all provided a medical certificate that 
was authorised by Lon Schattenberg. For three of these riders, the CIRC established that 
“nil”’ (“néant” in French) was indicated on the doping control form in the section on 
“remarks from the controlled rider and medicine taken” clearly showing that no medical 
prescription was declared at the time of the control by the rider to explain the presence 
of the doping substance in his body. On one occasion, a medical prescription was clearly 
faxed days after the doping control had taken place. Not one of these three riders was 
sanctioned by UCI. 
 
As discussed in the section on UCI and Anti-Doping, several interviewees advised the 
CIRC that after testing positive for a substance which required a medical certificate, riders 
were required by the UCI to provide a medical justification and consequently were not 
sanctioned when the medical prescription was considered adequate to explain the 
positive test. This policy was lenient towards riders, and failed to adhere to the strict 
provisions of article 43 of UCI ADR.  
 
In a letter to the newspaper Libération about an article published on 22 July 1999 about 
Lance Armstrong’s positive test, the UCI lawyer advised that “use of a medication is not an 
act of doping when it is done with a therapeutic purpose but, on the other hand, constitutes 
an act of doping where there is no therapeutic justification”.  The letter continued that “the 
sole fact of having forgotten to declare the use of a medication should not lead to a doping 
sanction if the forgetting is excusable” and further added: “Article 43 of the Rules should 
not be a blind automatism allowing an abstraction of reality to arrive at a result that one 
knows is unjust”.  
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Conclusion 
 
 On the basis of the foregoing facts and of article 43 of the UCI ADR applicable at 
the time, the UCI acted in breach of its own ADR in asking the riders’ entourages 
to provide a medical certificate after they tested positive when they had not 
declared the use of a substance on the doping control form.  Further, when a 
medical certificate was produced for Lance Armstrong, it should have been 
obvious to UCI that the medical certificate provided by his doctor was backdated 
and solely provided to justify a posteriori the traces of triamcinolone found in the 
rider’s urine. 
  
 Therefore, disciplinary proceedings should have been opened by UCI against both 
Laurent Brochard and Lance Armstrong following their positive tests for 
prohibited substances on the basis that they did not declare the use of a medicine 
justifying that substance on their doping control form. This is regardless of the fact 
that they subsequently produced a prescription explaining that use after testing 
positive. Lidocaine and corticosteroids were on the list of categories of doping 
substances and methods prohibited by the UCI.  
 
 UCI had a very flexible approach to the application of Article 43 of its own ADR, 
whereby exceptions to the rules were granted without any justification.  If after 
the Brochard case Article 43 of the UCI ADR was considered to be unfair or 
inappropriate, it should have been amended or abolished by the UCI. 
 
 The UCI failed to apply its own rules in the Laurent Brochard and Lance Armstrong 
cases which constituted a serious breach of its obligations as the international 
governing body for cycling to govern the sport correctly.  
 
 Lance Armstrong admitted that he took the drug without therapeutic motivation 
and only to enhance his performance. His doctor issued a certificate where not 
only was the date wrong, but also what it attested. The CIRC considers that it was 
a case of a false medical certificate and therefore the case should have been 
reported to the criminal authorities and the relevant medical boards.   
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2.4.2.3. 2008: Lance Armstrong comeback 
 
In the summary of “A Report on Corruption in the Leadership at the Union Cycliste 
Internationale,”285 there is an allegation that “in 2009 when Lance Armstrong was making 
a comeback to cycling, he had not been in the UCI doping testing pool for the previously 
proscribed period of time. Mr. McQuaid agreed to a bending of these rules, which allowed 
Mr. Armstrong to ride in the Tour Down Under for an appearance fee of $1 million and in 
exchange, Mr. Armstrong agreed to ride in the Tour of Ireland for free - a race he otherwise 
would not have participated in. Further, that Mr. McQuaid benefited from this agreement 
because his relatives or friends were involved in directing the Tour of Ireland”. 
 
Based on documents, open source information and interviews, the CIRC has been able to 
identify the timeline of events below in relation to Lance Armstrong’s comeback. 
 
From January 2008 onwards, discussions took place between the Tour Down Under 
organisers and Lance Armstrong looking at the possibility of him attending the 2009 race 
as a special guest. 
 
On 4 August 2008, USADA officially informed Lance Armstrong that he has been added to 
the USADA Registered Testing Pool (“RTP”) effective 1 August 2008 and that he would 
regain eligible status on 1 February 2009. This was confirmed by UCI Anti-Doping 
Manager Anne Gripper who notified Lance Armstrong on 8 August 2008 that he must be 
available for out-of-competition testing for six months before regaining eligibility to 
compete internationally as per Article 77 of the UCI ADR.  
 
On 16 September 2008, Mike Turtur the organiser of the Tour Down Under advised UCI 
that there were reports about Lance Armstrong intending to participate in the Tour Down 
Under, which took place from 20 to 25 January 2008. Considering the six month 
requirement for Lance Armstrong to be in the RTP before going back to competition, he 
asked whether this could be an issue for Lance Armstrong’s participation. CIRC 
understands that Lance Armstrong was to be paid an appearance fee of USD1 million to 
                                                     
285 Velonews, 29 September 2013. Available: http://cdn.velonews.competitor.com/files/2013/09/UCI-
Dossier-document.pdf. 
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be given to his Livestrong Foundation, in exchange for his participation in the 2009 Tour 
Down Under. He would have received a total of USD 3 million for his participation in the 
2009-2011 editions.286   
  
At the time of his comeback, Lance Armstrong was paid a minimum salary by Astana and 
would receive money for his charity by doing appearances at different races. 
 
On 29 September 2008, several news articles on the Lance Armstrong comeback quoted 
UCI President Pat McQuaid as saying that no exceptions would be made and that the rules 
would be applied. Lance Armstrong was quoted as saying he was “hoping that a difference 
of 10 days to comply with UCI rules doesn’t derail his planned comeback at the TDU,” and 
that the UCI “would apply common sense when interpreting rules that require a retired 
rider to register in the anti-doping program six months before returning to competition.” 
He then said: “We’re not asking for any exception, but they don’t always apply this rule. We 
all remember Mario Cipollini last year at the Tour of California. This rule was not applied to 
that. It’s a tricky situation. You’re talking about a few days overlap.” 287 
 
At the end of September 2008, internal discussions took place within UCI as to whether 
an exception to the rule should be made to enable Lance Armstrong to participate in the 
Tour Down Under. Strict application to the rule was recommended by UCI administration 
as the way forward, noting that Lance Armstrong should set an example. One argument 
was that he was informed of the rule in August and did not react. One former UCI staff 
member stated: “the heroes should have ethics of the same level and show the example: 
comply with the rules”. Reference was also made to the significant political pressure the 
UCI President was under, mainly from Australia, which had planned a big event involving 
high-level politicians around Lance Armstrong’s participation in the Tour Down Under. 
                                                     
286 See Samantha Lane, “State, tour backed a ‘loser’”, The Sydney Morning Herald (22 Jan.2013). Available: 
http://www.smh.com.au/sport/cycling/state-tour-backed-a-loser-20130121-2d35g.html 
287 See Andrew Hood, “Armstrong Optimistic About Tour Down Under”, Velonews (29 Sept. 2008). 
Available: http://velonews.competitor.com/2008/09/news/road/armstrong-optimistic-about-tour-
down-under_83853; and Sandy Macaskill, “Lance Armstrong's Tour Down Under return thrown into 
doubt”, The Telegraph (29 September 2008). Available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/cycling/3097563/Lance-Armstrongs-Tour-Down-
Under-return-thrown-into-doubt-Cycling.html?mobile=basic 
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On 2 October 2008, the President of UCI, Pat McQuaid, informed the Lance Armstrong 
team that Lance Armstrong could not participate in the Tour Down Under.   
 
On the morning of 6 October 2008, Pat McQuaid advised his senior team that he had 
decided that Lance Armstrong could ride the Tour Down Under. Several interviewees 
spoke about an abrupt “change of mind” by the UCI President that took many people at 
UCI by surprise and underlined the fact that the decision was unilaterally taken by the 
UCI President. No explanation was then given internally as to why Lance Armstrong was 
suddenly given an exemption to ride the Tour Down Under.  
 
On 6 October 2008 in the afternoon, a letter was sent to Lance Armstrong by Pat McQuaid 
advising that according to article 77 of the UCI ADR he was ineligible for participation in 
races on UCI’s international calendar until 6 February 2009, as he only informed UCI by 
fax on 6 August 2008 of his intention to return to competition. Pat McQuaid expressed 
disappointment with Lance Armstrong for referring to the case of Cipollini and did not 
deny that Mario Cipollini did not observe article 77 the UCI ADR before participating in 
the Tour of California. He added that this should not have happened and that there was 
no intention not to apply the rule or to grant an exception. Pat McQuaid concluded by 
noting, “above all I cannot imagine that you would consider the failure of another rider to 
respect the rules as a justification for not respecting the rules yourself. Even in such case the 
norm has to be the respect for the rules and not the disregarding of the rules. By returning 
to cycling, one accepts the rules of cycling”.   
 
Available documentation shows that there was concern inside UCI that Pat McQuaid was 
trying to cover his decision to let Lance Armstrong compete by publicly appearing to 
continue to deny him an exception to the rule. 
 
On 6 October 2008, Lance Armstrong confirmed to Pat McQuaid that he had decided to 
participate in the Tour of Ireland. Sources and documentation available to UCI show that 
this decision was linked to the decision of Pat McQuaid to let him race in Australia. The 
last time Lance Armstrong participated in the Tour of Ireland was in 1992. That same day, 
Pat McQuaid advised his brother, Darach McQuaid who was the Project Director of the 
Tour of Ireland that Lance Armstrong wanted to come to Ireland. Darach McQuaid 
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responded few hours later that he already had the wheels in motion for letters to the high-
level Irish personalities interested in helping.  
 
Late on 6 October 2008, a letter was sent from Lance Armstrong to Pat McQuaid asking 
him “to consider an exemption from a strict interpretation of Article 77” and outlining 
several reasons that he considered outweighed the need for strict adherence to article 
77.   
 
On 8 October 2008, Lance Armstrong and the organisers of the Tour Down Under were 
officially informed by Pat McQuaid that Lance Armstrong was allowed to participate in 
the Tour Down Under. The letter stated: “‘The purpose of Article 77 is to ensure that riders 
are properly tested before returning to international races from retirement. Since the 
introduction of the rule in 2004, significant improvement in testing have been made. Indeed, 
with the implementation of the program ‘100% against doping’ and the biological passport, 
the UCI is confident that the level of testing now required under the biological passport 
programme is far higher than that envisaged by the original post retirement testing rule. 
UCI’s Anti-Doping Department has assured me that they will make arrangements to ensure 
that you will have been tested sufficiently prior to the Tour Down Under to enable you to 
have a biological passport which can be assessed by the UCI’s group of scientific experts. 
Provided that you remain fully available for this testing program to be completed, the 
principle of the post retirement testing rule will be respected and the short period by which 
we are shortening the period you will have been in the RTP will not undermine the effect of 
the rule. As a result and given that you have been considered by USADA to have been 
reintegrated into their Registered Testing Pool on 1 August 2008, I am satisfied that we 
should allow you to participate in the Tour Down Under”.  
 
On 8 October 2008, UCI released a statement entitled: “Lance Armstrong to start the 2009 
Tour Down Under”.  
 
In an interview with Eurosport dated 9 October 2008, the UCI Anti-Doping Manager 
stated about the ABP: ‘‘We are in the early stages of the biological passport. This is a huge 
project in the fight against doping and I think we should move forward in a careful way. We 
must be patient and be assured that we have sufficient information at our disposal to put it 
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in place. This year was a start-up phase. We tried to get maximum information about the 
riders carrying in particular out of competition controls. Unfortunately we are often looking 
for them to be able to do these tests…”288 
 
In October 2008, after UCI’s decision to authorise Lance Armstrong to participate in the 
2009 Tour down Under, article 77 of UCI’s 2008 ADR was amended after receiving 
approval from the Management Committee by a vote at the end of December 2008.  Under 
the new provision, article 84 in the 2009 ADR that entered into force on 1 January 2009, 
a rider was required to give 6 months’ notice of his intention to return to competition and 
to make himself available for out-of-competition testing for a period of 4 months.  
 
On 4 December 2008, Lance Armstrong held an online press conference from the Astana 
team’s training camp in Tenerife, Canary Islands, during which he expressed his interest 
in riding the Tour of Ireland.289  
 
In January 2009, available documentation shows that UCI had difficulty organising a 
sample collection for Lance Armstrong because of inconsistent information regarding his 
whereabouts. 
 
On 29-30 January 2009, in the minutes of the UCI Management Committee meeting under 
the section on “UCI Pro Tour”, it is recorded that Mike Turtur, organiser of the Tour Down 
Under stated that the Tour Down Under was a real success as there was very good media 
coverage and the public came in great numbers, notably because of the presence of Lance 
Armstrong. The President then recalled that UCI had authorised Lance Armstrong to go 
back to competition before the date set by article 77 of UCI’s 2008 ADR to enable him to 
participate in the Tour Down Under. He then specified that Lance Armstrong had been 
the object of many anti-doping controls and that the fight against cancer campaign led by 
Lance Armstrong was a great success in Australia.  
 
                                                     
288 Eurosport, “Gripper: ‘Le passeport est en phase finale’”, (9 Oct. 2008) (translation from French). 
Available: http://www.eurosport.fr/cyclisme/story_sto1722170.shtml.  
289 Cycling Weekly, “Armstrong to ride Tour of Ireland?” (4 Dec. 2008). Available: 
http://www.cyclingweekly.co.uk/news/latest-news/armstrong-to-ride-tour-of-ireland-91547. 
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On 22 February 2009, Livestrong announced that the launch of the first Livestrong Global 
Cancer Summit would take place in Dublin on 24-26 August 2009 following Lance 
Armstrong's participation in the Tour of Ireland, from 19-23 August 2009.  
 
From March onwards, documents in CIRC’s possession show that the Tour of Ireland race 
organisation was struggling to complete the budget. Consequently in June 2009, when the 
organisation was still €250,000 short, the UCI President asked Lance Armstrong if he 
knew any US contacts who would take up a sponsorship package.  On 2 July 2009, Alan 
Rushton, Tour of Ireland race Director advised Pat McQuaid that due to a 50% reduction 
in the amount of their main sponsor funding that year, they had decided to reduce the 
length of the Tour that year to 3 days, a decision which greatly disappointed Pat McQuaid.    
 
On 21-23 August 2009, the Tour of Ireland was held and on 24-26 August 2009 the 
Livestrong Global Cancer Summit took place in Dublin.  Pat McQuaid, his wife and mother 
were Lance Armstrong’s special guests at the Summit’s dinner. The day after, Pat 
McQuaid thanked Lance Armstrong for the invitation and particularly for “his gracious 
words’”, which were very much appreciated by his mother, as well as for “the Nike 
assistance”.  
 
In an interview with the North Queensland Register dated 18 October 2012,290 the former 
UCI Anti-Doping Manager Anne Gripper stated about the Lance Armstrong comeback: ''I 
have always said that Armstrong's influence was a danger in the sport. He was allowed to 
ride in the 2009 Tour Down Under. He shouldn't have been. Once again, for Lance, special 
consideration was provided. The justification was that [former South Australia premier] 
Mike Rann and [race director] Mike Turtur had announced to the whole people of South 
Australia that Lance was going to be there. For the UCI to say, 'Sorry, he can't, would have 
appeared churlish and mean-spirited and really what difference do 13 days make? ''For me, 
it was a case of, 'Well, sure 13 days may not make a lot of practical difference' but the 
perception of once again rules being different for Lance than other riders shows his 
influence was so great, he basically told the sport how to administer its rules.'' 
                                                     
290 Rupert Guinness, “Armstrong got special treatment: drug chief”, North Queensland Register (18 Oct. 
2012). Available: http://www.northqueenslandregister.com.au/news/metro/national/sport/armstrong-
got-special-treatment-drug-chief/2629561.aspx?storypage=2.  
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According to documents in the CIRC’s possession and confirmed by interviewees, Lance 
Armstrong’s decision to have his Livestrong summit in Dublin was made after his decision 
to compete in the Tour of Ireland as an excuse to explain why he was riding the Tour of 
Ireland. It would otherwise have made no sense for Lance Armstrong to take part in the 
Tour of Ireland for free. Lance Armstrong’s participation made a huge difference to such 
a small race, particularly when big races were ready to pay around a million dollars to get 
him to participate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the above facts, documents in the CIRC’s possession and information provided 
by several interviewees: 
 
 When Pat McQuaid made the decision to allow Lance Armstrong to compete in the 
Tour Down Under, UCI failed to apply its own rules by not applying Article 77 of 
the 2008 UCI ADR. In doing so, UCI damaged its reputation by sending the message 
that rules applied differently to some athletes compared to the rest of the peloton.   
 
 The decision to amend Article 77 of the 2008 UCI ADR was made after UCI gave 
Lance Armstrong permission to compete in the Tour Down Under and in order to 
enable him to compete without being in breach of the rules. Again, it is clearly not 
appropriate for a governing body to change its rules for the benefit of one of its 
stars.  It is also noted that UCI appears to have considered that because the new 
provision took effect from 1 January 2009 the rules were complied with; however, 
it appears that it failed to appreciate that Lance Armstrong had still not complied 
with the requirement to give 6 months’ notice of his intention to return to 
competition and there was therefore still a failure to apply the rules.   
 
 The Management Committee Members displayed a lack of judgement by not 
challenging the decision of the UCI President to allow Lance Armstrong an 
exemption to return to competition early. 
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 By October 2008, the ABP was being put in place and out-of-competition testing 
was not sufficiently operational for the UCI to be able to decide confidently to 
shorten the qualifying period for Lance Armstrong on the basis of an improvement 
of the level of testing.    
 
 In terms of governance, the decision to shorten the qualifying period for Lance 
Armstrong should not have been taken unilaterally by the UCI President but rather 
should have been considered by the UCI Management Committee. This is 
particularly so given the political implications for the UCI as an institution, the 
President’s own acute awareness of the problems that would arise if Armstrong 
was allowed to race, and the advice of UCI administration to its President to follow 
the rules. 
 
 UCI and particularly the President missed an opportunity to demonstrate that the 
organisation was committed to applying its own rules and to stamp its authority 
on the sport, which would have generated greater respect.   
 
Without detracting from the comments above, it is however noted that Lance Armstrong 
put UCI in a difficult situation by publicising his participation in the Tour Down Under 
after having been informed that he was not eligible to participate. As a result, UCI was in 
the position that whichever decision it took, it would have been criticised by either the 
Tour Down Under organisers, the South Australian government, the public in Australia 
and Lance Armstrong for being too strict or by WADA and the media for amending their 
rules to favour of Lance Armstrong.  
 
CIRC has considered all the evidence and whilst there is no direct evidence of an 
agreement between Lance Armstrong and Pat McQuaid, documents in the CIRC’s 
possession show a temporal link between the two decisions: in the morning Pat McQuaid 
told UCI staff that he had changed his mind and decided to let Lance Armstrong 
participate in the Tour Down Under, and that same evening Lance Armstrong told Pat 
McQuaid that he had decided to participate in the Tour of Ireland. 
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2.4.3. Allegations concerning the preferential treatment of certain riders 
 
2.4.3.1. Allegations concerning the preferential treatment of Lance Armstrong by 
the UCI leadership 
 
Several sources, notably UCI staff and former UCI staff, reported that the UCI leadership 
had on several occasions “defended” or “protected” Lance Armstrong or taken favourable 
positions towards Lance Armstrong indicating that he had received preferential 
treatment. Among the explanations given to the CIRC was the UCI's promotion of a 
“celebrity rider” after the Festina scandal. The idea was to shine a spotlight on the sport 
through its best athletes, like the “people’s heroes” such as Lance Armstrong. The Vrijman 
report was one example of this policy. 
 
The Vrijman Report 
 
The “Vrijman Report” was prepared by Emile Vrijman,291 a former director of the 
Netherlands Centre for Doping Affairs who was appointed by UCI to conduct an 
independent investigation following the publication on 23 August 2005 in the French 
newspaper L’Équipe. The article reported that drug test results from the 1999 Tour 
showed that Lance Armstrong tested positive for the prohibited substance EPO. The 
positive test was identified in the course of a research project by the French Laboratory 
of Châtenay-Malabry (“LNDD”). Emile Vrijman commenced the investigation in early 
October 2005.  His report was released to the public on 1 June 2006.  
 
Available information shows that following the publication of the L’Équipe article, WADA 
urged UCI to conduct an enquiry into the allegations and offered its assistance. However, 
UCI focused instead on investigating issues regarding potential breaches of the relevant 
rules and procedures and how confidential information became public.  Considerable 
tension between UCI and WADA ensued, such that by 16 September 2005, UCI had 
engaged UK lawyers to consider potential legal proceedings against Dick Pound,  as 
suggested to UCI by the Lance Armstrong’s  team at the beginning of September. 
                                                     
291 Emile Vrijman was invited to speak to CIRC, but did not respond.  
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On 5 October 2005, WADA informed UCI that it would be conducting its own 
investigation. The following day, after Lance Armstrong’s agent, Bill Stapleton, assisted 
UCI in drafting a press release, UCI announced its decision to conduct an independent 
investigation, and to appoint Emile Vrijman.292 The press release stated that Emile 
Vrijman would conduct a comprehensive investigation regarding all issues arising out of 
the testing conducted by the LNDD. 
 
On 9 November 2005, in response to a request from WADA for an “official mandate 
indicating [Vrijman’s] jurisdiction and terms of reference”, the UCI issued a Letter of 
Authority to Emile Vrijman.  That letter appointed Vrijman “to undertake an independent 
and comprehensive inquiry” regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
LNDD’s analysis of the 1998 and 1999 Tour urine samples and “the subsequent alleged 
adverse analytical findings”. The Letter of Authority was provided by Emile Vrijman to the 
relevant parties (WADA, the LNDD, the French Ministry of Sport and Lance Armstrong) 
in the course of making his enquiries with them. Significantly, when the Letter of 
Authority was sent to Emile Vrijman, it was accompanied by a separate message from UCI 
President Pat McQuaid, a message which was not provided to the interested parties or 
otherwise published. That fax message directed Emile Vrijman that “this investigation 
must clearly be restricted to the formal irregularities which have led to the revelations [in 
L’Équipe]”. It could potentially be read from the message that UCI’s primary concern was 
not to examine the veracity of the allegations and the consequences that derive thereof, 
but rather to restrict the inquiry from the outset to procedural issues and alleged 
breaches committed by other stakeholders. Pat McQuaid’s direction to Emile Vrijman 
appears to contradict the undertaking that he gave to WADA on 29 September 2005 and 
6 October 2005 to the effect that “[t]he UCI is concerned [with]…investigating all aspects 
of this case”.  It was equally in contradiction with Emile Vrijman’s proposition to the UCI 
that, among other matters, the reliability of the EPO test used by the LNDD should 
be examined.      
 
                                                     
292 UCI press release dated 6 October 2005. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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The Vrijman Report drafting process was protracted over several months between 
January and May 2006, before its distribution to the relevant parties on 31 May 2006 and 
its “official” release on 1 June 2006.  UCI had originally set Emile Vrijman a deadline of 3 
months from November 2005, informing him that his conclusions were expected by the 
end of January 2006. It is to be noted that Hein Verbruggen had commenced IOC ethics 
proceedings against Dick Pound in December 2005 and that a mediation between Hein 
Verbruggen and Dick Pound in relation to the IOC proceedings was due to take place in 
Torino on 14 February 2006. It appears that the original plan was to have Vrijman’s 
report ready for that meeting with Dick Pound. 
 
During the drafting process UCI repeatedly placed pressure on Emile Vrijman to complete 
the report and, later, purported to terminate his contract on at least two occasions by 
reason of his delay and a loss of confidence in him. Hein Verbruggen and Lon 
Schattenberg met with Emile Vrijman on 16 January 2006. As a result of those 
discussions, it was determined that Emile Vrijman would now prepare two reports: 
namely, an “interim report” or “preliminary report” and a “final report”.  Later that week, 
Emile Vrijman provided the UCI with his preliminary findings and a draft table of contents 
for both reports.  
 
On 3 February 2006, Emile Vrijman sent “a copy of the confidential preliminary report in 
the matter of the analysis of the urine samples from the 1999 Tour de France by the French 
WADA-accredited doping control laboratory” to the UCI. The preliminary report 
comprised 16 pages and only dealt with matters associated with the LNDD’s research.  
Emile Vrijman concluded that “even under the presumption that the measurement results 
are regarded as reliable and trustworthy, they can absolutely not be regarded as proof in 
the context of doping control.  Therefore, the positives do not qualify as adverse analytical 
findings”. This first version of the report contains no references to WADA’s role in relation 
to the research or to communication that may have taken place between WADA and the 
LNDD. 
 
The preliminary report was subsequently revised by Lance Armstrong’s lawyer, Mark 
Levinstein, in collaboration with Emile Vrijman, during the following week. Emile 
Vrijman had personally sent Mark Levinstein a soft copy of the report.  Mark Levinstein 
185 
 
inserted substantial amounts of text into the interim report to make it more critical of 
WADA and criticising in detail the credibility of the LNDD’s methods and procedures from 
a doping control perspective, citing numerous alleged deficiencies and inconsistencies. 
Mark Levinstein’s second mark-up of the report included an entirely new section to the 
report entitled “Confidentiality”. This section was highly critical of Dick Pound and 
Jacques De Ceaurriz, the then Director of the LNDD.  In addition, this version of the report 
concluded with a list of 20 questions that needed to be answered which concerned 
specifics about the LNDD’s research and the communications between the LNDD, 
WADA and the French government in its regard. Mark Levinstein provided his mark-ups 
of the interim report to Hein Verbruggen on 8 and 9 February 2006, respectively.   
 
On 24 February 2006, Emile Vrijman informed UCI that the final version of the 
preliminary report would be sent by fax the following day, and that it would comprise a 
total of 55 pages. However, Emile Vrijman did not send anything through and by 17 
March, Emile Vrijman explained that he no longer intended to issue a “first report” and 
suggested instead, “to ensure that all relevant parties are dealt with in an equal manner 
and to avoid any discussion regarding the independent nature of the investigation”, 
he would request further information and materials from the LNDD and WADA, await 
their response, and then issue a final report. 
 
By letter dated 20 March 2006, the UCI purported to terminate Emile Vrijman’s mandate. 
Notwithstanding UCI’s notice of termination, Vrijman continued to work on the report, 
liaising with Mark Levinstein regarding recent correspondence he had received from the 
LNDD and WADA.   
 
In April 2006, Philippe Verbiest started reviewing a draft of the final report prepared by 
Emile Vrijman. Specifically, he set out a number of observations on the report structure 
and attached a marked-up report. Philippe Verbiest was careful to state that his 
comments and amendments were “suggestions…submitted to [Vrijman for his] 
consideration”. 
 
Dick Pound had been advised that the final report had been received by the UCI and on 
18 April 2006 he followed up with a request for a copy of the report to be provided 
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to him, but that request was ignored.  Dick Pound also requested the draft copy that Hein 
Verbruggen claimed to have had in his possession at the mediation in February 2006.  
Hein Verbruggen responded to Dick Pound by expressly stating that he “had NO draft copy 
of any report from the independent investigator”. 
 
Hein Verbruggen then proceeded to draft an executive summary of the report for which 
he received extensive input from Mark Levinstein. Between 22 and 29 April 2006, Emile 
Vrijman and Philippe Verbiest exchanged further drafts of the report as both of them 
continued to work on it.  Philippe Verbiest introduced several portions of new text into 
the report and made numerous suggestions for changes, additions and corrections 
throughout (although his view was that he was merely providing information and it was 
for Emile Vrijman to determine what to include in the report). 
 
On 29 April 2006, Emile Vrijman sent a final draft report to UCI for its review 
and comment. Hein Verbruggen responded on 30 April 2006 by expressing “a very 
disappointing feeling” advising Vrijman that: “The only party you really dare to tackle with 
hard hitting conclusions is the UCI.  You are running with such an incredible bow around 
WADA that I am asking myself if they are the client…”  
 
Hein Verbruggen reiterated his total disappointment with the report to Mark Levinstein, 
stating that the report was totally unacceptable “since there is no one definite conclusion 
in the whole report about the very doubtful role that WADA has played”. He adds that “there 
is full evidence that Dick Pound has been targeting [Lance Armstrong] and they just dodge 
any conclusion in that direction”. Mark Levinstein reassured Hein Verbruggen confirming 
that he spoke to Emile Vrijman and that he would work with him. 
 
During the following week, Mark Levinstein and Philippe Verbiest continued to 
collaborate with Emile Vrijman, providing him with further comments, suggestions and 
input. By 9 May 2006, Hein Verbruggen insisted to Emile Vrijman and Mark Levinstein 
that the report be ready by the next day given that the WADA Board was due to meet that 
weekend. On 11 May 2006, when the proposed deadline passed, Hein Verbruggen 
terminated Emile Vrijman’s contract on behalf of the UCI. Mark Levinstein reiterated that 
he would work with Emile Vrijman to help him complete the report. Bill Stapleton sought 
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to reassure Hein Verbruggen that the report was good and that: “[T]he document is going 
after WADA as I know you (and we) want them to do and as they should.”  
 
Finally, on 31 May 2006, a pdf version of the final report was emailed to all of the 
interested parties and the “official version” was published the following day.  The same 
day, Lance Armstrong commented in the press on the results of the investigation by 
thanking the investigator and his staff “for all their hard work and diligence in this process’. 
He added that he ‘had not had an opportunity to study the report yet”. 293 
 
Emile Vrijman did not give UCI notice of his intention to publish the report. Hein 
Verbruggen informed Emile Vrijman on 1 June 2006 that UCI had no option but to publish 
the report on its own website but that would not change the UCI’s position regarding the 
termination of his contract and the issue of outstanding bills. 
 
Lastly, during the lead-up to the UCI Presidential elections, on 19 July 2013, Pat McQuaid 
wrote to Paul Scholten in his capacity as UCI President. In the letter, he asked Paul 
Scholten to make a statement or send a letter which Pat McQuaid could forward to the 
UCI Management Committee. The statement/letter should include confirmation that the 
Vrijman report was compiled independently from the UCI, that Lance Armstrong’s 
lawyers wrote no part of the report, and that indications to the contrary would lead to 
legal action against any party that suggested it. Paul Scholten replied by letter that Emile 
Vrijman was solely responsible for the content and conclusions, logically because it was 
called “The Vrijman Report”. He further stated that when Emile Vrijman had told him that 
suggestions had been made to Emile Vrijman to put [information] into the report, he had 
warned Emile Vrijman to stay independent, but could not confirm whether he had 
precisely done that. He stated he reserved his rights regarding any allegations made 
against himself. Finally he stated that UCI refused to pay his invoices until settlement at 
arbitration, that he had never received monies from Lance Armstrong’s “camp”, and 
stated he had sacked Emile Vrijman immediately after the arbitration proceeding.294 
                                                     
293 Velo News, “UCI, Armstrong and WADA react to Vrijman Report” (31 May 2006). Available: 
http://velonews.competitor.com/2006/05/news/uci-armstrong-and-wada-react-to-vrijman-
report_9933#0yH7GYoTXcmVX6BM.99 
294 This is all the more surprising since on 25 September 2006, Paul Scholten wrote to UCI concerning the 
continuing dispute over fees for the Vrijman report. He stated that in relation to the extensive amount of 
correspondence between UCI and Emile Vrijman during the investigation and report drafting period, he 
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Based on information available to the CIRC, the Commission is of the view that: 
 
 The UCI purposely limited the scope of the independent investigator’s mandate to 
procedural issues contrary to what they told stakeholders and the public, and in 
contradiction to Emile Vrijman’s own suggestion. The CIRC agrees with the 
consensus that the research results of the LNDD could not have been used for 
disciplinary purposes; it is true that this was not a positive test, but it raised strong 
indications of doping and should have been followed up (e.g., re-test other 
samples, target test, launch investigations). However, UCI specifically excluded 
from Emile Vrijman’s mandate an examination of the EPO test, meaning that the 
allegation that Lance Armstrong used EPO during the 1999 Tour could not be 
directly considered.  
 
 UCI, together with the Armstrong team, became directly and heavily involved in 
the drafting of the Vrijman report, the purpose of which was only partly to 
expedite the publication of the report. The main goal was to ensure that the report 
reflected UCI’s and Lance Armstrong’s personal conclusions. The significant 
participation of UCI and Armstrong’s team was never publicly acknowledged, and 
was consistently denied by Hein Verbruggen.  
 
 Emile Vrijman failed to exert his independence and demonstrated a serious lack 
of impartiality: firstly, by allowing UCI and Armstrong’s team to define the scope 
of the mandate and letting them add to, and redact large parts of his “independent” 
report, secondly, by not giving all parties the same opportunities to contribute to 
the investigation or to comment on the report and, thirdly, by not disclosing the 
true facts to the public. 
 
 UCI had no intention of pursuing an independent report. UCI leadership failed to 
respect the independence of the investigator they commissioned by restricting the 
mandate of the investigator, allowing the primary subject of the investigation to 
                                                     
did not think it was in UCI’s interest to show this correspondence to the outside world, especially to 
WADA and to Dick Pound in particular. 
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participate in the drafting of the report and, by constantly influencing the content 
of the investigator’s work and the conclusions reached. This is again consistent 
with UCI leadership’s approach of prioritising the fight against WADA and the 
protection of its star athlete.  
 
Separately, the Commission notes that the leak of information (e.g., results from the 
laboratory and Lance Armstrong doping control forms) that led to the L’Équipe article 
was unacceptable and in breach of the athlete’s privacy rights. This breach was repeated 
in 2013 during the hearings of the French Senate when a list was published with the 
names of dozens of riders with positive EPO samples during the 1998 and 1999 Tours, 
which were identified in the course of the 2004 research project by the LNDD. 
 
However, it should also be emphasised that without the voluntary disclosure of the 
sample collection forms from UCI to L’Équipe, no link could ever have been made between 
Lance Armstrong and the analysis of the samples. Thus the CIRC is of the view that the 
speculation by UCI leadership that the incident was staged by third parties to attack UCI 
or UCI leadership is highly unlikely.  
 
On the subject of the "Vrijman" affair, an additional opinion was expressed in the 
Commission by its President Dick Marty, which if not different is at least supplementary.  
 
Consequently, it seems necessary to reiterate the circumstances of this affair. This could 
allow a different assessment of the facts described above. While it is true that the drafting 
of the report has clearly shown the existence of inappropriate preferential relationships 
between certain members of the UCI leadership and Lance Armstrong, the circumstances 
that can be described, at the very least, as disquieting at the root of the affair should not 
be overlooked: 
- Between 2004 and 2005, for scientific purposes the Châtenay-Malabry laboratory 
conducted analyses of samples that had been taken during the 1998 and 1999 Tours de 
France: this research was conducted in agreement with WADA to test a new positivity 
criterion for EPO. 
- Informed of the positive outcome of several tests as early as February 2005, WADA 
informed the laboratory that it would be interested to receive the results of these 
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analyses as well as the code numbers of the samples. The laboratory accepted this on the 
express condition that WADA would not use the results for disciplinary proceedings. 
- Scientific research carried out on human material must be carried out while respecting 
the strictest conditions of anonymity. The laboratory manifestly displayed a certain 
negligence by retaining the same sample numbers that had been used at the time of 
sampling: this allowed the potential identification of the athletes concerned which 
represented a breach of the accepted rules in the scientific domain. 
- The identification of Lance Armstrong was, in fact, only possible following a breach of 
medical confidentiality (or at least professional confidentiality). The analyses had been 
conducted for scientific purposes rather than for anti-doping proceedings and this of 
course engaged the matter of privacy. 
- The identification of Lance Armstrong was possible by at least two different means. A 
journalist from L’Équipe requested the UCI for access to the forms drawn up at the time 
of the doping control. According to the journalist, this was to verify that Armstrong had 
not used doping substances prescribed by his doctor following his cancer during his 
return to competition. When requested, Armstrong gave his consent in the knowledge 
that no doping substances had been prescribed or listed on the form. However, this was 
not the journalist's real motivation. He was actually interested in the control number on 
the form. During interviews, the journalist admitted to having knowledge of the results 
of the analyses. By showing these forms to the journalist, UCI executives displayed a 
certain carelessness, if not considerable naivety. Furthermore, Lance Armstrong's 
agreement did not represent informed consent as would be required in such 
circumstances. We will not draw any conclusions on the ethical nature of the journalist's 
behaviour. 
- For completeness, it should also be reiterated that the French Ministry of Health, Youth 
Affairs and Sport – to which, in the organisational hierarchy, the laboratory reported – 
also possessed the identification numbers from the 1998 and 1999 samples. The Minister 
in question at the time was Jean-François Lamour, a member of the WADA Committee, 
then Vice-President and potential presidential candidate (however, following 
controversy over his sporting career, he ultimately declined to stand).  
- In any event, upon learning – following an unauthorised leak – that the samples from 
the prologue of the 1999 Tour had been discovered to be positive in the scope of scientific 
research conducted by the French laboratory, it was not difficult to implicate Armstrong. 
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The US rider had won the prologue and as a result had been subject to an anti-doping test 
(it should be recalled that at the time EPO was not detectable and was very widely used 
in the peloton). All the tests from the prologue had returned positive results. 
- According to one testimony, the publication of the article by L’Équipe had been delayed 
upon the express request of the Minister to avoid it occurring before or during the 2005 
Tour. The article was published on 23 August 2005 and WADA, in its press release at the 
time, confirmed that the laboratory had sent it the results on 22 August and that it had 
acknowledged these on 25 August. According to the USADA decision regarding 
Armstrong, it appears that the French laboratory conducted the analyses on the 
Armstrong samples between November 2004 and March 2005. In the same press release, 
WADA mentioned the 15 forms obtained by the journalist; these were then personally 
shown to Hein Verbruggen by Dick Pound. 
- It is furthermore rather significant that among the positive retroactive analyses for EPO, 
the leaks had only targeted Lance Armstrong; eight years later, other names would come 
to light (and not insignificant ones!). In revealing the names during the hearing of the 
French Senate Commission, the laboratory director said: “There were so many positive 
results (for EPO) that I thought that our test should be completely reviewed ...” The leak and 
publication by l’Équipe however only targeted Armstrong. 
 
This affair attracted a huge amount of publicity – yet it was known, or should have been 
known, from the very start, that no sanctions could arise (as it lay outside any anti-doping 
procedure). The affair gave rise to genuine feelings of unease, especially when taking into 
account the serious conflicts that at that time existed between the UCI on the one hand 
and WADA (at least at executive level), the French Anti-Doping Agency and ASO 
(belonging to the same group as L’Équipe) on the other. Such indiscretions (not forgetting 
what happened in the Contador case) certainly do not contribute to the credibility and 
standing of the anti-doping structures. This is certainly not to defend riders who have 
doped, but an effective fight against doping cannot be conducted by endorsing targeted 
leaks in the press, in this way indirectly legitimising the existence of the underlying 
infringements, rather than strongly condemning such leaks from the outset. If this 
information had been dealt with while respecting the necessary discretion, it would also 
have been easier to put in place a more effective surveillance of Lance Armstrong. It must 
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not be forgotten, as seems to have been the case, that several other riders were 
retroactively discovered to be positive. 
 
Other examples of a favoured treatment by the UCI leadership towards Lance 
Armstrong 
 
According to several sources, this policy of “favours” towards Lance Armstrong started in 
1999 with UCI's intervention when Lance Armstrong tested positive for corticosteroids 
during the Tour. After the positive result for Lance Armstrong had been made public in 
French newspapers, UCI issued a justification in a press release defending the American 
cyclist. For many, it would have been catastrophic for the 1999 Tour if the yellow jersey 
had been disqualified. The 1999 Tour had been marketed as the “Tour of Renewal” 
following the host of doping scandals related to the 1998 edition. Lance Armstrong 
himself considered the UCI's intervention a favour. 
 
Lance Armstrong was of course entitled to the benefit of the fundamental principle of the 
presumption of innocence, and it is true that he was subject to extensive testing by the 
various anti-doping agencies. The fact remains however, that there were several serious 
indications that suggested the use of doping substances and which should have led UCI 
to be more circumspect in their dealings with him and to actively target-test him. 
 
These doping suspicions included, in particular: the revelations of June 2001 that Lance 
Armstrong was working with Dr Michele Ferrari; Lance Armstrong's two suspect test 
results for EPO of June 2001 and June 2002; publication of a journalist’s book in 2004 and 
the assertions of Lance Armstrong's masseuse Emma O'Reilly on his doping practices;295 
L’Équipe August 2005 revelations of positive EPO tests for Lance Armstrong in the 1999 
Tour; disclosures in September 2006 by Frankie Andreu, Lance Armstrong's teammate, 
that he was doping while in the USPS team; Floyd Landis's admission of doping in 2010 
and his accusations against his former teammate; the testimony of Tyler Hamilton and 
other former USPS riders and their doping confessions to the Federal Grand Jury; 
accusations of doping made against Lance Armstrong by Tyler Hamilton in the “60 
                                                     
295 Pierre Ballester & David Walsh, “L.A. Confidentiel Les Secrets de Lance Armstrong” (in French) (2004). 
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Minutes” TV programme in May 2011; the opening of a formal investigation into Lance 
Armstrong by USADA in July 2012. 
 
The suspicions of doping were sufficient to justify a policy of target testing of Lance 
Armstrong by all competent agencies. UCI should also have maintained a certain distance 
from, and been circumspect in its relations with the athlete.   
 
However, on the basis of interviews and an analysis of documents in our possession, the 
CIRC considers that certain former presidents actually initiated a special relationship 
with Lance Armstrong and failed to establish a more distant relationship, which would 
have been more prudent given his status as an athlete and because of the suspicions of 
doping that persisted. Special consideration was allowed for Lance Armstrong and, to 
return the favour, Lance Armstrong was used in UCI's battles against various third parties 
on different fronts.   
 
 With regards to the suspect test results for Lance Armstrong in 2001 and 2002, 
several interviewees reported that Lon Schattenberg's attitude was to say that the 
results were “not possible” and to call the reliability of the EPO test into question. 
It would seem that he found it impossible to believe that a cancer survivor could 
resort to doping, as one CIRC source reported. The CIRC has not found any 
evidence to show that, following Lance Armstrong's two suspect EPO tests of 2001 
and 2002, the UCI established a policy of targeting Lance Armstrong in order to 
determine whether he was in fact doping. On the contrary, the UCI asked the 
director of the Lausanne laboratory to explain the EPO test method at a meeting, 
a request which was not made for other athletes.  
 
 Internal communications and testimony show that Lance Armstrong was 
considered as a veritable icon by the institution: a cancer survivor who had 
managed to beat his disease, helped the sport to recover and to return some 
credibility to UCI after the difficult post-Festina years for cycling.  One source said 
that in defending Lance Armstrong, the UCI wanted to defend the icon of cycling 
and thus the sport itself. This “admiration” is visible in the words of the former 
UCI President who in a letter to the President of the French Cycling Federation in 
194 
 
2008 said that he was particularly proud of maintaining good relations with a man 
whom Time Magazine had recently included in its list of the 100 most influential 
heroes and pioneers of our time. It must be recognised that the vast majority of 
the sports world and the media, not to mention important political figures, shared 
this admiration and this enthusiasm for the Texan rider. 
 
 On numerous occasions Lance Armstrong was asked by UCI to send letters of 
support or gifts or to meet people suffering from cancer whom they knew. 
Personal favours were also asked such as requests for Nike watches for the family 
members of a former UCI President. Lance Armstrong’s financial assistance was 
also requested on several occasions, whether directly in April 2008 to finance the 
ABP with a payment of USD 100,000 or indirectly to assist in securing sponsors to 
finance cycling events or UCI itself. UCI also accepted two donations from Lance 
Armstrong for the fight against doping. 
 
 The documents in our possession show that in the dispute between Hein 
Verbruggen and Dick Pound, the UCI President sought Lance Armstrong's 
assistance to support him. On 22 July 2002, he attached an email from Lance 
Armstrong to his letter of resignation from the WADA Foundation Board. In 
February 2004, together with Lance Armstrong's agent, Hein Verbruggen 
coordinated the drafting and publication of an open letter from Lance Armstrong 
to Dick Pound in response to an interview with the WADA President in the 
newspaper Le Monde on 28 January 2004.  
 
 The documents confirm that UCI requested Lance Armstrong's assistance in its 
struggle with ASO, in particular asking him to sign a letter of support for the UCI 
ProTour in 2007.  
 
 As discussed earlier in the report, UCI made an exception to its ADR to allow Lance 
Armstrong, then seven-time winner of the Tour, to return to competition at the 
Tour Down Under in January 2009, before he was legally entitled to participate in 
an international event. 
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The CIRC has also gathered information demonstrating that Lance Armstrong sought the 
assistance of UCI on several occasions and made use of his privileged relationship with 
the UCI leadership to his own advantage.  
 
 Before the 2003 Tour, as well as in 2009, Lance Armstrong informed UCI of the 
dangers of drugs prevalent in the peloton such as synthetic haemoglobin (HBOC) 
and AICAR. According to a source, several riders achieved incredible 
performances in 2003, in particular during the Critérium du Dauphiné Libéré, and 
Lance Armstrong felt threatened before the Tour. UCI had already informed riders 
at the end of January 2003 that synthetic haemoglobin could now be detected and 
before the start of the Tour sent a letter to all riders reiterating the detection 
method for synthetic haemoglobin by means of a free plasma haemoglobin test. 
According to the same source, this warning to the riders had the effect that those 
who, two weeks previously, had been performing very well at the Critérium du 
Dauphiné Libéré, produced normal performances at the Tour (although the CIRC 
has not been able to corroborate this).   
 
 In 2004, Lance Armstrong's lawyers contacted UCI on two occasions to obtain 
statements and/or affidavits in support of Lance Armstrong in two legal cases: the 
first involved Lance Armstrong against The Times newspaper, David Walsh and 
Alan English and the second involved Lance Armstrong and the company SCA 
Promotions. In both cases, UCI worked with the rider's lawyers to respond to 
accusations of doping and defend the effectiveness of UCI's anti-doping policy.  
 
 On 12 June 2012, as a result of the enquiry conducted by the American judicial 
authorities, USADA announced the opening of disciplinary proceedings against 
Lance Armstrong and five of his associates: Johan Bruyneel, Michele Ferrari, Luis 
del Moral, Pedro Celaya and Pepe Marti. A review of documents in our possession 
from June 2012 shows that UCI had no intention of contesting USADA's 
jurisdiction over the Lance Armstrong case, as clearly expressed in an analysis of 
the situation by Philippe Verbiest sent to Pat McQuaid on 23 June 2012: “It may be 
a witch hunt but it may also be a hunt that is based on evidence that the witch is 
guilty indeed and we have to be careful with this as any criticism of the USADA 
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process may be explained as UCI further aiding doping and dopers and further 
protecting LA. This may be lethal if it is shown indeed that LA doped. In my view UCI 
should remain neutral. I agree this is a difficult exercise: for the sake of the image 
UCI has an interest that LA is acquitted as otherwise UCI will be seen as not having 
done its job properly and as having ‘protected’ LA. In addition the whole LA period, 
cycling’s pop star and above all cycling’s credibility will be in the drains. On the other 
hand, for the sake of the fight against doping UCI cannot object (or be seen to object) 
to the truth coming out.” This sums up the UCI's attitude to Lance Armstrong 
during his racing years.  
 
From 27 June 2012, Lance Armstrong's lawyer sent several messages to UCI 
setting out why UCI had jurisdiction over the alleged breaches of the ADR by his 
client.  On 9 July 2012, he sent UCI the pleadings made before the US District Court 
for the Western District of Texas on behalf of Lance Armstrong indicating that UCI 
had jurisdiction over the rider's alleged breaches of the UCI ADR.  
 
In an interview with Cyclingnews on 11 July 2012, Pat McQuaid confirmed the 
UCI's policy of neutrality in the Lance Armstrong case. At the start of stage 10 of 
the Tour in Macon, McQuaid told Cyclingnews that the sport’s universal governing 
body had next to nothing to do with a doping case surrounding seven time winner 
of the Tour, Lance Armstrong. “I’ve read what they’ve said but as they’re not licence 
holders so I don’t know how they can ban them or what they can be banned for,” he 
told Cyclingnews. “I don’t want to comment. The UCI has already said that we’re not 
involved in this investigation and our last press release we said we would not 
comment. So don’t ask me. If you want to talk about it ask USADA, not me.”  
 
Two days later, on 13 July 2012, UCI informed USADA that UCI had authority over 
the management of the results in the case against Lance Armstrong and five 
respondents and as such had the right to receive the entire dossier and to decide 
after examination if there were grounds to open disciplinary proceedings. The 
arguments put forward by UCI were, according to USADA, the same as those 
advanced by Lance Armstrong's lawyers in their pleadings of 9 July.  
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UCI was in frequent communication with Lance Armstrong and/or his lawyers 
between June and September 2012.  
 
On 22 October 2012, the UCI President said in a press conference: “The UCI will 
not appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport and it will recognise the sanctions 
that USADA has proposed. The UCI will ban Lance Armstrong from cycling and the 
UCI will strip him of his seven titles. Lance Armstrong has no place in cycling." 
 
In light of the above, there are numerous examples that prove that Lance Armstrong 
benefited from a preferential status afforded by the UCI leadership.  These favours were 
granted to him because he was considered the greatest cyclist and moreover the people’s 
hero as a cancer survivor.   As one source summarises, “the UCI chose business to be the 
priority for the sport. The primary concern was the commercial and international 
development of cycling and the arrival of Lance Armstrong was an extraordinary 
opportunity, a real success story, and the UCI closed its eyes to the rest.” Another source 
considered that within UCI, Lance Armstrong was considered “the illustration of the 
success of professional cycling and that if he fell, everyone would fall with him.”   
 
There was a tacit exchange of favours between the UCI leadership and Lance Armstrong, 
and they presented a common front against anyone who dared to attack him. As a former 
UCI employee summarised, “to defend the image of the sport, they defended the 
champions.”  
 
UCI did not try to prevent Lance Armstrong from being tested on numerous occasions. 
However, UCI did not actively seek to corroborate whether allegations of doping against 
Lance Armstrong were well founded by looking at the information at its disposal, 
cooperating with the various anti-doping authorities and listening to those individuals 
who over the years had provided an insight into the rider's doping practices. In contrast, 
UCI fell back to a defensive position as if every attack against Lance Armstrong was an 
attack against cycling and the UCI leadership.  
 
The UCI leadership did not know how to differentiate between Armstrong the hero, 
seven-time winner of the Tour, cancer survivor, huge financial and media success and a 
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role model for thousands of fans, from Lance Armstrong the cyclist, a member of the 
peloton with the same rights and obligations as any other professional cyclist. This policy 
of offering favours and defending Lance Armstrong seriously harmed the UCI's image and 
credibility despite all the efforts and dedication of its employees to fight doping. An IF 
must ensure that all sportspeople are treated equally and subject to the same rules and 
procedures. “Stars” and “heroes” must also set an example in terms of ethics and the 
respect of the rules.  
 
2.4.3.2. Allegations regarding UCI’s favourable treatment of Alberto Contador 
 
It has been reported in the press that UCI allegedly tried to cover up Alberto Contador’s 
positive test in 2010 until German TV ARD found out about it and brought it to the surface. 
 
According to interviews and UCI documents, samples collected during the Tour were sent 
to the Lausanne laboratory, with the exception of samples on 12 and 21 July 2010 where 
the top five riders of the Tour had their samples sent to the Cologne laboratory. The 
Cologne laboratory was able to undertake a more in-depth analysis for AICAR, insulin and 
clenbuterol.  
 
On 21 July 2010, a rest day following the 16th stage of the 2010 Tour, Alberto Contador 
underwent a doping test. The analyses of the urine samples revealed the presence of 
clenbuterol, a prohibited substance classified as an anabolic agent on the 2010 WADA 
Prohibited List.  
 
On 24 August 2010, UCI telephoned Alberto Contador to set up a meeting with him in 
Puertollano (Spain) on 26 August to discuss an AAF. Three UCI staff members met with 
Alberto Contador and a doctor and informed him of the ADRV. Contaminated meat eaten 
the night prior to the rest day was put forward as a possible source of contamination that 
could explain the very low level of clenbuterol found on 21 July.296  
                                                     
296 According to available information, during the FIFA World Cup, 11 players from the same team were 
found positive for a doping substance whose effects are similar to those of clenbuterol. In the country 
where the team training camp was located, those substances are used to improve the quality of meat. If 
used correctly, they should not be detectable in the meat. The anti-doping authority considered it was a 
case of contamination and did not publicise the case.  
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There are countries where clenbuterol is widely used to bolster muscle growth in cattle. 
It is also public knowledge that previous cases have arisen in China and Mexico and 
comparable cases (however not involving clenbuterol) in the USA. There were, thus, good 
reasons to investigate the matter further before making the case against Alberto 
Contador public. In his case the CAS finally came to the conclusion that the meat 
contamination scenario was less likely than the scenario that the AAF resulted from a 
contaminated nutritional supplement (for which there are also many examples in the 
past). It goes without saying that even though the meat contamination scenario is a 
possible scenario and has been accepted in other cases, each case must be decided based 
on its own specific facts and circumstances.  
 
In view of the explanation given by the rider about potential meat contamination, 
together with the extremely low concentration of clenbuterol found in Alberto Contador’s 
21 July 2010 sample and other analytical data, a discussion took place between UCI, 
WADA, experts and laboratories, and further analysis was undertaken to assess how best 
to handle the results management process.  
 
A review of UCI data shows that the UCI legal department was not in favour of opening a 
procedure on the basis of the clenbuterol finding only, given their concern about the high 
possibility of failure. WADA lawyers on the other hand maintained a procedure had to be 
opened, as it was an ADRV but agreed that further investigation needed to be undertaken 
to check if the meat contamination scenario held up.  
 
On 30 September 2010, UCI published a press release announcing that the Spanish rider 
returned an ADRV for clenbuterol during the 2010 Tour as they had been made aware 
that journalists had got news of the information.  
 
On 8 November 2010, following an investigation, UCI urged the Spanish Cycling 
Federation (RFEC) to open disciplinary proceedings against Alberto Contador for the 
contested ADRV. On 25 January 2011, the RFEC proposed a suspension of one year to 
Alberto Contador. The rider refused such proposal. On 14 February 2011, the RFEC 
acquitted Alberto Contador. On 24 March 2011, UCI filed an appeal with the CAS against 
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the decision in issue. The UCI’s appeal was followed by another appeal filed by WADA on 
29 March 2011. Both UCI and WADA requested the CAS to annul the decision of the RFEC 
and to impose on the rider a period of ineligibility of two years. On 6 February 2012, CAS 
issued its decision to sanction Alberto Contador with a two-year ban for doping and to 
strip him of the 2010 Tour title. 
 
The CIRC has found no evidence to show that UCI tried to hide the positive test of Alberto 
Contador. WADA had been informed about the positive test and was involved in the 
discussion regarding the results management of the case. 
 
Several interviewees have however explained that they found it odd that the rider was 
notified in person in his country about his ADRV as this was not the usual procedure.  The 
CIRC has not found any other example where this procedure has been followed for other 
riders.    
 
Notwithstanding the peculiarity of the case due to the very low level of clenbuterol found 
in the rider’s body and the fact that Alberto Contador was the winner of the 2010 Tour, 
the CIRC is of the opinion that the same rules and procedures should have applied to 
Alberto Contador as to all riders irrespective of his ranking and status.   
 
The CIRC again expresses concern over the different testing capacities of the laboratories, 
as this results in unequal treatment. The Cologne laboratory was at that time, the only 
laboratory capable of detecting the minuscule thresholds of clenbuterol in Alberto 
Contador’s sample. 
 
The Commission regrets again the violation of the duty of professional secrecy when the 
positive test was leaked to the press. This is yet another example that has been brought 
to the CIRC’s attention and such cases should be seriously investigated in order to respect 
the athlete’s right to privacy as well as his/her rights for due process. 
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2.5. GOVERNANCE OF UCI 
 
The good governance of sporting institutions is essential if anti-doping policies are to be 
effective. The reliability and acceptance of anti-doping policies depends on the credibility 
of the people called on to define and implement them. This means that: institutions must 
be governed by a set of clear, coherent rules; decision-making processes should be 
democratic, transparent and impartial; the choice of leaders and managers in the various 
sectors should be based on objective quality criteria; and qualified, independent bodies 
should carry out rigorous internal checks with regard to observance of the rules and the 
appropriate use of financial resources.  
 
It is common knowledge that sporting organisations have serious problems in these 
domains. The UCI is no exception. The Commission considers that shortcomings, of 
greater or lesser importance, existed both in terms of the management of the organisation 
as well as in terms of respect of its own regulations and financial scrutiny. 
 
2.5.1. Management of UCI 
 
The rapid development of UCI has already been set out above. In order to fulfil his vision 
for the UCI, Hein Verbruggen surrounded himself with trusted individuals. Certain key 
positions were allocated externally; for example for all major legal matters, medical 
issues and doping as well as financial affairs. An external management structure, 
superimposed on the institutional structure was, in fact, used to manage the UCI and to 
take the most important decisions. The main decisions concerning doping were 
principally taken by the President, lawyer Philippe Verbiest and Dr Lon Schattenberg, as 
has been described above. As a former UCI employee reported, Hein Verbruggen “was the 
Management Committee”. 
 
The CIRC is also of the view that the UCI Management Committee generally took a passive 
approach and demonstrated a lack of a critical attitude. This illustrates the weaknesses 
of the organisation in terms of its governance. Responsibility for these weaknesses and 
inappropriate decisions cannot be solely attributed to the President, but also to any 
executives who accepted the situation without speaking out. A management committee 
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has a crucial role as a counterweight and safeguard against excessive concentration of 
powers within the administration. 
 
Several people indicated that Hein Verbruggen, described as an “Executive President” or 
“Enlightened Dictator”, did not accept opposition and any potential opponents were side-
lined. They describe how Daniel Baal, President of the French Cycling Federation and UCI 
Vice-President, who many saw as a designated successor to Hein Verbruggen, was 
removed by the UCI President, in particular for his demands for the UCI to have a more 
assertive, committed anti-doping policy.  
 
The evidence available to the Commission gave a clear impression that the UCI 
management adopted a strategy of aggressive defence, a “with us or against us” strategy, 
to counter anyone who opposed the organisation, its members or favoured third parties, 
as shown by the legal proceedings initiated against Floyd Landis, Dick Pound and Paul 
Kimmage as well as disciplinary procedures against Jean Pitallier, Eric Boyer and Sylvia 
Schenk, or the threat of such procedures.  
 
This “siege mentality" can be explained in part, but not be justified, by the fact that cycling 
had become the main target of all criticism in respect of doping. These criticism were 
certainly justified but often failed to recognise what was happening in other sports. 
 
The UCI leadership also did not hesitate to resort to the politicisation of conflicts, 
involving powerful third parties such as IOC members or other political personalities in 
their disputes. For example, in his letter to the Malaysian candidate Dato Darsan Singh 
Gill before the 2005 presidential election, UCI President Hein Verbruggen informed him 
that he would send copies of their current and past correspondence to Sultan Azlan Shah 
of Malaysia “in order to correct the impression you are trying to give on the UCI and me”. 
  
2.5.2. Elections with little transparency 
 
2.5.2.1. Succession of Hein Verbruggen in 2005: A favoured candidate 
 
At the time of his re-election in 2001, Hein Verbruggen announced that he would not 
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stand for the office of UCI President again. Well before the end of his mandate in 2005, 
the President proposed Irishman Pat McQuaid as his successor. In information available 
to the CIRC, Hein Verbruggen made reference to this being approved by the Management 
Committee, although there appears to be no record of this in the minutes of meetings 
around that time. Pat McQuaid was a member of the Management Committee and 
President of the Road Commission. Hein Verbruggen offered Pat McQuaid paid work at 
the UCI for a period of approximately six months before the 2005 election, without 
making the post open to a competitive recruitment procedure and without a specific job 
description. It is the CIRC’s view that conferring this type of benefit is not in keeping with 
principles of good governance or equality of opportunity for candidates. 
 
In addition, Pat McQuaid had accepted a paid position as a consultant to the organisers of 
the 2004 Road World Championships in Verona. At that time Pat McQuaid was the 
President of the UCI Road Commission. This conflict of interest was acknowledged by 
Hein Verbruggen in a letter from him to Pat McQuaid, as in June 2003 he made a proposal 
to Pat McQuaid that his fees from Verona (EUR 85,000) should be paid to the UCI. These 
fees would then be paid back to Pat McQuaid “on the basis of an internal agreement”. The 
UCI's accounting documents show that this sum, paid to the UCI in May 2004, served to 
finance Pat McQuaid's “training” in Aigle before his election to the office of President, for 
which he received CHF 20,833 per month for seven months, plus a car and an apartment 
(at a total cost to UCI of about CHF 180,000). In the CIRC’s view these types of 
arrangements are not consistent with principles of transparency and good governance. 
As will be discussed below, Sylvia Schenk, a member of the Management Committee, 
challenged these practices and Pat McQuaid's candidature, but the CIRC has found no 
evidence that others did.  
 
It was then that Hein Verbruggen announced, after leaks to the press, his own candidature 
“in case something were to happen to Pat McQuaid…Our intentions have not changed at all 
with regards to our support for Pat and I will explain all this to you soon in Madrid.”297 The 
fear was clearly that Sylvia Schenk's claims could invalidate Pat McQuaid's candidature. 
He justified presenting his candidature to the Presidents of cycling's five Continental 
                                                     
297 Letter of 31 August 2005 sent to six members of the Management Committee. Copy on file with CIRC. 
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Confederations, telling them that the other two candidates “are not the best choice for 
being president of the UCI, be it by their background, their personality or their motivation”. 
It was a matter of preventing ASO from gaining an influence on cycling's umbrella 
organisation. One of the other two candidates for the presidency in 2005 was Gregorio 
Moreno from Spain who the outgoing President considered, rightly or wrongly, an ASO-
supported candidate. 
 
It should also be added that Hein Verbruggen was quick to promise to send the UCI's chief 
accountant to Asia to assist the President of the Asian Cycling Confederation to thwart his 
colleague Dato Darsan Singh Gill (“Thank you for your willingness of helping me in fighting 
against Mr Darshan Singh”) who he suspected of irregularities. The haste displayed by 
President Verbruggen can be better understood in light of the fact that Dato Darsan Singh 
Gill was the third candidate to the UCI Presidency. Ultimately the chief accountant did not 
go to Asia as the accounting documentation could not have been analysed in time for the 
election. 
 
Pat McQuaid was elected UCI President following a seemingly regular ballot, although 
accusations were made concerning buying of votes, which have not been proved 
(discussed in the following section) but which demonstrate the tense atmosphere at the 
time. The period before the election is however open to severe criticism and illustrates a 
clear disregard for genuinely democratic, transparent processes.  
 
Funding federations to “facilitate” the election? 
 
Hein Verbruggen, assisted by almost all of the Management Committee, made every effort 
to ensure the election of "his" candidate Pat McQuaid. One of the reasons for such 
commitment was the conflict with ASO and the fear that this organisation would get 
control over UCI. But this was not the only reason. Through Pat McQuaid, Hein 
Verbruggen could retain his predominant influence over the UCI. Furthermore, Hein 
Verbruggen was elected Vice-President, which allowed him to remain an IOC member 
until the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Several interviewees confirmed that Hein 
Verbruggen continued, for some years after the election of his successor, to exercise a 
decisive influence on major resolutions passed by the UCI. 
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                               The documents in our possession show that Hein Verbruggen organised 
a meeting with six representatives of South American NFs in Rio at the end of August 
2005 with a view to convincing them to vote for Pat McQuaid, as according to Hein 
Verbruggen the Spanish candidate was “the ASO and Vuelta candidate which means that 
they will take control of the UCI if he is elected”. Returning from his journey, Hein 
Verbruggen expressly requested the finance department to charge the expense accounts 
for these NFs, amounting to a total of CHF 13,200 (approximately EUR 10,800), to his 
private current account. However, six months after the elections, he received 
reimbursement for these expense accounts for a similar amount “deducted in error”.   
The Sylvia Schenk affair 
The conduct before Pat McQuaid’s election, in particular his paid employment for several 
months before the ballot, was severely criticised, including in public, by Sylvia Schenk, a 
member of the Management Committee. She referred the matter to the UCI Ethics 
Commission five times between 2004 and 2005, as well as once to the IOC Ethics 
Commission and once to the UCI Appeals Board. Sylvia Schenk, supported by another 
candidate to the Presidency, the Malaysian Darshan Singh, contested Pat McQuaid's 
candidature, asserting in particular that he had benefited from the unauthorised 
financing of his electoral campaign by receiving a salary from the UCI for six months 
before the ballot. The majority of the members of the Management Committee reacted by 
complaining to the Ethics Commission about Sylvia Schenk. The Ethics Committee 
declared that Sylvia Schenk had made false declarations and breached the duty of 
confidentiality applicable to all of the organisation's executives. Her appeal was rejected 
by the Appeals Board which made her liable for the payment of considerable procedural 
costs. Sylvia Schenk then turned to the Swiss civil courts. The UCI responded by 
injunctions to prevent her from continuing to make statements that it considered to be 
untrue. The proceedings concluded in February 2008 with an out-of-court settlement 
between the parties. The parties undertook not to reveal the content of this settlement. 
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This confidentiality clause has been maintained including with regards to this 
Commission.  
 
This affair is revealing of the culture that existed within UCI. The accusations raised by 
Sylvia Schenk were serious and pertinent and should have been carefully considered by 
the members of the Management Committee. The Management Committee clearly did not 
observe a culture of dialogue and dialectical debate. Finally, that this challenge should 
come from the only woman of this male-dominated assembly certainly did not make 
things any easier. It can be seen that on this occasion, the great majority of the 
Management Committee supported the action of the President's office.  
 
The Ethics Commission: independent or a facade? 
 
Documents available to the Commission show that the President of the Ethics 
Commission sent, before any formal decision, a draft ruling on the Sylvia Schenk affair to 
the UCI leadership. Such a manner of operating is entirely contrary to due process and 
severely prejudicial to the independence and credibility of the Ethics Commission. It also 
seems that, at that time at least, there were close links between certain members of the 
Commission and the UCI leadership, in particular the President. 
 
2.5.2.2. The 2013 election 
 
Pat McQuaid intended to stand in the presidential election of autumn 2013. According to 
the Constitution, candidates to the presidency must be nominated by their NF (Art. 51 of 
the Constitution). However, the Irish Federation declined to nominate Pat McQuaid as a 
candidate. Pat McQuaid then turned to the Swiss Federation (as a resident of Switzerland) 
which initially agreed but then withdrew its nomination of him. Finally it was the NFs of 
Morocco and Thailand that endorsed the candidature of the outgoing President, which 
was accompanied by a proposal to amend the Constitution to allow this to happen. The 
voting session at the UCI Congress in Florence in September 2013 thus opened in a 
climate of confusion and controversy. After long discussions on the admissibility of Pat 
McQuaid's candidature, the other candidate, Brian Cookson, invited delegates to accept 
his rival's candidature and finally proceed to a vote.  
207 
Igor Makarov, owner of the Katusha team and member of the Management Committee, 
had publicly called for Pat McQuaid not to be re-elected. Pat McQuaid was accused of 
corruption during a Management Committee meeting of June 2013. Allegations have also 
been made against the wealthy Igor Makarov that he offered the Greek federation money 
to support Brian Cookson's candidature. The matter was referred to the Ethics 
Commission which presented this information to the Congress in Florence without 
having undertaken any investigation. Subsequently, the Ethics Commission, in its new 
composition, established that this accusation was baseless. All of this offers a rather 
lamentable image of the leadership of the UCI and the Ethics Commission at this time.  
2.5.3. The casual use of financial resources 
As set out above, the UCI rapidly changed from a small, insignificant organisation into a 
major IF with qualified staff and a sizeable infrastructure of which few other sporting 
institutions can boast. The World Cycling Centre in Aigle was an excellent achievement 
for UCI at that time, both from a technical point of view and with regard to how its funding 
had been secured. However, there are several factors and incidents that cause the 
Commission to consider that the use of its financial resources has not always been as 
transparent as it should have been. UCI structure lacked an internal control mechanism 
and, above all, a Management Commission that reviews and monitors the engagement of 
financial resources. 
The Commission has noted the extensive use of cash, in particular for the reimbursement 
of expenses for meetings. It is true that for the delegates of certain countries, bank 
transfers are laborious and sometimes not even possible. However, the systematic use of 
cash on these occasions does not contribute to transparency or allow any form of effective 
monitoring. An example of how this could be used to circumvent rules was the use of cash 
payments for accommodation expenses of accompanying partners, which appears to 
have been in disregard of specific rules. 
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Another example of UCI spending money without adequate financial planning was the 
significant sum spent on the first independent commission, which was formed after the 
publication of USADA’s Reasoned Decision on the Lance Armstrong affair. Between the 
commission and the various third parties involved, including legal advisors, UCI spent 
over CHF 2 million in under 2 months. The financing of this operation was initiated by the 
UCI President without the involvement of the Management Committee. The fact that so 
much money was spent in such a short period, and that the commission was established 
in circumstances where UCI failed to lay the groundwork for a successful investigation by 
failing to gain the support of other major stakeholders (such as WADA), demonstrates 
both extremely poor management and the absence of proper financial oversight.  
 
2.5.4. Conflicts of interest 
 
The world of cycling is quite small with only about 1,000 licensed professional riders. The 
staffs of teams and federations are often made up of former riders. Everyone, or nearly 
everyone, knows everyone else. This increases the risk of cronyism and conflicts of 
interest, as depicted by some examples below. 
 
The documents in our possession show that Pat McQuaid sent e-mails to close contacts 
who were professionally active in the world of cycling, attaching confidential UCI 
documents, such as the contract between a leading rider with his team and other 
confidential information. 
 
The CIRC has already noted the consultancy post accepted by Pat McQuaid in respect of 
the organisation of the World Championships in Verona while he was President of the 
UCI Road Commission. 
 
There are five Continental Confederations (one per continent) in the UCI, each of which 
is made up of its respective NF members. The President of each Confederation has the 
right to be a member of the UCI Management Committee. According to Article 36 of the 
UCI Constitution, the vote of the NFs to elect the President of the UCI is exercised through 
voting delegates, appointed in each Continental Confederation. Each delegate must be a 
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member of a NF of the relevant Continental Confederation. There are 42 voting delegates 
in total, divided between the Continental Confederations. 
 
Igor Makarov is a member of the UCI Management Committee and at the same time is the 
owner of a professional cycling team, President of the Russian National Cycling 
Federation and a sponsor, through his company Itera, of three of the five UCI Continental 
Confederations: the African Cycling Confederation (CAC), the European Cycling Union 
(UEC) and the PanAmerican Cycling Confederation (COPACI). The sponsorship of the CAC 
and the renewal of the sponsorship of the UEC were put in place at the same time as the 
2013 presidential election. These three Confederations account for 30 voting delegates 
in the presidential election.  
 
Donations and contributions to the development of cycling need to be controlled by the 
governing body of cycling to ensure that the fundamental principles of independence and 
transparency are respected in the electoral process and to avoid a situation where the 
financing of development projects is synonymous with political influence and indirect 
vote buying.  
 
In addition, the CIRC recommends that any financial contribution of a material nature by 
any individual linked to UCI needs to be properly monitored.  
 
It is disappointing and unexplainable that Igor Makarov did not agree to meet with the 
CIRC despite repeated invitations. However, he sent four representatives for two 
separate meetings. Whilst this was of assistance to the CIRC, it finds it unacceptable that 
Igor Makarov chose not to meet with the Commission.  
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CHAPTER 3: RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The recommendations aim to assist UCI to make the changes necessary to avoid repeating 
mistakes in the future.  
 
As part of its investigation and in the context of making these recommendations, the 
Commission has taken into account reports and recommendations made by other bodies 
and interested groups, including the French Senate Report,300 WADA’s 2013 Report,301 
WADA’s Independent Observer Reports,302 and numerous national-level reports from 
federations and NADOs. The Commission has also considered recommendations for the 
future made by interviewees who spoke to CIRC. This body of work and information has 
assisted the Commission in making these recommendations and provided a foundation 
upon which to build.  
 
What is clear from the findings of this Commission is that there is no straightforward 
solution to the problem of doping in cycling. One important message that UCI and all 
stakeholders must keep to the fore is that the fight against doping is a continual process. 
Those involved in the fight against doping always have to look ahead, anticipate what 
needs to be done and be proactive. Even if UCI and other stakeholders were to implement 
these recommendations in their entirety, they must still remain vigilant and adapt as the 
doping landscape itself morphs and changes. When it comes to anti-doping, there is no 
such thing as “job done”. 
 
The recommendations are based on the CIRC’s firmly-held belief that doping should not 
be legalised since the anti-doping framework protects the very essence of sport. 
Moreover, the backbone in the fight against doping in sport must be the WADA Code and 
                                                     
300 N° 782 Sénat session extraordinaire de 2012-2013, rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête 
sur l’efficacité de la lutte contre le dopage. Available: http://www.senat.fr/rap/r12-782-2/r12-782-
21.pdf (in French). 
301 Report to WADA Executive Committee on Lack of Effectiveness of Testing Programs, published on 5 
Dec. 2013. Available: https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/world-anti-doping-program/lack-of-
effectiveness-of-testing-programs.  
302 Reports available: https://www.wada-
ama.org/en/resources/search?f%5B0%5D=field_resource_collections%3A165.  
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International Standards. The CIRC considers it inapt to compare the question of legalising 
doping with the question of legalising recreational drugs.  
 
The recommendations are arranged in the following categories:  
3.1. Legislative framework  
3.2. Operational  
3.3. Governance 
3.4. Changes to the sport  
 
3.1. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1.1. Investigative powers 
 
Primary responsibility for controlling doping in sport lies with the sporting world. Only 
subsidiary responsibility lies with governments. However, CIRC notes that major doping 
scandals were uncovered due to the investigative powers of public authorities. This is 
evidence that governments need to make use of these investigative powers. Furthermore, 
today’s doping techniques (e.g., microdosing) get harder to detect with classical 
instruments of doping control. Thus, there is a need for these investigative tools and 
information sharing between the governments and the sports movement. The CIRC 
recommends that UCI works closely together with governments/national authorities that 
make their investigative tools available to the fight against doping and that, together with 
other stakeholders, it urges other governments to have these tools in place and work 
towards closer cooperation with sports bodies on criminal matters in anti-doping. 
 
3.1.2. Corporate governance 
 
The Commission believes that governments should provide a better legal framework to 
ensure good governance in sports organisations. There appears to be a need to better 
monitor the IF’s exercising of their autonomy. This is also justified by the fact that sports 
federations are often exempt from tax and enjoy other privileges. As Switzerland is home 
to many international sports federations, it should adopt standards for the criminal 
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liability of private corruption, as envisaged by the Federal Department of Justice and 
Police in its April 2014 communiqué, “Effectively combating private corruption”.303 
 
3.1.3. Doctors 
 
In addition to serving any sport sanction, doctors who are found guilty of an ADRV should 
be investigated to determine whether they are fit to continue their general medical 
practice. The situation where doctors found guilty of supplying or administering 
prohibited substances are suspended from acting as sports doctors, but remain free to 
practice in general medicine, needs to be addressed. Anti-doping bodies should have an 
obligation to inform the doctor’s professional regulatory body that he has been 
sanctioned for a sport violation so that the regulatory body may open an investigation 
against the doctor.   
 
3.1.4. WADA Code 
 
Independent commissions are an important and necessary tool in investigating structural 
deficits in anti-doping. A commission, however, will only be able to investigate a matter 
successfully, if it has the support of all stakeholders. The CIRC has experienced some 
resistance by some stakeholders in the beginning of its operations for reasons that, 
quickly, have proven to be unjustified. The CIRC recommends to amend the WADA Code 
to provide for commissions as a tool to investigate doping scandals or monitoring 
compliance with the WADA Code. Any such commission installed by WADA or operating 
with its consent should have the cooperation of all signatories under the Code, including 
sharing information with the investigating commission.  
 
The CIRC thinks that it is worth contemplating whether the development that has been 
experienced in anti-doping on the national sporting level, i.e., to shift anti-doping away 
from national cycling federations to independent NADOs, could also be a model for 
cycling at an international level. The CIRC has observed that the development of the CADF 
goes in that direction. However, the development of the CADF in a fully independent 
                                                     
303 Available: http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/fr/home/aktuell/news/2014/2014-04-30.html (in 
French).  
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(NADO-like) entity is, at least for the moment, limited by the WADA Code that provides 
that IFs have ultimate responsibility in matters of anti-doping. CIRC recommends that 
WADA studies the possibility of fully independent anti-doping bodies, including results 
management, at international level and that such bodies would become signatories of the 
WADA Code.  
 
If an IF is not compliant with the WADA Code, the only possible sanction provided for at 
present is that it may be expelled from the Olympic Movement. The CIRC recommends 
that instead of one ultimate sanction, whose threshold is very high and which in practice 
has never been applied, the WADA Code should be amended to include a range of 
measures and sanctions for non-compliant federations. 
The CIRC has observed that “public shaming” is frequently used to put pressure on other 
stakeholders. In particular, allegations that are not fully investigated or not investigated 
at all are put into the public domain by ADOs. Such conduct should not be employed. It 
infringes on fundamental rights, leads to a waste of resources and undermines the 
credibility of the fight against doping. In the same way that WADA-accredited 
laboratories are bound by a duty of confidentiality, the same principle should apply to 
ADOs in respect of allegations. 
3.1.5. Other UCI rules 
 
The imposition of financial sanctions can have a deterrent effect both on riders and team 
personnel. The 2015 UCI ADR set out the financial consequences of an ADRV for riders, 
other persons exercising a professional activity in cycling, and teams. While the CIRC 
recognises that financial sanctions have to be proportionate, it recommends that UCI uses 
its full discretion in the context of financial sanctions.  
 
CIRC notes that Article 21.2.5 of the 2015 UCI ADR (dealing with roles and responsibilities 
of rider support personnel) provides that failure to cooperate with ADOs investigating 
ADRVs may form the basis for disciplinary action. In order to make the obligation to 
cooperate effective, UCI must utilise this rule and apply it to all persons involved in 
cycling. UCI should also educate participants on their obligation to cooperate, and the 
potential repercussions of failing to do so.  
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3.2. OPERATIONAL 
 
3.2.1. Testing and investigations 
 
3.2.1.1. Plan 
 
 Prevalence study: the CIRC recommends that prevalence studies of doping in 
different countries, teams, levels (including amateur) and disciplines, should be 
undertaken by UCI/CADF to establish the level of doping in those different 
populations; this would enable UCI to define better how to deploy resources and 
support an effective anti-doping strategy. All the statistical data from testing 
should be integrated into these studies. 
 
 Integrate intelligence/quantitative to qualitative testing: CADF should move 
to a qualitative rather than quantitative testing plan and collect and integrate all 
available information, including from the following sources: prevalence studies, 
information from whereabouts, ABP, information from other NADOs, laboratories 
and ADOs, in-the-field intelligence from doping collection, whistleblower 
information, information from results management, national authorities, testing 
records, scientific data, medical research information, imagery, open sources 
information and social media. In order to be able to process this information, CADF 
needs to recruit personnel with the requisite experience and technical skill. 
 
 CIRC recommends better coordination between ADOs to ensure that there is 
testing at all levels of competition.  
 
3.2.1.2. Conducting testing 
 
UCI/CADF should be aware that athletes are constantly adapting so that testing should 
accordingly adapt and be unpredictable at all times. The following issues should be taken 
into account: 
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 Window: the no testing window from 11pm to 6am helps riders who micro-dose 
to avoid being caught. The CIRC is conscious of the principle of proportionality but 
the absence of night time testing is a weakness of the current system and needs to 
be addressed. CADF should make more use of the exception contained in Article 
5.2 of the 2015 UCI ADR (“serious and specific suspicion that the Rider may be 
engaged in doping”) to test at night-time.  
 
 ADAMS notification: ADAMS should be adapted to process information gathered 
through the intelligence collection set out above. The CIRC recommends that 
software be adapted for processing this information. The CIRC has learned that 
developments to this end are already under way and encourages all stakeholders 
involved to speed up this process. Furthermore, all stakeholders are encouraged 
to gear up with resources in order to collect intelligence as per our earlier 
comment, populate the global database in a timely fashion and keep it current, and 
ensure quality information is delivered to ADAMS for the benefit of all. This 
intelligence, of course, would not be available to athletes, but would be made 
available to other NADOs.  
 
 Athletes should not be given timely information about their ABP results because 
this could be mis-used by athletes to adapt their behaviour (with an exception if 
some pathology is detected). For this reason, there should be a time lag between 
testing and the publishing of information on ADAMS. 
 
 Re-testing: re-testing should be an integral part of the testing programme. A 
coherent re-testing strategy should be developed that is systematic and regularly 
undertaken, with additional tests when new science is available, and well 
publicised. Retrospective sample testing is perhaps as great a disincentive to 
riders as today’s testing is, even more so for the more successful riders. A sample 
given by a rider should have a mandatory re-testing programme attached to it.    
 
 DCOs and sample collection: the selection of service providers for DCOs should 
be quality driven rather than cost driven, and based upon the professionalism, 
quality of training, and proven independence of their approach at events.   
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3.2.2. Independent whistleblower mechanism 
 
CIRC recommends that in order to encourage people to come forward with information, 
UCI should set up an independent whistleblower desk, where the processes and systems 
are fully outlined to a potential caller. Absolute confidentiality must be guaranteed. The 
whistleblower mechanism would deal with information related to all forms of corruption 
and cheating, including doping, outcome fixing, and technical cheating.  
 
UCI should ensure the risk of being ostracised or legal repercussions are minimised by 
providing structural support and help to people who come forward with material 
information. The attitude towards whistleblowers should be shifted to highlight the 
positive role they play in cleaning up cycling. 
 
3.2.3. Results management 
 
3.2.3.1. Non-analytical investigations 
 
At present, CADF concentrates solely on testing. There must also be a focus on non-
analytical means of establishing ADRVs. The CIRC recommends that intelligence-led 
testing and broader, non-analytical investigations should target individual riders and 
support staff when most likely to be engaged in doping activities, particularly in out-of-
competition time periods. 
 
3.2.3.2. Proactive use of substantial assistance 
 
UCI should proactively make full use of substantial assistance provisions (every athlete 
who is sanctioned should be approached to enquire whether he is interested in providing 
substantial assistance). 
 
3.2.4. Laboratories 
 
CIRC notes that incidents have arisen in the past where leaks from laboratories became 
the subject of media reports. Article 14.1.5 of the 2015 International Standard for 
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Laboratories imposes a duty of confidentiality on persons involved in the results 
management process, and a disciplinary process for failure to respect that duty. CIRC 
recommends that this rule be used to protect the integrity of the results management 
process. 
 
3.2.5. ABP 
 
CADF should review the process by which ABP cases are managed to ensure it is as 
efficient as possible. At present, the time from apparent violation to imposition of a 
sanction takes several years.  
 
3.2.6. Two-tier approach 
 
The CIRC considers that below the level of prohibited substances and methods, there are 
medical problems in the peloton that should be addressed. The use of substances, even if 
not prohibited, needs to be comprehensively investigated for medical but also anti-
doping purposes. For example, one medical expert told the CIRC of wide use of anti-
depressants in the peloton. This should be addressed first and foremost as a medical 
issue, irrespective of whether anti-depressants are prohibited in sport. Furthermore, this 
phenomenon should also be investigated from an anti-doping perspective, as it could be 
indicative of other prohibited substances being used to compensate their side-effects. In 
order to understand the full context of substances being taken, there needs to be this two-
tier approach. Medical information gathered in this way could have many uses, including 
being used to develop the Prohibited List. These two areas should be kept separate but 
information shared from the medical side to better understand and improve the anti-
doping side.  
 
3.2.7. Proportionality and consistency of sanctions 
 
Where there is a range of applicable sanctions, a NADO should apply the just and 
proportionate sanction, regardless of what the maximum sanction might be. The CIRC has 
observed that in a one well-known case, some athletes got a 6 months ban and another a 
lifetime ban for the exact same behaviour. Such disparity in sanction undermines 
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athletes’ confidence in the disciplinary system. To ensure equality, irrespective of an 
athlete’s resources and his ability to defend himself, NADOs should seek consistent and 
proportionate sanctions within the legal framework.  
 
3.2.8. Science 
 
3.2.8.1. Laboratories 
 
CIRC has noted that laboratories have different testing capacities. The way in which a 
laboratory is chosen is rarely based on capability but on other factors, including 
numerous subjective criteria, geography and cost. CIRC recommends that the strategy be 
enhanced to better take into account the different skills of laboratories and to ensure that 
any test that is sent to any laboratory will ultimately have the best available science 
applied to it, in the interests of transparent and best practice outcomes. 
  
3.2.8.2. ABP 
 
In order to address issues with the efficacy of the ABP, and with allegations that the ABP 
can be manipulated, CIRC recommends that more scientific research be carried out, 
including the effects of altitude and dehydration.  
 
3.2.8.3. Allocation of funding to research 
 
CIRC recommends that the process for allocating money to medical, scientific and 
technical research projects be enhanced in order to bring funded projects to fruition 
earlier. 
 
CIRC recommends that UCI/CADF allocate funds for academic research that benefits the 
cycling community and helps develop new approaches to anti-doping, for example by 
undertaking a cross-discipline study with other disciplines in the cycling family, to 
establish the core factors and drivers that differentiate or overlap regarding doping or 
non-doping issues; a study into the phenomenon of collective or group denial, to help 
prevent such issues as omerta taking hold again; a study across similar endurance sports 
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that identifies the common drivers, indicators, methods, approaches, factors and 
networks that cause doping in these sports; and a medical research paper on the value of 
starting ABP profiling earlier in riders’ careers, than it is doing at present. 
 
3.2.9. Pharmaceutical 
 
The CIRC recommends that Anti-doping entities and the pharmaceutical industry 
continue to develop close ties with a view to improving the traceability of medical 
substances used for illicit reasons in sport, and tightening up down-stream supply-chain 
systems with end-user providers such as pharmacies, hospitals and other distribution 
mechanisms. 
 
3.3. GOVERNANCE 
 
3.3.1. Election process 
 
CIRC recommends that UCI carry out a study on the election process to make it more 
transparent, democratic, representative and straightforward, perhaps to include voting 
rights for representatives of professional licence holders. CIRC considers that past 
elections for president were seriously flawed and lessons should be learned from those 
past mistakes.  
 
3.3.2. Checks and balances 
 
3.3.2.1. Finance/accountability 
 
The Commission considers that there should be better control and accountability for UCI 
in the form of its overarching management body, which has effective financial control 
over all actions, commissions and bodies of UCI. 
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3.3.2.2. Ethics Commission 
 
CIRC recommends that the Ethics Commission should be revamped to ensure it is 
independently appointed and that people who are cited are obliged to cooperate. The 
Ethics Commission should be proactive rather than reactive. Furthermore, the Ethics 
Commission’s mandate should not be linked to the president’s term in office, so that it 
cannot be dissolved immediately after an election.  
 
3.3.2.3. Management Committee 
 
CIRC recommends that Management Committee members should take a more active role 
and be accountable. CIRC also recommends that, unlike in the past, everything that occurs 
during committee meetings should be recorded in the minutes.  
 
3.3.3. Riders’ union 
 
CIRC recommends that UCI facilitate the creation of a strong riders’ union. The purpose 
of the union would be to give riders a collective voice, particularly on issues of ownership, 
revenue sharing, the racing calendar and anti-doping. The riders’ union should also be 
given a number of votes in Congress, so that riders have a say in how UCI is run. 
Membership could be linked to voting eligibility in the presidential elections. 
 
3.3.4. Anti-cheating 
 
CIRC recognises there are other forms of cheating that go beyond doping. CIRC 
recommends the UCI to investigate whether and to what extent lessons from the anti-
doping fight can be used to combat these new forms of cheating and how a collaborative 
approach could be taken for these other forms of cheating too, such as technical violations 
and outcome fixing. 
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3.3.5. Education 
 
The CIRC recommends using sanctioned riders as an educational tool. This should include 
interviews with the rider, appearances, lectures and recorded messages pointing out the 
impact of doping on their lives. The information should detail the social stigma, financial 
impact, health effects and self-esteem issues. UCI should be creative and make the 
education programme relevant to young athletes through the use of social media.  
 
3.4. CHANGES TO THE SPORT 
 
3.4.1. Former doped riders in the sport 
 
The most effective way of cleaning up the sport is to pursue individuals through 
investigations as soon as a suspicion is raised. UCI should make efforts to investigate 
those individuals that it believes were involved in doping in the past, observing the 
principles of due process, and make full use of the extended statute of limitations. The 
CIRC considers that the sanction system according to the WADA Code, which provides 
that the person sanctioned is prohibited from participating in sport in any capacity, is 
sufficient. The CIRC has taken note of Article 1.1.006.2 of the UCI Cycling Regulations, 
General Organisation of Cycling as a Sport (2014). In view of CAS jurisprudence in 
relation to the Osaka Rule,304 the CIRC wonders whether this rule is compatible with the 
WADA Code. Furthermore, the rule as it stands adds to further inequality in the sport, as 
it will target individuals in an arbitrary manner. The rule could only achieve its goal, from 
an equality and proportionality perspective, if every individual suspected of being 
involved in doping was investigated. Since this rule does not apply retroactively, it fails 
from the outset to control the participation of former doped riders in the sport. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
304 See CAS 2011/O/2422 United States Olympic Committee (USOC) v. International Olympic Committee 
(IOC); and CAS 2011/A/2658 British Olympic Association (BOA) v. World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). 
223 
 
3.4.2. TUEs 
 
CIRC recommends that more attention be paid to medical issues in the peloton to better 
understand how and when TUEs should be granted. Anonymous information collected on 
medical issues should be used as intelligence for anti-doping.  
 
3.4.3. Centralised pharmacy for short stage races 
 
CIRC recommends that UCI study the feasibility of requiring that any substances taken by 
riders during short stage races, including food supplements, be dispensed by a 
centralised pharmacy for the whole peloton.  
 
3.4.4. Equality in the field 
 
CIRC recommends that if competitions are devised in which teams of different tour levels 
are competing, that all teams are subject to the same level of testing, and always to the 
higher standard.  
 
3.4.5. Financial stability 
 
CIRC recommends that UCI take steps to address the lack of financial stability for teams 
and riders, which currently fosters an environment that pushes teams and riders to do all 
they can to achieve results. 
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ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
In the course of its investigation, CIRC spoke to 174 interviewees. Below is a list of those 
interviewees who agreed to their names being disclosed by the CIRC.  
I. UCI affiliated individuals 
1. Lucien Bailly 
2. Olivier Banuls 
3. Martin Bruin 
4. Alain Calvez 
5. Philippe Chevallier 
6. Brian Cookson 
7. Enrico Della Casa 
8. Arlette Dumas 
9. Simon Geinoz 
10. Martin Gibbs 
11. Anne Gripper 
12. Amina Lanaya  
13. Richard Leggat 
14. Dominique Leroux 
15. Anne-Laure Masson 
16. Pat McQuaid 
17. Roxane Rochat 
18. Francesca Rossi 
19. Dieter Schellenberg 
20. Sylvia Schenk 
21. Claude Schnegg 
22. Paul Scholten  
23. Jean-Pierre Strebel 
24. Caroline Thom 
25. Jorge Vazquez Monroy 
26. Philippe Verbiest 
27. Hein Verbruggen 
28. Pierre Zappelli 
29. Mario Zorzoli  
 
II. Sponsors 
1. François Migraine 
2. Robert Tansey  
 
III. Team personnel 
1. Marc Biver 
2. Eric Boyer 
3. Pedro Celaya 
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4. Alain Gallopin 
5. Bobby Julich 
6. Roger Palfreeman  
7. Bjarne Riis 
8. Bruno Roussel 
9. Iwan Speckenbrink 
10. Bob Stapleton 
11. Prentice Steffen 
12. Antoine Vayer 
13. Jonathan Vaughters 
14. Alexander Vinokourov 
15. Gerard Vroomen  
 
IV. Riders/former riders 
1. Lance Armstrong 
2. Carlos Barredo 
3. Michael Boogerd 
4. Nicole Cooke 
5. Chris Froome 
6. Tyler Hamilton 
7. Jörg Jaksche 
8. Scott Mercier  
9. Joe Papp 
10. Leonardo Piepoli 
11. Michael Rasmussen 
12. Riccardo Riccò 
13. Dan Stevens 
14. Andrei Tchmil 
15. Tammy Thomas 
16. Dietrich Thurau 
 
V. International/national federations 
1. Susan Ahern (IRB) 
2. Daniel Baal (former French Cycling Federation) 
3. Sally Clark (ICC) 
4. Shawn Farrell (USA Cycling) 
5. David Gullberg (Danish Cycling Union) 
6. David Lappartient (French Cycling Federation) 
7. Victoria Lesnikova (Russian Cycling Federation) 
8. Sarah Lewis (FIS) 
9. Greg Mathieu (Cycling Canada) 
10. Stuart Miller (ITF) 
11. Paolo Pavoni (Italian Cycling Federation) 
12. Thomas Peter (Swiss Cycling) 
13. Markus Pfisterer (Swiss Cycling) 
14. Jean Pitallier (former French Cycling Federation) 
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15. Huw Roberts (IAAF) 
16. Renato Di Rocco (Italian Cycling Federation)  
17. Gianluca Santilli (Italian Cycling Federation) 
18. Malcolm Speed (Australian Cycling Federation) 
19. Bob Stapleton (USA Cycling) 
20. Kevin Tabotta (Australian Cycling Federation) 
21. Melinda Tarant (Australian Cycling Federation) 
22. Thorward Veneberg (KNWU) 
23. Margo de Vries (KNWU) 
 
VI. Anti-doping organisations 
1. Rune Andersen (Anti-Doping Norway) 
2. Enrique Bastida Gomez (AEPSAD-Spain) 
3. Bill Bock (USADA) 
4. Pierre Bordry (former AFLD) 
5. Anne Cappelen (Anti-Doping Norway) 
6. Christina Friis Johansen (Anti-Doping Denmark) 
7. Fahmy Galant (SAIDS) 
8. Andrea Gotzmann (NADA Germany) 
9. Lone Hansen (Anti-Doping Denmark) 
10. David Howman (WADA) 
11. Matthias Kamber (Anti-doping Switzerland) 
12. Roger Legeay (MPCC) 
13. Lars Mortsiefer (NADA Germany) 
14. Pat Myhill (UKAD) 
15. Oliver Niggli (WADA) 
16. Dick Pound (WADA) 
17. Olivier Rabin (WADA) 
18. Herman Ram (Dopingautoriteit) 
19. Regina Reiser (NADA Germany) 
20. Jack Robertson (WADA) 
21. Anders Solheim (Anti-Doping Norway) 
22. Marco Steiner (Anti-doping Switzerland) 
23. Gry Støtvig (Anti-Doping Norway) 
24. Travis Tygart (USADA) 
25. Jean-Pierre Verdy (AFLD) 
 
VII. Third party doctors/scientists/laboratory personnel  
1. Michel Audran 
2. Christine Ayotte  
3. Simon Chadwick  
4. David Cowan  
5. Rasmus Damsgaard 
6. Charles Dauwe 
7. Alessandro Donati 
8. Hans Geyer 
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9. Nelson Khoo 
10. Christer Malm 
11. Patrice Mangin 
12. Yannis Pitsiladis  
13. Martial Saugy  
14. Wilhelm Schänzer 
15. Olaf Schumacher 
16. Mario Thevis  
 
VIII. Journalists  
1. Stéphane Mandard 
2. Mark Misérus 
3. Damien Ressiot 
4. Hans Vandeweghe 
5. David Walsh  
 
IX. Event organisers  
1. Patrice Clerc  
2. Angelo Zomegnan  
 
X. National law enforcement agencies/national governments  
1. Rafael Blanco  
2. Renzo Ferrante  
 
